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6 Marracc. ubi sup. p. 75. 7 Al Shahrest. ubi sup. p. 220.
8 Poc. Spec. p. 221 9 Marracc. ubi sup.
10 Idem, ibid. 1 Al Shahrest. 2 Al Firauzab. Vide Poc.
Spec. p. 231, 232, and 214.
3 Al Shahrest. Vide Poc. Spec. p. 235 and 240, &c. 4 Vide Poc. ibid.
p. 238. 5 Al Motarrezi, al Shahrest. Vide ibid. p. 232.
6 Idem, &c. ibid. 7 Idem, ibid.

for they (at least the generality of them) ascribe men's good deeds to GOD,
but their evil deeds to themselves; meaning thereby that man has a free
liberty and power to do either good or evil, and is master of his actions; and
for this reason it is that the other Mohammedans call them Magians, because
they assert another author of actions besides GOD.8 And, indeed, it is a
difficult matter to say what Mohammed's own opinion was in this matter; for on
the one side the Korân itself is pretty plain for absolute predestination, and
many sayings of Mohammed are recorded to that purpose,9 and one in particular,
wherein he introduces Adam and Moses disputing before GOD in this manner:
"Thou," says Moses, "art Adam; whom GOD created, and animated with the breath
of life, and caused to be worshipped by the angels, and placed in paradise,
from whence mankind have been expelled for thy fault:" whereto Adam answered,
"Thou art Moses; whom GOD chose for his apostle, and entrusted with his word,
by giving thee the tables of the law, and whom he vouchsafed to admit to
discourse with himself: how many years dost thou find the law was written
before I was created?" Says Moses, "Forty." "And dost thou not find," replied
Adam, "these words therein: 'And Adam rebelled against his Lord and
transgressed'?" which Moses confessing, "Dost thou therefore blame me,"
continued he, "for doing that which GOD wrote of me that I should do forty
years before I was created? nay, for what was decreed concerning me fifty
thousand years before the creation of heaven and earth?" In the conclusion of
which dispute Mohammed declared that Adam had the better of Moses.1 On the
other side, it is urged in the behalf of the Mótazalites, that Mohammed
declaring that the Kadarians and Morgians had been cursed by the tongues of
seventy prophets, and being asked who the Kadarians were, answered, "Those who
assert that GOD predestinated them to be guilty of rebellion, and yet punishes
them for it:" al Hasan is also said to have declared, that GOD sent Mohammed
to the Arabs while they were Kadarians, or Jabarians, and laid their sins upon
GOD: and to confirm the matter, this sentence of the Korân is quoted:2 "When
they commit a filthy action, they say, We found our fathers practising the
same, and GOD hath commanded us so to do: Say, Verily GOD commandeth not
filthy actions."3
11. The Sefâtians held the opposite opinion to the Mótazalites in respect
to the eternal attributes of GOD, which they affirmed; making no distinction
between the essential attributes and those of operation: and hence they were
named Sefâtians, or Attributists. Their doctrine was that of the first
Mohammedans, who were not yet acquainted with these nice distinctions: but
this sect afterwards introduced another species of declarative attributes, or
such as were necessarily used in historical narration, as hands, face, eyes,
&c., which they did not offer to explain, but contented themselves with saying
they were in the law, and that they called them declarative attributes.4
However, at length, by giving various explications and interpretations of
these attributes they divided into many different opinions: some, by taking
the words

8 Vide Poc. ibid. p. 233, &c. 9 Vide ibid. p. 237. 1 Ebn
al Athîr, al Bokhari, apud Poc. p. 236.
2 Cap. 7, p. 107. 3 Al Motarrezi, apud eund. p. 237, 238.
4 Al Shahrest. apud Poc. Spec. p. 223.

in the literal sense, fell into the notion of a likeness or similitude between
GOD and created beings; to which it is said the karaïtes among the Jews, who
are for the literal interpretation of Moses's law, had shown them the way:5
others explained them in another manner, saying that no creature was like GOD,
but that they neither understood nor thought i necessary to explain the
precise signification of the words which seem to affirm the same of both; it
being sufficient to believe that GOD hath no companion or similitude. Of this
opinion was Malec Ebn Ans, who declared as to the expression of GOD'S sitting
on his throne, in particular, that though the meaning is known, yet the manner
is unknown; and that it is necessary to believe it, but heresy to make any
questions about it.1
The sects of the Sefâtians are:
I. The Ashárians, the followers of Abu'l Hasan al Ashári, who was first a
Mótazalite, and the scholar of Abu Ali al Jobbâï, but disagreeing from his
master in opinion as to GOD'S being bound (as the Mótazalites assert) to do
always that which is best or most expedient, left him, and set up a new sect
of himself. The occasion of this difference was the putting a case concerning
three brothers, the first of whom lived in obedience to GOD, the second in
rebellion against him, and the third died an infant. Al Jobbâi being asked
what he thought would become of them, answered, that the first would be
rewarded in paradise, the second punished in hell, and the third neither
rewarded nor punished: "But what," objected al Ashári, "if the third say, O
LORD, if thou hadst given me longer life, that I might have entered paradise
with my believing brother, it would have been better for me?" to which al
Jobbâï replied, "That GOD would answer, I knew that if thou hadst lived
longer, thou wouldst have been a wicked person, and therefore cast into hell."
"Then," retorted al Ashári, "the second will say, O LORD, why didst thou not
take me away while I was an infant, as thou didst my brother, that I might not
have deserved to be punished for my sins, nor to be cast into hell?" To which
al Jobbâï could return no other answer than that GOD prolonged his life to
give him an opportunity of obtaining the highest degree of perfection, which
was best for him: but al Ashári demanding farther, why he did not for the same
reason grant the other a longer life, to whom it would have been equally
advantageous, al Jobbâï was so put to it, that he asked whether the devil
possessed him? "No," says al Ashári, "but the master's ass will not pass the
bridge;"2 i.e., he is posed.
The opinions of the Ashárians were-I. That they allowed the attributes of
GOD to be distinct from his essence, yet so as to forbid any comparison to be
made between GOD and his creatures.3 This was also the opinion of Ahmed Ebn
Hanbal, and David al Ispahâni, and others, who herein followed Malec Ebn Ans,
and were so cautious of any assimilation of GOD to created beings, that they
declared whoever moved his hand while he read these words, "I have created
with my hand," or "stretched forth his finger," in repeating this saying of
Mohammed, "The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the

5 Vide Poc. ibid. p. 224. 1 Vide eund. ibid. 2 Auctor al
Mawâkef, et al Safadi, apud Poc. ubi sup. p. 230, &c. Ebn Khalec. in Vita al
Jabbâï. 3 Al Shahrest. apud Poc. Spec. p. 230.

Merciful," ought to have his hand and finger cut off;1 and the reasons they
gave for not explaining any such words were, that it is forbidden in the
Korân, and that such explications were necessarily founded on conjecture and
opinion, from which no man ought to speak of the attributes of GOD, because
the words of the Korân might by that means come to be understood differently
form the author's meaning: nay, some have been so superstitiously scrupulous
in this matter as not to allow the words hand, face, and the like, when they
occur in the Korân, to be rendered into Persian or any other language, but
require them to be read in the very original words, and this they call the
safe way.2 2. As to predestination, they held that GOD hath one eternal will
which is applied to whatsoever he willeth, both of his own actions and, those
of men, so far as they are created by him, but not as they are acquired or
gained by them; that he willeth both their good and their evil, their profit
and their hurt, and as he willeth and knoweth, he willeth concerning men that
which he knoweth, and hath commanded the pen to write the same in the
preserved table: and this is his decree, and eternal immutable counsel and
purpose.3 They also went so far as to say, that it may be agreeable to the
way of GOD that man should be commanded what he is not able to perform.4 But
while they allow man some power, they seem to restrain it to such a power as
cannot produce anything new; only GOD, say they, so orders his providence that
he creates, after, or under, and together with every created or new power, an
action which is ready whenever a man will sit, and sets about it: and this
action is called Casb, i.e., Acquisition, being in respect to its creation,
from GOD, but in respect to its being produced, employed, and acquired, from
man.5 And this being generally esteemed the orthodox opinion, it may not be
improper farther to explain the same in the words of some other writers. The
elective actions of men, says one, fall under the power of GOD alone; nor is
their own power effectual thereto; but GOD causeth to exist in man power and
choice; and if there be no impediment, he causeth his action to exist also,
subject to his power, and joined with that and his choice; which action, as
created, is to be ascribed to GOD, but as produced, employed, or acquired, to
man. So that by the acquisition of an action is properly meant a man's
joining or connecting the same with his power and will, yet allowing herein no
impression or influence on the existence thereof, save only that it is subject
to his power.1 Others, however, who are also on the side of al Ashári, and
reputed orthodox, explain the matter in a different manner, and grant the
impression or influence of the created power of man on his action, and that
this power is what is called Acquisition.2 But the point will be still
clearer if we hear a third author, who rehearses the various opinions, or
explications of the opinion of this sect, in the following words, viz.: Abu'l
Hasan al Ashári asserts all the actions of men to be subject to the power of
GOD, being created by him, and that the power of man hath no influence at all
on that which he is empowered to do; but that both the power, and what is
subject thereto, fall under the power of GOD:

1 Idem, apud eund. p. 228, &c. 2 Vide Poc. ibid.
3 Al Shahrest. apud eund. p. 245, &c.
4 Idem, ibid. p. 246. 5 Al Shahrest. apud Poc. p. 245, &c.
1 Auctor Sharh al Mawâkef, apud eund. p. 247.
2 Al Shahrest. ibid. p. 248.

al Kâdi Abu Becr says that the essence or substance of the action is the
effect of the power of GOD, but its being either an action of obedience, as
prayer, or an action of disobedience, as fornication, are qualities of the
action, which proceed from the power of man: Abd'almalec, known by the title
of Imâm al Haramein, Abu'l Hosein of Basra, and other learned men, held that
the actions of men are effected by the power which GOD hath created in man,
and that GOD causeth to exist in man both power and will, and that this power
and will do necessarily produce that which man is empowered to do: and Abu
Ishâk al Isfarâyeni taught that that which maketh impression, or hath
influence on an action, is a compound of the power of GOD and the power of
man.3 The same author observes that their ancestors, perceiving a manifest
difference between those things which are the effects of the election of man
and those things which are the necessary effects of inanimate agents,
destitute both of knowledge and choice, and being at the same time pressed by
the arguments which prove that GOD is the Creator of all things, and
consequently of those things which are done by men, to conciliate the matter,
chose the middle way, asserting actions to proceed from the power of GOD, and
the acquisition of man; GOD'S way of dealing with his servants being, that
when man intendeth obedience, GOD createth in him an action of obedience, and
when he intendeth disobedience, he createth in him an action of disobedience;
so that man seemeth to be the effective producer of his action, though he
really be not.1 But this, proceeds the same writer, is again pressed with its
difficulties, because the very intention of the mind is the work of GOD, so
that no oman hath any share in the production of his own actions; for which
reason the ancients disapproved of too nice an inquiry into this point, the
end of the dispute concerning the same being, for the most part, either the
taking away of all precepts positive as well as negative, or else the
associating of a companion with GOD, by introducing some other independent
agent besides him. Those, therefore, who would speak more accurately, use
this form: there is neither compulsion nor free liberty, but the way lies
between the two; the power and will in man being both created by GOD, though
the merit or guilt be imputed unto man. Yet, after all, it is judged the
safest way to follow the steps of the primitive Moslems, and, avoiding subtle
disputations and too curious inquiries, to leave the knowledge of this matter
wholly unto GOD.2 3. As to mortal sin, the Ashárians

3 Auctor Sharh al Tawâlea, apud eund. ibid. p. 248, &c. 1 Idem,
ibid. p. 249, 250.
2 Idem, ibid. p. 250, 251. I trust the reader will not be offended if, as
a farther illustration of what has been said on this subject (in producing of
which I have purposely kept to the original Mohammedan expressions) I
transcribe a passage or two from a postscript subjoined to the epistle I have
quoted above (§4, p. 85), in which the point of free will is treated ex
professo. Therein the Moorish author, having mentioned the two opposite
opinions of the Kadarians, who allow free will, and the Jabarians, who make
man a necessary agent (the former of which opinions, he says, seems to
approach nearest to that of the greater part of Christians and of the Jews),
declares the true opinion to be that of the Sonnites, who assert that man hath
power and will to choose good and evil, and can moreover know he shall be
rewarded if he do well, and shall be punished if he do ill; but that he
depends, notwithstanding, on GOD'S power, and shall be punished if he do ill;
but that he depends, notwithstanding, on GOD'S power, and willeth, if GOD
willeth, but not otherwise. Then he proceeds briefly to refute the two
extreme opinions, and first to prove that of the Kadarians, though it be
agreeable to GOD'S justice, inconsistent with his attributes of wisdom and
power: "Sapientia enim Dei," says he, "comprehendit quicquid fuit et futurum
est ab æternitate in finem usque mundi et postea. Et ita novit ab æterno
omnia opera creaturarum, sive bona, sive mala, quæ fuerint creata cum potentia
Dei, et ejus libera et determinate voluntate, sicut ipsi visum fuit. Denique
novit eum qui futurus

taught, that if a believer guilty of such sin die without repentance, his
sentence is to be left with GOD, whether he pardon him out of mercy, or
whether the prophet intercede for him (according to that saying recorded of
him, "My intercession shall be employed for those among my people who shall
have been guilty of grievous crimes"), or whether he punish him in proportion
to his demerit, and afterwards, through his mercy, admit him into paradise:
but that it is not to be supposed he will remain for ever in hell with the
infidels, seeing it is declared that whoever shall have faith in his heart but
of the weight of an ant, shall be delivered from hell fire.1 And this is
generally received for the orthodox doctrine in this point, and is
diametrically opposite to that of the Mótazalites.
These were the more rational Sefâtians, but the ignorant part of them, not
knowing how otherwise to explain the expressions of the Korân relating to the
declarative attributes, fell into most gross and

erat malus, et tamen creavit: neque negari potest quin, si ipsi libuisset,
potuisset omnes creare bonos: placuit tamen Deo creare bonos et malos, cùm Deo
soli sit absoluta et libera voluntas, et perfecta electio, et non homini. Ita
enim Salomon in suis proverbiis dixit. Vitam et mortem, bonum et malum,
divitias et paupertatem, esse et venire à Deo. Christiani etiam dicunt S.
Paulum dixisse in suis epistolis; Dicet etiam lutum figulo, quare facis unum
vas ad honorem, et aliud vas ad contumeliam? Cum igitur miser homo fuerit
creatus à voluntate Dei et potentia, nihil aliud potest tribui ipsi quàm ipse
sensus cognoscendi et sentiendi an bene vel male faciat. Quæ unica causa (id
est, sensus cognoscendi) erit ejus gloriæ vel ponæ causa: per talem enim
sensum novit quid boni vel mali adversus Dei præcepta fecerit." The opinion
of the Jabarians, on the other hand, he rejects as contrary to man's
consciousness of his own power and choice, and inconsistent with GOD'S
justice, and his having given mankind laws, to the observing or transgressing
of which he was annexed rewards and punishments. After this he proceeds to
explain the third opinion in the following words: "Tertia opinio Zunis (i.e.,
Sonnitarum) quæ vera est, affirmat homini potesttatem esse, sed limitatem à
sua causa, id est, dependentem à Dei potentia et voluntate, et proper illam
cognitionem qua deliberat benè vel malè facere, esse dignum pona vel præmio.
Manifestum est in æternitate non fuisse aliam potentiam præter Dei nostri
omnipotentis, e cujus potentia pendebant omnia possibilia, id est, quæ
poterant esse, cum ab ipso fuerint creata. Sapientia verò Dei novit etiam quæ
non sunt futura; et potentia ejus, etsi non creaverit ea, potuit tamen, si ita
Deo placuisset. Ita novit sapientia Dei quæ erant impossibilia, id est, quæ
non poterant esse; quæ tamen nullo pacto pendent ab ejus potentia: ab ejus
enim potentia mulla pendent nisi possibilia.-Dicimus enim à Dei potentia non
pendere creare Deum alium ipsi similem, nec creare aliquid quod moveatur et
quiescat simul eodem tempore, cùm hæc sint ex impossibilibus: comprehendit
tamen suâ sapientiâ tale aliquid non pendere ab ejus potentiâ.-A potentiâ
igitur Dei pendet solùm quod potest esse, et possibile est esse; quæ semper
parata est dare esse possibilibus. Et si hoc penitus cognoscamus,cognoscemus
pariter omne quod est, seu futurum est, sive sint opera nostra, sive quidvis
aliud, pendere à sola potentia Dei. Et hoc non privatim intelligitur, sed in
genere de omni eo quod est et movetur, sive in colis sive in terrâ; et nec
aliquâ potentiâ potest impediri Dei potentia, cùm nulla alia potentia absoluta
sit, præter Dei; potentia verò nostra non est à se, nisi à Dei potentia: et
cum potentia nostra dicitur esse a causa sua, ideo dicimus potentiam nostram
esse straminis comparatam cum potentia Dei: eo enim modo quo stramen movetur à
motu maris, ita nostra potentia et voluntas à Dei potentia. Itaque Dei
potentia semper est parata etiam ad occidendum aliquem; ut si quis hominem
occidat, non dicimus potentiâ hominis id factum, sed æterna potentia Dei:
error enim est id tribuere potentiæ hominis. Potentia enim Dei, cùm semper
sit parata, et ante ipsum hominem, ad occidendum; si solâ hominis potentiâ id
factum esse diceremus, et moreretur, potentia sanè Dei (quæ antè erat) jam ibi
esset frustra: quia post mortem non potest potentia Dei eum iterum occidere;
ex quo sequeretur potentiam Dei impediri à potentia hominis, et potentiam
hominis anteire et antecellere potentiam Dei; quod est absurdum et
impossibile. Igitur Deus est qui operatur æternâ suâ potentiâ: si verò homini
injiciatur culpa, sive in tali homicidio, sive in aliis, hoc est quantùm ad
præcepta et legem. Homini tribuitur solùm opus externè, et ejus electio, quæ
est a voluntate ejus et potentia; non verò internè.-Hoc est punctum illud
indivisibile et secretum, quod à paucissimis capitur, ut sapientissimus Sidi
Abo Hamet Elgaceli (i.e., Dominus Abu Hâmed al Ghazâli) affirmat (cujus
spiritui Deus concedat gloriam, Amen!) Sequentibus verbis: Ita abditum et
profundum et abstrusum est intelligere punctum illud Liberi Arbitrii, ut neque
characteres ad scribendum, neque ullæ rationes ad exprimendum sufficiant, et
omnes, quotquot de hac re locuti sunt, hæserunt confusi in ripa tanti et tam
spaciosi maris."
1 Al Shahrest. apud Poc. Spec. p. 258.

absurd opinions, making GOD corporeal, and like created beings.2 Such were-
2. The Moshabbehites, or Assimilators; who allowed a resemblance between
GOD and his creatures,3 supposing him to be a figure composed of members or
parts, either spiritual or corporeal, and capable of local motion, of ascent
and descent, &c.1 Some of this sect inclined to the opinion of the Holûlians,
who believed that the divine nature might be united with the human in the same
person; for they granted it possible that GOD might appear in a human form, as
Gabriel did: and to confirm their opinion they allege Mohammed's words, that
he saw his LORD in a most beautiful form, and Moses talking with GOD face to
face.2 And
3. The Kerâmians, or followers of Mohammed Ebn Kerâm, called also
Mojassemians, or Corporalists; who not only admitted a resemblance between GOD
and created beings, but declared GOD to be corporeal.3 The more sober among
them, indeed, when they applied the word body to GOD, would be understood to
mean, that he is a self-subsisting being, which with them is the definition of
body: but yet some of them affirmed him to be finite, and circumscribed,
either on all sides, or on some only (as beneath, for example), according to
different opinions;4 and others allowed that he might be felt by the hand, and
seen by the eye. Nay, one David al Jawâri went so far as to say, that his
deity was body composed of flesh and blood, and that he had members, as
hands, feet, a head, a tongue, eyes, and ears; but that he was a body,
however, not like other bodies, neither was he like to any created being: he
is also said farther to have affirmed that from the crown of the head to the
breast he was hollow, and from the breast downward solid, and that he had
black curled hair.5 These most blasphemous and monstrous notions were the
consequence of the literal acceptation of those passages in the Korân which
figuratively attribute corporeal actions to GOD, and of the words of Mohammed,
when he said, that GOD created man in his own image, and that himself had felt
the fingers of GOD, which he laid on his back, to be cold: besides which, this
sect are charged with fathering on their prophet a great number of spurious
and forged traditions to support their opinion, the greater part whereof they
borrowed from the Jews, who are accused as naturally prone to assimilate GOD
to men, so that they describe him as weeping for Noah's flood till his eyes
were sore.6 and, indeed, though we grant the Jews may have imposed on
Mohammed and his followers in many instances, and told them as solemn truths
things which themselves believed not or had invented, yet many expressions of
this kind are to be found in their writings; as when they introduce GOD
roaring like a lion at every watch of the night, and crying, "Alas! that I
have laid waste my house, and suffered my temple to be burnt, and sent my
children into banishment among the heathen," &c.1
4. The jabarians-who are the direct opponents of the Kadarians-denying
free agency in man, and ascribing his actions wholly unto

2 Vide Poc. ibid. p. 255, &c. Abulfar. p. 167, &c. 3 Al
Mawâkef, apud Poc. ibid. 1 Al Shahrest. apud eund. ibid. p. 226.
2 Vide Marracc. Prodr. part iii. p. 76. 3 Al Shahrest. ubi sup.
4 Idem, ibid. p. 225.
5 Idem, ibid. p. 226, 227. 6 Idem, ibid. p. 227, 228. 1 Talm.
Berachoth, c. I. Vide Poc. ubi supra, p 228.

GOD.2 They take their denomination from al Jabr, which signifies necessity,
or compulsion; because they hold man to be necessarily and inevitably
constrained to act as he does, by force of GOD'S eternal and immutable
decree.3 This sect is distinguished into several species; some being more
rigid and extreme in their opinion, who are thence called pure Jabarians, and
others more moderate, who are therefore called middle Jabarians. The former
will not allow men to be said either to act, or to have any power at all,
either operative or acquiring; asserting that man can do nothing, but produces
all his actions by necessity, having neither power, nor will, nor choice, any
more than an inanimate agent: they also declare that rewarding and punishing
are also the effects of necessity; and the same they say of the imposing of
commands. This was the doctrine of the Jahmians, the followers of Jahm Ebn
Safwân, who likewise held that paradise and hell will vanish, or be
annihilated, after those who are destined thereto respectively shall have
entered them, so that at last there will remain no existing being besides
GOD;4 supposing those words of the Korân which declare that the inhabitants of
paradise and of hell shall remain therein for ever, to be hyperbolical only,
and intended for corroboration, and not to denote an eternal duration in
reality.5 The moderate Jabarians are those who ascribe some power to man, but
such a power as hath no influence on the action: for as to those who grant the
power of man to have a certain influence on the action, which influence is
called Acquisition, some6 will not admit them to be called Jabarians; though
others reckon those also to be called middle Jabarians, and to contend for the
middle opinion between absolute necessity and absolute liberty, who attribute
to man acquisition, or concurrence in producing the action, whereby he gaineth
commendation or blame (yet without admitting it to have any influence on the
action), and, therefore, make the Ashárians a branch of this sect.7 Having
again mentioned the term Acquisition, we may, perhaps, have a clearer idea of
what the Mohammedans mean thereby, when told, that it is defined to be an
action directed to the obtaining of profit, or the removing of hurt, and for
that reason never applied to any action of GOD, who acquireth to himself
neither profit nor hurt.1 Of the middle or moderate Jabarians were the
Najârians and the Derârians. The Najârians were the adherents of al Hasan Ebn
Mohammed al Najâr, who taught that GOD was he who created the actions of men,
both good and bad, and that man acquired them, and also that man's power had
an influence on the action, or a certain co-operation, which he called
acquisition; and herein he agreed with al Ashári.2 The Derârians were the
disciples of Derâr Ebn Amru, who held also that men's actions are really
created by GOD, and that man really acquired them.3 The Jabarians also say,
that GOD is absolute Lord of his creatures, and may deal with them according
to his own pleasure, without rendering account to any, and that if he should
admit all men, without distinction, into paradise, it would be no
impartiality, or if he should cast them all into hell it would