Books: Leviathan
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Thomas Hobbes >> Leviathan
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The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that
have the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred
to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty,
as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them;
so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they
doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort,
than when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this
consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature,
a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his People.
All breaches of the Law, are offences against the Common-wealth:
but there be some, that are also against private Persons.
Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may without breach
of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done
against himselfe, according to his own discretion. But an offence
against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the
consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.
The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power;
and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign;
that is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between
Kings, and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings.
The honour of great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence,
and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all.
And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not
extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons;
because they have least need to commit them. The consequences
of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner.
Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred,
an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious
greatnesse, though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.
Equall Taxes
To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes;
the equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches,
but on the Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the
Common-wealth for his defence. It is not enough, for a man
to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight,
(if need be,) for the securing of his labour. They must either do
as the Jewes did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying
the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the Sword in the other;
or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the Impositions
that are layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are nothing else
but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword, to defend
private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings.
Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the
enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich;
the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life,
is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his;
saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors
not onely for their own persons, but for many more. Which considered,
the Equality of Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality
of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons
that consume the same. For what reason is there, that he which
laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little,
should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth little,
and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection
from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the Impositions,
are layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth Equally
for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by the
luxurious waste of private men.
Publique Charity
And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable
to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left
to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for,
(as far-forth as the necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes
of the Common-wealth. For as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man,
to neglect the impotent; so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,
to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.
Prevention Of Idlenesse
But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise:
they are to be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not
finding employment, there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage
all manner of Arts; as Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all
manner of Manifacture that requires labour. The multitude of poor,
and yet strong people still encreasing, they are to be transplanted
into Countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse,
they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them
to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground,
to snatch what they find; but to court each little Plot with art
and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season.
And when all the world is overchargd with Inhabitants, then
the last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man,
by Victory, or Death.
Good Lawes What
To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes.
But what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a Just Law:
for no Law can be Unjust. The Law is made by the Soveraign Power,
and all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned
by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so,
no man can say is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth,
as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on,
is Injustice to none of them. A good Law is that, which is Needfull,
for the Good Of The People, and withall Perspicuous.
Such As Are Necessary
For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not
to bind the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct
and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves
by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion,
as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way.
And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End
of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to be Good, when
it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary
for the People; but it is not so. For the good of the Soveraign
and People, cannot be separated. It is a weak Soveraign, that has
weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power
to rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes;
but trapps for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power
is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged,
unsufficient to defend the People.
Such As Are Perspicuous
The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe,
as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made.
That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator, and the
meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood
by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity;
and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law,
is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply,
(by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words,
is without the compasse of the Law. And this is a cause of many
unnecessary Processes. For when I consider how short were the
Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer;
me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders
of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later;
and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders
have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office
of a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme
Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the
reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law
it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.
Punishments
It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right
application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing
is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of
the offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments
are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Danger
to the Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice
to the Government established; those that spring from contempt
of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the Multitude;
and those, which unpunished, seem Authorised, as when they are
committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority:
For Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors,
and Authors of Injustice; but against all Power that is likely
to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act
of one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy
it selfe dissolved. But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those
which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need,
or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not,
there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to
the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it,
is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of the Leaders,
and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People,
when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example.
To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may
in great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was,
they were no better instructed.
Rewards
In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign,
to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit
to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End;
and is then done, when they that have well served the Common-wealth,
are with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible,
so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to
serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts
by which they may be enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony,
or Preferment, from a Popular ambitious Subject, to be quiet,
and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the People,
has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which is ordained not
for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of Gratitude,
but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage
of the Publique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of
Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every
one that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner,
when the stubbornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward,
there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe,
in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of Manifacture,
so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes
a Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the
danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured.
It is therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the
Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those that aspire to
greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and not rather
to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger,
than after a longer time with greater.
Counsellours
Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours;
I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government
of the Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium,
corrupted from Considium, is a large signification, and comprehendeth
all Assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate
what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past,
and of Law for the present. I take it here in the first sense onely:
And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in
a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling
are members of the person Counselled. The choyce of Counsellours
therefore is to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth
not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able,
dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able
Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving
evill Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce
to the Peace, and Defence of the Common-wealth. It is a hard matter
to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes
that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people
in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose
estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences,
and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it.
But to know, who has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet
harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse.
For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great
degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no man can be
assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first taught
to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art,
are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it.
Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore
there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich,
or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions
of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method
in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study
of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so.
For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these
parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain persons,
to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance;
it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many
absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not
enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be
marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity,
and the posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being
inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign,
they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right,
they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no
further honour, than adhaereth naturally to their abilities.
And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the benefit
of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Advice,
and reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly,
by way of Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when
they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time,
to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject
to be carried away to contradiction, through Envy, Emulation,
or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.
The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations,
but onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes
that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informations,
and complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted
with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing
in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently
taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often
before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.
Commanders
A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall not
be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently
cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore
be Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he
may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers.
This is Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire,
and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects
the severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Mutinous,
or negligent Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution be
not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing
to Soveraign Power; especially when it is in the hands of an
Assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety
of the People, both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull
subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.
But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular, that is, reverenced
and beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the
Popularity of a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust,
as to side with their Captain; though they love him, against their
Soveraign, when they love not onely his Person, but also his Cause.
And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed
the Power of their Lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle
themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble
of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame
of receiving them. To have a known Right to Soveraign Power,
is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more,
for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him,
but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family:
Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies.
For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never
hetherto been well contented with the present.
Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are
comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations,
I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations,
and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every Soveraign
hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that
any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body.
And the same Law, that dictateth to men that have no Civil Government,
what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another,
dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences
of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no
Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience onely; where not Man,
but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such of them as oblige all Mankind,)
in respect of God, as he is the Author of Nature, are Naturall;
and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Lawes.
But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as King also
of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.
CHAPTER XXXI
OF THE KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE
The Scope Of The Following Chapters
That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty,
such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects,
is Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts,
by which men are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature:
That a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word,
without substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns,
simple Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant
to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have
already written. There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of
Civill duty, to know what are those Lawes of God. For without that,
a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the Civill Power,
whether it be contrary to the Law of God, or not: and so, either by
too much civill obedience, offends the Divine Majesty, or through feare
of offending God, transgresses the commandements of the Common-wealth.
To avoyd both these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are
the Lawes Divine. And seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth
on the knowledge of the Soveraign Power; I shall say something
in that which followeth, of the KINGDOME OF GOD.
Who Are Subjects In The Kingdome Of God
"God is King, let the Earth rejoice," saith the Psalmist. (Psal. 96. 1).
And again, "God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that
sitteth on the Cherubins, though the earth be moved." (Psal. 98. 1).
Whether men will or not, they must be subject alwayes to
the Divine Power. By denying the Existence, or Providence of God,
men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke. But to call this
Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not onely to Man, but also
to Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies inanimate, by the name of Kingdome,
is but a metaphoricall use of the word. For he onely is properly
said to Raigne, that governs his Subjects, by his Word, and by promise
of Rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning them with Punishment
that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the Kingdome of God, are not
Bodies Inanimate, nor creatures Irrationall; because they understand
no Precepts as his: Nor Atheists; nor they that believe not that God
has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no
Word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatnings.
They therefore that believe there is a God that governeth the world,
and hath given Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Punishments to
Mankind, are Gods Subjects; all the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.
A Threefold Word Of God, Reason, Revelation, Prophecy
To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known;
for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth
a sufficient, and clear Promulgation, such as may take away
the excuse of Ignorance; which in the Lawes of men is but of
one onely kind, and that is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by
the voyce of man. But God declareth his Lawes three wayes;
by the Dictates of Naturall Reason, By Revelation, and by the Voyce
of some Man, to whom by the operation of Miracles, he procureth
credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a triple Word of God,
Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which Correspondeth a
triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith.
As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation,
or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given,
because God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons,
and to divers men divers things.
A Twofold Kingdome Of God, Naturall And Prophetique
From the difference between the other two kinds of Gods Word,
Rationall, and Prophetique, there may be attributed to God,
a two-fold Kingdome, Naturall, and Prophetique: Naturall,
wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence,
by the naturall Dictates of Right Reason; And Prophetique, wherein
having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects,
he governed them, and none but them, not onely by naturall Reason,
but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of
his holy Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend
to speak in this Chapter.
The Right Of Gods Soveraignty Is Derived From His Omnipotence
The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth
those that break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them,
as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits;
but from his Irresistible Power. I have formerly shewn, how the
Soveraign Right ariseth from Pact: To shew how the same Right may
arise from Nature, requires no more, but to shew in what case
it is never taken away. Seeing all men by Nature had Right to
All things, they had Right every one to reigne over all the rest.
But because this Right could not be obtained by force, it concerned
the safety of every one, laying by that Right, to set up men
(with Soveraign Authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them:
whereas if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had
been no reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled,
and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own discretion.
To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion of all
men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently
it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the Right
of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty;
not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent. And though Punishment
be due for Sinne onely, because by that word is understood Affliction
for Sinne; yet the Right of Afflicting, is not alwayes derived from
mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.
Sinne Not The Cause Of All Affliction
This question, "Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men
suffer Adversity," has been much disputed by the Antient,
and is the same with this of ours, "By what Right God dispenseth
the Prosperities and Adversities of this life;" and is of
that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not onely of the Vulgar,
but of Philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning
the Divine Providence. "How Good," saith David, "is the God of Israel
to those that are Upright in Heart; and yet my feet were almost gone,
my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the Wicked,
when I saw the Ungodly in such Prosperity." And Job, how earnestly
does he expostulate with God, for the many Afflictions he suffered,
notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This question in the case of Job,
is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from Job's Sinne,
but his own Power. For whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments
from his Affliction to his Sinne, and he defended himselfe by
the conscience of his Innocence, God himselfe taketh up the matter,
and having justified the Affliction by arguments drawn from his Power,
such as this "Where was thou when I layd the foundations of the earth,"
and the like, both approved Job's Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous
doctrine of his friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence
of our Saviour, concerning the man that was born Blind, in these words,
"Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works
of God might be made manifest in him." And though it be said
"That Death entred into the world by sinne, (by which is meant that
if Adam had never sinned, he had never dyed, that is, never suffered
any separation of his soule from his body,) it follows not thence,
that God could not justly have Afflicted him, though he had not Sinned,
as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sinne.
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