Sarah Tytler - "Life of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen V.1."

Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne - "Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, v10"

Mary Godolphin - "Robinson Crusoe"

Anatole France - "Monsieur Bergeret a Paris"

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Book and Publishing News from Publishers Newswire(tm)

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PHILADELPHIA, Pa. -- The Philadelphia literary world will celebrate the launch of two new players today, April 10th: Kay Square Press, a new publishing company focused on Philadelphia-area artists, their stories, and their art; and Kay Square's first release, 'With the Rich and Mighty: Emlen Etting of Philadelphia' (ISBN: 978-0-9815129-0-7), a critical biography by Kenneth C. Kaleta.

FlatSigned Press Alleges Don Imus Remarks Damage Legacy of President Gerald R. Ford
NEW YORK, N.Y. -- Nathan Yungerberg, an accomplished model scout and professional child photographer is launching a nation-wide casting call to find the cover model for his highly anticipated book release, 'The Model Child: A Parents Guide to the Child Modeling Industry' (ISBN: 978-0-9817018-0-6).

Books: Literary and Philosophical Essays

V >> Various >> Literary and Philosophical Essays




For this reason a rational being must regard himself qua
intelligence (not from the side of his lower faculties) as belonging
not to the world of sense, but to that of understanding; hence he
has two points of view from which he can regard himself, and
recognise laws of the exercise of his faculties, and consequently of
all his actions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of sense,
he finds himself subject to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly,
as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which being
independent on nature have their foundation not in experience but in
reason alone.

As a rational being, and consequently belonging to the intelligible
world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will
otherwise than on condition of the idea of freedom. for independence
on the determining causes of the sensible world (an independence
which Reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom. Now the idea
of freedom is inseparably connected with the conception of autonomy,
and this again with the universal principle of morality which is
ideally the foundation of all actions of rational beings, just as
the law of nature is of all phenomena.

Now the suspicion is removed which we raised above, that there was a
latent circle involved in our reasoning from freedom to autonomy,
and from this to the moral law, viz.: that we laid down the idea of
freedom because of the moral law only that we might afterwards in
turn infer the latter from freedom and that consequently we could
assign no reason at all for this law, but could only [present]
[Footnote: The verb is wanting in the original.] it as a petitio
principii which well disposed minds would gladly concede to us, but
which we could never put forward as a provable proposition. For now
we see that when we conceive ourselves as free we transfer ourselves
into the--world of understanding as members of it, and recognise the
autonomy of the will with its consequence, morality; whereas, if we
conceive ourselves as under obligation we consider ourselves as
belonging to the world of sense, and at the same time to the world
of understanding.

How is a Categorical Imperative Possible?

Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging
to the world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient
cause belonging to that world that he calls his causality a will. On
the other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the
world of sense in which his actions which are mere appearances
[phenomena] of that causality are displayed; we cannot, however,
discern how they are possible from this causality which we do not
know; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the
sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena,
namely,--desires and inclinations. If therefore I were only a member
of the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly
conform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will; if I were
only a part of the world of sense they would necessarily be assumed
to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in
other words, to the heteronomy of nature. (The former would rest on
morality as the supreme principle, the latter on happiness.), Since,
however, the world of understanding contains the foundation of the
world of sense, and consequently of its laws alsof and accordingly
gives the law to my will (which belongs wholly to the world of
understanding) directly, and must be conceived as doing so, it
follows that, although on the one side I must regard myself as a
being belonging to the world of sense, yet on the other side I must
recognise myself as subject as an intelligence to the law of the
world of understanding, i. e., to reason, which contains this law in
the idea of freedom, and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the
will: consequently I must regard the laws of the world of
understanding as imperatives for me, and the actions which conform
to them as duties.

And thus what makes categorical imperatives possible is this, that
the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, in
consequence of which if I were nothing else all my actions would
always conform to the autonomy of the will; but as I at the same
time intuite myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought so
to conform, and this categorical "ought" implies a synthetic a
priori proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as affected by
sensible desires there is added further the idea of the same will
but as belonging to the world of the understanding, pure and
practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according
to Reason of the former will; precisely as to the intuitions of
sense there are added concepts of the understanding which of
themselves signify nothing but regular form in general, and in this
way synthetic a priori propositions become possible, on which all
knowledge of physical nature rests.

The practical use of common human reason confirms this reasoning.
There is no one, not even the most consummate villain, provided only
that he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we
set before him examples of tionesty of purposea of steadfastness in
following good maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even
combined with great sacrifices of advantages and comfort), does not
wish that he might also possess these qualities. Only on account of
his inclinations and impulses he cannot attain this in himself, but
at the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations which
are burdensome to himself. He proves by this that he transfers
himself in thought with a will free from the impulses of--the
sensibility into an order of things wholly different from that of
his desires in the field of the sensibility; since he cannot expect
to obtain by that wish any gratification of his desires, nor any
position which would satisfy any of his actual or supposable
inclinations (for this would destroy the pre-eminence of the very
idea which wrests that wish from him): he can only expect a greater
intrinsic worth of his own person. This better person, however, he
imagines himself to be when he transfers himself to the point of
view of a member of the world of the understanding, to which he is
involuntarily forced by the idea of freedom, i. e., of independence
on determining causes of the world of sense; and from this point of
view he is conscious of a good will, which by his own confession
constitutes the law for the bad will that he possesses as a member
of the world of sense-a law whose authority he recognises while
transgressing it. What he morally "ought" is then what he
necessarily "would" as a member of the world of the understanding,
and is conceived by him as an "ought" only inasmuch as he likewise
considers himself as a member of the world of sense.

On the Extreme Limits of all Practical Philosophy

All men attribute to themselves freedom of will. Hence come all
judgments upon actions as being such as ought to have been done,
although they have not been done. However, this freedom is not a
conception of experience, nor can it be so, since it still remains,
even though experience shows the contrary of what on supposition of
freedom are conceived as its necessary consequences. On the other
side it is equally necessary that everything that takes place should
be fixedly determined according to laws of nature. This necessity of
nature is likewise tot an empirical conception, just for this
reason, that it involves the motion of necessity and consequently of
a priori cognition. But this conception of a system of nature is
confirmed by experience, and it must even be inevitably presupposed
if experience itself is to be possible, that is, a connected
knowledge of the objects of sense resting on general laws. Therefore
freedom is only an Idea [Ideal Conception] of Reason, and its
objective reality in itself is doubtful, while nature is a concept
of the understanding which proves, and must necessarily prove, its
reality in examples of experience.

There arises from this a dialectic of Reason, since the freedom
attributed to the will appears to contradict the necessity of
nature, and placed between these two ways Reason for speculative
purposes finds the road of physical necessity much more beaten and
more appropriate than that of freedom; yet for practical purposes
the narrow footpath of freedom is the only one on which it is
possible to make use of reason in our conduct; hence it is just as
impossible for the subtlest philosophy as for the commonest reason
of men to argue away freedom. Philosophy must then assume that no
real contradiction will be found between freedom and physical
necessity of the same human actions, for it cannot give up the
conception of nature any more than that of freedom.

Nevertheless, even though we should never be able to comprehend how
freedom is possible, we must at least remove this apparent
contradiction in a convincing manner. For if the thought of freedom
contradicts either itself or nature, which is equally necessary, it
must in competition with physical necessity be entirely given up.

It would, however, be impossible to escape this contradiction if the
thinking subject, which seems to itself free, conceived itself in
the same sense or in the very same relation when it calls itself
free as when in respect of the same action it assumes itself to be
subject to the law of nature. Hence it is an indispensable problem
of speculative philosophy to show that its illusion respecting the
contradiction rests on this, that we think of man in a different
sense and relation when we call him free, and when we regard him as
subject to the laws of nature as being part and parcel of nature. It
must, therefore, show that not only can both these very well co-
exist, but that both must be thought as necessarily united in the
same subject, since otherwise no reason could be given why we should
burden reason with an idea which, though it may possibly without
contradiction be reconciled with another that is sufficiently
established, yet entangles us in a perplexity which sorely
embarrasses Reason in its theoretic employment. This duty, however,
belongs only to speculative philosophy, in order that it may clear
the way for practical philosophy. The philosopher then has no option
whether he will remove the apparent contradiction or leave it
untouched; for in fhe latter case the theory respecting this would
be bonum vacans into the possession of which the fatalist would have
a right to enter, and chase all morality out of its supposed domain
as occupying it without title.

We cannot, however, as yet say that we are touching the bounds of
practical philosophy. For the settlement of that controversy does
not belong to it; it only demands from speculative reason $hat it
should put an end to the discord in which it entangles itself in
theoretical questions, so that practical reason may have rest and
security from external attacks which might make the ground debatable
on which it desires to build.

The claims to freedom of will made even by common reason are founded
on the consciousness and the admitted supposition that reason is
independent on merely subjectively determined causes which together
Constitute what belongs to sensation only, and which consequently
come under the general designation of sensibility. Man considering
himself in this way as an intelligence, places himself thereby in a
different order of things and in a relation to determining grounds
of a wholly different kind when on the one hand he thinks of himself
as an intelligence endowed with a will, and consequently with
causality, and when on the other he perceives himself as a
phenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is also), and affirms
that his causality is subject to external determination according to
laws of nature. [Footnote: The punctuation of the original gives the
following sense: "Submits his causality, as regards its external
determination, to laws of nature." have ventured to make what
appears to be a necessary correction, by simply removing a comma.]
Now he soon becomes aware that both can hold good, nay, must hold
good at the same time. For there is not the smallest contradiction
in saying that a thing in appearance (belonging to the world of
sense) is subject to certain laws, on which the very same as a thing
or being in itself is independent; and that he must conceive and
think of himself in this twofold way, rests as to the first on the
consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses,
and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an
intelligence, i. e., as independent on sensible impressions in the
employment of his reason (in other words as belonging to the world
of understanding).

Hence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will
which takes no account of anything that comes under the head of
desires and inclinations, and on the contrary conceives actions as
possible to him, nay, even as necessary, which can only be done by
disregarding all desires and sensible inclinations. The causality of
such actions [Footnote: M. Barni translates as if he read desselben
instead of derselben, "the causality of this will." So also Mr.
Semple.] lies in him as an intelligence and in the laws of effects
and actions [which depend] on the principles of an intelligible
world, of which indeed he knows nothing more than that in it pure
reason alone independent on sensibility gives the law; moreover
since it is only in that world, as an intelligence, that he is his
proper self (being as man only the appearance of himself) those laws
apply to him directly and categorically, so that the incitements of
inclinations and appetites (in other words the whole nature of the
world of sense) cannot impair the laws of his volition as an
intelligence. Nay, he does not even hold himself responsible for the
former or ascribe them to his proper self, i. e., his will: he only
ascribes to his will any indulgence which he might yield them if he
allowed them to influence his maxims to the prejudice of the
rational laws of the will.

When practical Reason thinks itself into a world of understanding it
does not thereby transcend its own limits, as it would if it tried
to enter it by intuition or sensation. The former is only a negative
thought in respect of the world of sense, which does not give any
laws to reason in determining the will, and is positive only in this
single point that this freedom as a negative characteristic is at
the same time conjoined with a (positive) faculty and even with a
causality of reason, which we designate a will, namely, a faculty of
so acting that the principle of the actions shall conform to the
essential character of a rational motive, i. e., the condition that
the maxim have universal validity as a law. But were it to borrow an
object of will, that is, a motive, from the world of understanding,
then it would overstep its bounds and pretend to be acquainted with
something of which it knows nothing. The conception of a world of
the understanding is then only a point of view which Reason finds
itself compelled to take outside the appearances in order to
conceive itself as practical, which would not be possible if the
influences of the sensibility had a determining power on man, but
which is necessary unless he is to be denied the consciousness of
himself as an intelligence, and consequently as a rational cause,
energizing by reason, that is, operating freely. This thought
certainly involves the idea of an order and a system of laws
different from that of the mechanism of nature which belongs to the
sensible world, and it makes the conception of an intelligible world
necessary (that is to say, the whole system of rational beings as
things in themselves). But it does not in the least authorize us to
think of it further than as to its formal condition only, that is,
the universality of the maxims of the will as laws, and consequently
the autonomy of the latter, which alone is consistent with its
freedom; whereas, on the contrary, all laws that refer to a definite
object give heteronomy, which only belongs to laws of nature, and
can only apply to the sensible world.

But Reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain
how pure reason can be practical, which would be exactly the same
problem as to explain how freedom is possible.

For we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws, the
object of which can be given in some possible experience. But
freedom is a mere Idea [Ideal Conception], the objective reality of
which can in no wise be shown according to laws of nature, and
consequently not in any possible experience; and for this reason it
can never be comprehended or understood, because we cannot support
it by any sort of example or analogy. It holds good only as a
necessary hypothesis of reason in a being that believes itself
conscious of a will, that is, of a faculty distinct from mere desire
(namely, a faculty of determining itself to action as an
intelligence), in other words, by laws of reason independently on
natural instincts. Now where determination according to laws of
nature ceases, there all explanation ceases also, and nothing
remains but defence, i. e. the removal of the objections of those
who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of things, and
thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible. We can only point out
to them that the supposed contradiction that they have discovered in
it arises only from this, that in order to be able to apply the law
of nature to human actions, they must necessarily consider man as an
appearance: then when we demand of them that they should also think
of him qua intelligence as a thing in itself, they still persist in
considering him in this respect also as an appearance. In this view
it would no doubt be a contradiction to suppose the causality of the
same subject (that is, his will) to be withdrawn from all the
natural laws of the sensible world. But this contradiction
disappears, if they would only bethink themselves and admit, as is
reasonable, that behind the appearances there must also lie at their
root (although hidden) the things in themselves, and that we cannot
expect the laws of these to be the same as those that govern their
appearances.

The subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will
is identical with the impossibility of discovering and explaining an
interest [Footnote: Interest is that by which reason becomes
practical, i. e., a cause determining the will. Hence we say of
rational beings only that they take an interest in a thing;
irrational beings only feel sensual appetites. Reason takes a direct
interest in action then only when the universal validity of its
maxims is alone sufficient to determine the will. Such an interest
alone is pure. But if it can determine the will only by means of
another object of desire or on the suggestion of a particular
feeling of the subject, then Reason takes only an indirect interest
in the action, and as Reason by itself without experience cannot
discover either objects of the will or a Special feeling actuating
it, this latter interest would only be empirical, and not a pure
rational interest. The logical interest of Reason (namely, to extend
its insight) is never direct, but presupposes purposes for which
reason is employed.] which man can take in the moral law.
Nevertheless he does actually take an interest in it, the basis of
which in us we call the moral feeling, which some have falsely
assigned as the standard of our moral judgment, whereas it must
rather be viewed as the subjective effect that the law exercises on
the will, the objective principle of which is furnished by Reason
alone.

In order indeed that a rational being who is also affected through
the senses should will what Reason alone directs such beings that
they ought to will, it is no doubt requisite that reason should have
a power to infuse a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the
fulfilment of duty, that is to say, that it should have a causality
by which it determines the sensibility according to its own
principles. But it is quite impossible to discern, i. e., to make it
intelligible a priori, how a mere thought, which itself contains
nothing sensible, can itself produce a sensation of pleasure or
pain; for this is a particular kind of causality of which as of
every other causality we can determine nothing whatever a priori, we
must only consult experience about it. But as this cannot supply us
with any relation of cause and effect except between two objects of
experience, whereas in this case, although indeed the effect
produced lies within experience, yet the cause is supposed to be
pure reason acting through mere ideas which offer no object to
experience, it follows that for us men it is quite impossible to
explain how and why the universality of the maxim as a law, that is,
morality, interests. This only is certain, that it is not because it
interests us that it has validity for us (for that would be
heteronomy and dependence of practical reason on sensibility,
namely, on a feeling as its principle, in which case it could never
give moral laws), but that it interests us because it is valid for
us as men, inasmuch as it had its source in our will as
intelligences, in other words in our proper self, and what belongs
to mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the
nature of the thing in itself.

The question then: How a categorical imperative is possible can be
answered to this extent that we can assign the only hypothesis on
which it is possible, namely, the idea of freedom; and we can also
discern the necessity of this hypothesis, and this is sufficient for
the practical exercise of reason, that is, for the conviction of the
validity of this imperative, and hence of the moral law; but how
this hypothesis itself is possible can never be discerned by any
human reason. On the hypothesis, however, that the will of an
intelligence is free, its autonomy, as the essential formal
condition of its determination, is a necessary consequence.
Moreover, this freedom of will is not merely quite possible as a
hypothesis (not involving any contradiction to the principle of
physical necessity in the connexion of the phenomena of the sensible
world) as speculative philosophy can show: but further, a rational
being who is conscious of a causality [Footnote: Reading "einer" for
"seiner."] through reason, that is to say, of a will (distinct from
desires), must of necessity make it practically, that is, in idea,
the condition of all his voluntary actions. But to explain how pure
reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of
action that could be derived from any other source, i. e. how the
mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws
(which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason) can
of itself supply a spring, without any matter (object) of the will
in which one could antecedently take any interest; and how it can
produce an interest which would be called purely moral; or in other
words, how pure reason can be practical--to explain this is beyond
the power of human reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking
an explanation of it are lost.

It is just the same as if I sought to find out how freedom itself is
possible as the causality of a will. For then I quit the ground of
philosophical explanation, and I have no other to go upon. I might
indeed revel in the world of intelligences which still remains to
me, but although I have an idea of it which is well founded, yet I
have not the least knowledge of it, nor can I ever attain to such
knowledge with all the efforts of my natural faculty of reason. It
signifies only a something that remains over when I have eliminated
everything belonging to the world of sense from the actuating
principles of my will, serving merely to keep in bounds the
principle of motives taken from the field of sensibility; fixing its
limits and showing that it does not contain all in all within
itself, but that there is more beyond it; but this something more I
know no further. Of pure reason which frames this ideal, there
remains after the abstraction of all matter, i. e., knowledge of
objects, nothing but the form, namely, the practical law of the
universality of the maxims, and in conformity with this the
conception of reason in reference to a pure world of understanding
as a possible efficient cause, that is a cause determining the will.
There must here be a total absence of springs; unless this idea of
an intelligible world is itself the spring, or that in which reason
primarily takes an interest; but to make this intelligible is
precisely the problem that we cannot solve.

Here now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry, and it is of
great importance to determine it even on this account, in order that
reason may not on the one hand, to the prejudice of morals, seek
about in the world of sense for the supreme motive and an interest
comprehensible but empirical; and on the other hand, that it may not
impotently flap its wings without being able to move in the (for it)
empty space of transcendent concepts which we call the intelligible
world, and so lose itself amidst chimeras. For the rest, the idea of
a pure world of understanding as a system of all intelligences, and
to which we ourselves as tational beings belong (although we are
likewise on the other side members of the sensible world), this
remains always a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes of
rational belief, although all knowledge stops at its threshold,
useful, namely, to produce in us a lively interest in the moral law
by means of the noble ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in
themselves (rational beings), to which we can belong as members then
only when we carefully conduct ourselves according to the maxims of
freedom as if they were laws of nature.