Mary J. Holmes - "Cousin Maude"

G. G. Putnam - "Nonsenseorship"

Horatio Alger - "Hector's Inheritance"

Emile Zola - "The Three Cities Trilogy: Paris, Vol. 4"

New Philadelphia Book Publisher Highlights Local Talent
Book and Publishing News from Publishers Newswire(tm)

Looking for Child to be on Cover of a New Book, 'The Model Child'
PHILADELPHIA, Pa. -- The Philadelphia literary world will celebrate the launch of two new players today, April 10th: Kay Square Press, a new publishing company focused on Philadelphia-area artists, their stories, and their art; and Kay Square's first release, 'With the Rich and Mighty: Emlen Etting of Philadelphia' (ISBN: 978-0-9815129-0-7), a critical biography by Kenneth C. Kaleta.

FlatSigned Press Alleges Don Imus Remarks Damage Legacy of President Gerald R. Ford
NEW YORK, N.Y. -- Nathan Yungerberg, an accomplished model scout and professional child photographer is launching a nation-wide casting call to find the cover model for his highly anticipated book release, 'The Model Child: A Parents Guide to the Child Modeling Industry' (ISBN: 978-0-9817018-0-6).

Books: Leviathan

T >> Thomas Hobbes >> Leviathan




And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self;
they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be
altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths;
as being a common measure of the commodities of all places.
But base Mony, may easily be enhanced, or abased. Secondly, they have
the priviledge to make Common-wealths, move, and stretch out their armes,
when need is, into forraign Countries; and supply, not only private
Subjects that travell, but also whole Armies with provision.
But that Coyne, which is not considerable for the Matter, but for the
Stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect
at home only; where also it is subject to the change of Laws,
and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times
of those that have it.

The Conduits And Way Of Mony To The Publique Use
The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Publique use,
are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers;
The other, that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments.
Of the first sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers;
of the second are the Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed
for payment of severall publique or private Ministers. And in this also,
the Artificiall Man maintains his resemblance with the Naturall;
whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the severall Parts of the Body,
carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall, the Heart by
the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion
all the Members of the same.

The Children Of A Common-wealth Colonies
The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those
we call Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out
from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit
a Forraign Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made
voyd then, by warre. And when a Colony is setled, they are either
a Common-wealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to
their Soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many
Common-wealths of antient time,) in which case the Common-wealth
from which they went was called their Metropolis, or Mother,
and requires no more of them, then Fathers require of the Children,
whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestique government,
which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain united to
their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of Rome;
and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces,
and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right
of Colonies (saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,)
dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign
authorised them to Plant.



CHAPTER XXV

OF COUNSELL


Counsell What
How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary
and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the
confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative
manner of speaking in them both, and in may other occasions besides.
For the words "Doe this," are the words not onely of him that Commandeth;
but also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth;
and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very
different things; or that cannot distinguish between them,
when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech
is directed, and upon what occasion. But finding those phrases
in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter
into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes
the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that command;
and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the
conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve.
To avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes of Commanding,
Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct significations,
I define them thus.

Differences Between Command And Counsell
COMMAND is, where a man saith, "Doe this," or "Doe this not,"
without expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it.
From this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth,
pretendeth thereby his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command
is his own Will onely, and the proper object of every mans Will,
is some Good to himselfe.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, "Doe" or "Doe not this," and
deduceth his own reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it
to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident,
that he that giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth)
the good of him, to whom he giveth it.

Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is,
that Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell
to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference,
that a man may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath
covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled,
because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should
covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature
of a Command. A third difference between them is, that no man can
pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell; because he is not
to pretend benefit by it to himselfe; but to demand right to
Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain
some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans
will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be,
he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask
Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he
shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to
his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it,
cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to
the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate.
For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the
Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell;
For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate,
and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsell,
is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign
cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another,
to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed
from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable
by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good
excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes
to which he is subject.

Exhortation And Dehortation What
EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accompanied with signes
in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed;
or to say it more briefly, Counsell Vehemently Pressed. For he that
Exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth
to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning;
but encourages him he Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth,
deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their speeches,
a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing
their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples,
and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers of the Utility,
Honour, or Justice of following their advise.

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation,
is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him
that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour;
who (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own
benefits, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell
to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging,
or by the artificial giving thereof; which being not required of him,
and consequently proceeding from his own occasions, is directed
principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good
of him that is Counselled, or not at all.

Secondly, that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth onely,
where a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech
is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons
more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many
to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently
to them all at once. Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort,
where they are required to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours,
and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell
they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more
a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward,
is a just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father
in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations,
are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they
are no more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution
of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth
to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune
and phrase of Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Command.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take
from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture.
"Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image;
Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents;
Kill not; Steale not," &c. are Commands; because the reason for which
we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our King,
whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, "Sell all thou hast;
give it to the poore; and follow me," are Counsell; because the reason
for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this,
that we shall have "Treasure in Heaven." These words, "Go into the
village over against you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt;
loose her, and bring her to me," are a Command: for the reason of
their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words,
"Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus," are Counsell;
because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit
of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell;
but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punishment
hanging over us for our sins.

Differences Of Fit And Unfit Counsellours
As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced
from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the benefit,
or hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary
or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the
differences between apt, and inept counsellours be derived from the same.
For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions
formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience
is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell,
are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall:
And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him
in the place of Memory, and Mentall Discourse. But with this
resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one
dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall
man receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense,
which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own;
whereas they that give Counsell to the Representative person of
a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends,
and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected,
and many times unfaithfull. And therefore we may set down for the
first condition of a good Counsellour, That His Ends, And Interest,
Be Not Inconsistent With The Ends And Interest Of Him He Counselleth.

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes
into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it,
in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently
informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech,
as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say,
with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language,
and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore Rash,
And Unevident Inferences; (such as are fetched onely from Examples,
or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good,
or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,) Obscure, Confused,
And Ambiguous Expressions, Also All Metaphoricall Speeches, Tending To
The Stirring Up Of Passion, (because such reasoning, and such
expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him
we Counsell towards other ends than his own) Are Repugnant
To The Office Of A Counsellour.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience,
and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all
those things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth
are necessary to be known, No Man Is Presumed To Be A Good Counsellour,
But In Such Businesse, As He Hath Not Onely Been Much Versed In,
But Hath Also Much Meditated On, And Considered. For seeing the
businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people at home,
and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall find,
it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind,
of the Rights of Government, and of the nature of Equity,
Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without study;
And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country,
and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes
of all Nations that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to,
without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe,
but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation
of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required
for Counsel, as I have said before is Judgement. And the differences
of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind
of study, or businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing
of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices,
the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall
his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there
is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular
kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement, and is
the best Counsellour.

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth,
in a businesse that hath reference to another Common-wealth,
It Is Necessary To Be Acquainted With The Intelligences, And Letters
That Come From Thence, And With All The Records Of Treaties,
And Other Transactions Of State Between Them; which none can doe,
but such as the Representative shall think fit. By which we may see,
that they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell
in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better
Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that
for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice
of every man; but in an Assembly may of them deliver their advise with I,
or No, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense,
but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing
some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by contradiction;
or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that
have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many,
there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that
of the Publique; and these their Interests make passionate,
and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice.
For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat
of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another,
(especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting
of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it.
Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need)
the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of
the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections;
which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult
question) a man is rather astonied, and dazled with the variety
of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take.
Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice,
wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent,
and also learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care
of the businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations,
made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of Authors; which is an
Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation,
and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided.
Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there
be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells of many,
and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great
Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers,
and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity
they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of
Counsell from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for,
or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of
marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household,
or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them
such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his businesse
by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one
consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth
able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations.
He does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has
no Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his businesse
in a framed Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality
of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy,
or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all,
and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players,
yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self,
and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours
of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set
their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more
amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true,
that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood
of many Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution
is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing
in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their
private benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke,
though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one;
And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up;
but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the
reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret
Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions;
and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for
very little Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall,
there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer then the
Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours.



CHAPTER XXVI

OF CIVILL LAWES


Civill Law what
By CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore
bound to observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that
Common-wealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge
of particular Lawes belongeth to them, that professe the study of
the Lawes of their severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law
in generall, to any man. The antient Law of Rome was called their
Civil Law, from the word Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth;
And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire,
and governed by that Law, retaine still such part thereof as they
think fit, call that part the Civill Law, to distinguish it from
the rest of their own Civill Lawes. But that is not it I intend
to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here,
and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers
others have done, without taking upon them the profession of
the study of the Law.

And first it manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell,
but Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him,
whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him.
And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person
Commanding, which is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.

Which considered, I define Civill Law in this Manner. "CIVILL LAW,
Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath
Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will,
to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say,
of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule."

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight evident.
For every man seeth, that some Lawes are addressed to all the Subjects
in generall; some to particular Provinces; some to particular Vocations;
and some to particular Men; and are therefore Lawes, to every of those
to whom the Command is directed; and to none else. As also,
that Lawes are the Rules of Just, and Unjust; nothing being
reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law. Likewise, that
none can make Lawes but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection
is to the Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified
by sufficient Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them.
And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by necessary
consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth.
Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

The Soveraign Is Legislator
1. The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign,
be he one Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in
a Democracy, or Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that
maketh the Law. And the Common-wealth only, praescribes,
and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law:
Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator. But the Common-wealth
is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the
Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore the Soveraign
is the sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate
a Law made, but the Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated,
but by another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

And Not Subject To Civill Law
2. The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or one Man,
is not subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to make,
and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from
that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him,
and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he is free,
that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person
to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release;
and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound.

Use, A Law Not By Vertue Of Time, But Of
The Soveraigns Consent
3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not
the Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will
of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes
an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the
Soveraign shall be silent therein. And therefore if the Soveraign
shall have a question of Right grounded, not upon his present Will,
but upon the Lawes formerly made; the Length of Time shal bring
no prejudice to his Right; but the question shal be judged by Equity.
For many unjust Actions, and unjust Sentences, go uncontrolled
a longer time, than any man can remember. And our Lawyers account
no Customes Law, but such as are reasonable, and that evill Customes
are to be abolished; But the Judgement of what is reasonable,
and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law,
which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch.

The Law Of Nature, And The Civill Law Contain Each Other
4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other,
and are of equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature, which consist
in Equity, Justice, Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on
these depending, in the condition of meer Nature (as I have said
before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not properly Lawes,
but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience.
When a Common-wealth is once settled, then are they actually Lawes,
and not before; as being then the commands of the Common-wealth;
and therefore also Civill Lawes: for it is the Soveraign Power
that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private men,
to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and what is morall Vertue,
and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of
Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordained for such as shall
break them; which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law.
The Law of Nature therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all
Common-wealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the Civill Law
is a part of the Dictates of Nature. For Justice, that is to say,
Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a Dictate
of the Law of Nature. But every subject in a Common-wealth,
hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law, (either one with another,
as when they assemble to make a common Representative, or with
the Representative it selfe one by one, when subdued by the Sword
they promise obedience, that they may receive life;) And therefore
Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the Law of Nature.
Civill, and Naturall Law are not different kinds, but different
parts of Law; whereof one part being written, is called Civill,
the other unwritten, Naturall. But the Right of Nature, that is,
the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be abridged,
and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but such
Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace.
And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit
the naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they
might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against
a common Enemy.