Books: Leviathan

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As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man;
so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is,
more Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy
against the Soveraignty; Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority
against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distinctions,
that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their obscurity)
that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome,
as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest,
that the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the
same thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons,
and granting Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth,
that where one is Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes,
and another make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths,
of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe,
and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction
of Temporall, and Ghostly, they are still two Kingdomes, and every
Subject is subject to two Masters. For seeing the Ghostly Power
challengeth the Right to declare what is Sinne it challengeth
by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sinne being nothing but
the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civill Power
challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey
two Masters, who bothe will have their Commands be observed as Law;
which is impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Civill,
which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to
the Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall
and then there is no Supremacy but the Temporall. When therefore
these two Powers oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but
be in great danger of Civill warre, and Dissolution. For the Civill
Authority being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light
of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times
a very considerable part of the people: And the Spirituall,
though it stand in the darknesse of Schoole distinctions,
and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and Ghosts,
is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble,
and sometimes to Destroy a Common-wealth. And this is a Disease
which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse
(which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits)
in the Body Naturall. For as in this Disease, there is an
unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots
of the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion
which naturally they should have from the power of the Soule
in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions
(which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that
is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water,
and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses;
so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall power,
moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments,
and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than
by the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth)
they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates
the people, and either Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression,
or cast it into the Fire of a Civill warre.

Mixt Government
Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more
than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the
Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power
of conduct and command, (which is the Motive Faculty,) on one man;
and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,)
on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third;
This endangereth the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent
to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is
necessary to Life, and Motion. For although few perceive, that such
government, is not government, but division of the Common-wealth
into three Factions, and call it mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is,
that it is not one independent Common-wealth, but three independent
Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three. In the Kingdome
of God, there may be three Persons independent, without breach of unity
in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity
of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the King bear
the person of the People, and the generall Assembly bear also
the person of the People, and another assembly bear the person
of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign,
but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.

To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare
this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen
a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head,
armes, breast, and stomach, of his own: If he had had another man
growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Want Of Mony
Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are
of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great;
which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the
difficulty of raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth;
especially in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from
the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands
and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same.
From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign Power,
which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common-wealth,
(finding the passage of mony to the publique Treasure obstructed,
by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe,
to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings,
contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer,
struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain little summes,
which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way
for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities,
at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the
Common-wealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper
very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed,
or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall
course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be)
supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first
a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot,
and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud;
and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small
refreshments of such things as coole of a time, till (if Nature be
strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed,
and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak)
the Patient dyeth.

Monopolies And Abuses Of Publicans
Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth
the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth,
flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance,
in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by Farmes of the
Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie,
getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation,
accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.

Popular Men
Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common-wealth
have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Disease;
because the people (which should receive their motion from the
Authority of the Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation
of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes,
to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge.
And this is commonly of more danger in a Popular Government, than in
a Monarchy; as it may easily be made believe, they are the People.
By this means it was, that Julius Caesar, who was set up by the People
against the Senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his Army,
made himselfe Master, both of Senate and People. And this proceeding
of popular, and ambitious men, is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled
to the effects of Witchcraft.

Excessive Greatnesse Of A Town,
Multitude Of Corporations
Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse
of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit,
the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number
of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths
in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.

Liberty Of Disputing Against Soveraign Power
To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power,
by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the
most part in the Lees of the people; yet animated by False Doctrines,
are perpetually medling with the Fundamentall Lawes, to the
molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which
Physicians call Ascarides.

We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia,
of enlarging Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times
received from the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests,
which are many times a burthen, and with lesse danger lost,
than kept; As also the Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of
Riot and Vain Expence.

Dissolution Of The Common-wealth
Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies
got a final Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth
keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection
of Subjects in their loyalty; then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED,
and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses
as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the Soveraign,
is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth;
which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the
Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soule.
For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished
by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may.
For he that wants protection, may seek it anywhere; and when he hath it,
is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe
out of fear,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able.
But when the Power of an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right
of the same perisheth utterly; because the Assembly it selfe
is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the
Soveraignty to re-enter.

CHAPTER XXX

OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERAIGN REPRESENTATIVE

The Procuration Of The Good Of The People
The OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,)
consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power,
namely the procuration of the Safety Of The People; to which he is
obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God,
the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here,
is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments
of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger,
or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.

By Instruction & Lawes
And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls,
further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain;
but by a generall Providence, contained in publique Instruction,
both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing
of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their own cases.

Against The Duty Of A Soveraign To Relinquish
Any Essentiall Right of Soveraignty:
Or Not To See The People Taught The Grounds Of Them
And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before
in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is
thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition,
and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest
evill that can happen in this life;) it is the Office of the Soveraign,
to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently against his duty,
First, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them.
For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth
the Means, that being the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject
to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature;
or of making Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of
the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers,
when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary;
or of making Officers, and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace;
or of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable,
or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people.
Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant,
or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall
Rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to
resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be diligently,
and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any
Civill Law, or terrour of legal punishment. For a Civill Law,
that shall forbid Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the
essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law)
any obligation, but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature, that
forbiddeth the violation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men
know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh.
And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility;
which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour
by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.

Objection Of Those That Say There Are No Principles
Of Reason For Absolute Soveraignty
As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance;
and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe,
(not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,)
is his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also
that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Principles of Reason,
to sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Soveraignty absolute.
For if there were, they would have been found out in some place,
or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth,
where those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged.
Wherein they argue as ill, as if the Savage people of America,
should deny there were any grounds, or Principles of Reason,
so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they
never yet saw any so well built. Time, and Industry, produce every day
new knowledge. And as the art of well building, is derived from
Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion,
long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time
after men have begun to constitute Common-wealths, imperfect,
and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason
be found out, by industrious meditation, to make use of them,
or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest,
at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine are not
such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are Principles
from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall
come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,)
over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.

Objection From The Incapacity Of The Vulgar
But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Common
people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them.
I should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a Kingdome,
or those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse
incapable than they. But all men know, that the obstructions
to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty
of the matter, as from the interest of them that are to learn.
Potent men, digest hardly any thing that setteth up a Power
to bridle their affections; and Learned men, any thing that
discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their Authority:
whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with
dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions
of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever
by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations
be brought to Acquiesce in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion,
which are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe,
that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the
same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able,
by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that
received, which is so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man,
needs no more to learn it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore,
that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights
(which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty,
there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,)
but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom
he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently,
it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely
his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger
that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.

Subjects Are To Be Taught,
Not To Affect Change Of Government:
And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First,
that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government
they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own,
nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are
otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity
of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly,
commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience,
and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy,
because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him.
Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the
Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish,
but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience,
to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do
thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;)
which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father,
did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him,
together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man.
This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods
Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos;
Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place
concerning Kings, that they are Gods.

Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men:
Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led
with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects,
how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine
in the Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign
Assembly,) so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour,
appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations)
they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is
conveighed by them from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign,
cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not
Jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of Popular men,
to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely
secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them
In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing the same
in the open streets: which may fitly be compared to the violation
of the second of the ten Commandements.

Nor To Dispute The Soveraign Power:
Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed,
how great fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative,
(whether One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute
his Power, or any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may
be brought into Contempt with his People, and their Obedience
(in which the safety of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened.
Which doctrine the third Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.

And To Have Dayes Set Apart To Learn Their Duty:
Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 'tis taught,
remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom
the Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their
ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend
those that are appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that
some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together,
and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns)
hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as
generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind
of the Authority that maketh them Lawes. To this end had the Jewes
every seventh day, a Sabbath, in which the Law was read and expounded;
and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their
King was God; that having created the world in six days, he rested
the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour,
that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their servile,
and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had
rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation.
So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all,
in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God,
but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore
give light, to those that have the Soveraign Power conferred
on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought
to teach their Subjects.

And To Honour Their Parents
And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on
the care of their Parents; it is necessary that they should
be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition;
and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,)
they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall
signes of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that originally
the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him
of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by
instituting a Common-wealth, they resigned that absolute Power,
yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due
unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right,
was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would
there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children,
or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were
afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men.
And this accordeth with the fifth Commandement.

And To Avoyd Doing Of Injury:
Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which
(consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say,
to cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbour, by violence,
or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs.
Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are
his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,)
those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches
and means of living. Therefore the People are to be taught,
to abstain from violence to one anothers person, by private revenges;
from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcibly rapine,
and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods. For which purpose
also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences
of false Judgement, by corruption either of Judges or Witnesses,
whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and Justice
becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth,
seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.

And To Do All This Sincerely From The Heart
Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts,
but the designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,)
are Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will,
as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention
of the tenth Commandement, and the summe of the Second Table;
which is reduced all to this one Commandement of mutuall Charity,
"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe:" as the summe of the
first Table is reduced to "the love of God;" whom they had then
newly received as their King.

The Use Of Universities
As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive
this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions,
contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles,
have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those,
which I have in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge
of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by
their own private Judgements; That Subjects sinne in obeying
the Commands of the Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have
first judged them to be lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches
is such, as to exclude the Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath
over the same: That it is lawfull for Subjects to kill such,
as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign Power may be divided,
and the like; which come to be instilled into the People by this means.
They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their trades,
and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity,
or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts
of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from
the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in
the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences
necessarily requireth, receive the Notions of their duty,
chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit, and partly from such of
their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having the Faculty
of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned
in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves. And the Divines,
and such others as make shew of Learning, derive their knowledge from
the Universities, and from the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which
by men eminent in those Schooles, and Universities have been published.
It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people,
dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities.
But are not (may some men say) the Universities of England learned
enough already to do that? or is it you will undertake to teach
the Universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not
to answer; that till towards the later end of Henry the Eighth,
the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the Power of
the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that
the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the
Soveraign Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others,
that had their education there, is a sufficient argument,
that though the Universities were not authors of those false doctrines,
yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction
of Opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently
instructed; and 'tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that
subtile liquor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against
the Civill Authority. But to the later question, it is not fit,
nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for any man that sees
what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.