Books: Leviathan

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To these places may be added also that of Genesis, (Gen. 3. 5)
"You shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill." and verse 11.
"Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree,
of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?" For the Cognisance
of Judicature of Good and Evill, being forbidden by the name of
the fruit of the tree of Knowledge, as a triall of Adams obedience;
The Divell to enflame the Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit
already seemed beautifull, told her that by tasting it, they should
be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. Whereupon having both eaten,
they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is Judicature
of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability to distinguish
between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that having eaten,
they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place,
as if they had formerly blind, as saw not their own skins:
the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse
(wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being
ashamed, did tacitely censure God himselfe. And thereupon God saith,
"Hast thou eaten, &c." as if he should say, doest thou that owest me
obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is
cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the Commands of them
that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be
censured, nor disputed.

Soveraign Power Ought In All Common-wealths To Be Absolute
So it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason,
and Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One Man,
as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular,
and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men
can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a Power,
men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of
the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against
his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life
shall never be without Inconveniences; but there happeneth in no
Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what proceeds from
the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants,
from which the Common-wealth had its being. And whosoever
thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse;
must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is
to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask,
where, and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged.
But one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a Kingdome
long free from Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose
Common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by
forraign warre, the Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power.
But howsoever, an argument for the Practise of men, that have not
sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes,
and nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries,
that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in
all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses
on the sand, it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be.
The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in
certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play)
on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure,
nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity,
or the method to find out.

CHAPTER XXI

OF THE LIBERTY OF SUBJECTS

Liberty What
Liberty, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition;
(by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion;) and may be
applyed no lesse to Irrational, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall.
For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within
a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some
externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further.
And so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned,
or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it
is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread
it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty,
to move in such manner, as without those externall impediments they would.
But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing
it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move;
as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.

What It Is To Be Free
And according to this proper, and generally received meaning
of the word, A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, which by his
strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what
he has a will to." But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed
to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not
subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And therefore,
when 'tis said (for example) The way is free, no liberty of the
way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop.
And when we say a Guift is free, there is not meant any liberty
of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law,
or Covenant to give it. So when we Speak Freely, it is not the
liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law
hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use
of the word Freewill, no liberty can be inferred to the will,
desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth
in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will,
desire, or inclination to doe.

Feare And Liberty Consistent
Feare and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods
into the Sea for Feare the ship should sink, he doth it neverthelesse
very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore
the action, of one that was Free; so a man sometimes pays his debt,
only for Feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him
from detaining, was the action of a man at Liberty. And generally
all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for Feare of the law,
or actions, which the doers had Liberty to omit.

Liberty And Necessity Consistent
Liberty and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath
not only Liberty, but a Necessity of descending by the Channel:
so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe; which
(because they proceed from their will) proceed from Liberty;
and yet because every act of mans will, and every desire,
and inclination proceedeth from some cause, which causes in
a continuall chaine (whose first link in the hand of God the
first of all causes) proceed from Necessity. So that to him
that could see the connexion of those causes, the Necessity of
all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God,
that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the Liberty
of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the Necessity
of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though
men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is
therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite
to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause.
And did not his will assure the Necessity of mans will, and
consequently of all that on mans will dependeth, the Liberty of men
would be a contradiction, and impediment to the omnipotence and
Liberty of God. And this shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand)
of that naturall Liberty, which only is properly called Liberty.

Artificiall Bonds, Or Covenants
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of
themselves thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call
a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains,
called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants,
have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly,
to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end
to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak,
may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not
by the difficulty of breaking them.

Liberty Of Subjects Consisteth In Liberty From Covenants
In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now,
of the Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth
in the world, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men,
(as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in
all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty,
of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable
to themselves. For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense,
for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains,
and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe,
for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty,
for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand
as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters
of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand;
not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them,
without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws
to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore
only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign
hath praetermitted; such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell,
and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad,
their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children
as they themselves think fit; & the like.

Liberty Of The Subject Consistent With
The Unlimited Power Of The Soveraign
Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty,
the Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited.
For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative
can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called
Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act
the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing,
otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound
thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And therefore it may,
and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Subject may be
put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet neither
doe the other wrong: as when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed:
In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe
the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death.
And the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death
an Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature,
as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;)
yet it was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah,
because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself;
And yet to God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all
Iniquitie by the law of Nature. Which distinction, David himself,
when he repented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, "To thee only
have I sinned." In the same manner, the people of Athens,
when they banished the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years,
thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned
what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they commanded
the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citizen bringing
his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him
he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him,
sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice;
And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it.
And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right
to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.

The Liberty Which Writers Praise, Is The Liberty
Of Soveraigns; Not Of Private Men
The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable mention,
in the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans,
and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have
received all their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie
of Particular men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is
the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were
no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it
also be the same. For as amongst masterlesse men, there is
perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance,
to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no propriety
of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Libertie
in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent
on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute
Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man,
or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing
to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition of a
perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their frontiers
armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round about.
The Athenians, and Romanes, were free; that is, free Common-wealths:
not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own
Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist,
or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city
of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man
can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie
from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in Constantinople.
Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome
is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious
name of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish,
mistake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right,
which is the right of the Publique only. And when the same errour
is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings
in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition,
and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world,
we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution,
and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men,
Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived
those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed
them into their books, out of the Practice of their own Common-wealths,
which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language,
out of the Practise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the
Poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught,
(to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that they
were Freemen, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves;
therefore Aristotle puts it down in his Politiques,(lib.6.cap.2)
"In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for 'tis commonly held,
that no man is Free in any other Government." And as Aristotle;
so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine,
on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy,
at first, by them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst
them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards by their Successors.
And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their
childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of Liberty,)
of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions
of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers,
with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say,
there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts
have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.

Liberty Of The Subject How To Be Measured
To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject;
that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by
the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do;
we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make
a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves,
by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly
we make our Soveraign. For in the act of our Submission, consisteth
both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must therefore be inferred
by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man,
which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally,
are by Nature Free. And because such arguments, must either be drawn
from the expresse words, "I Authorise all his Actions," or from the
Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention
is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;)
The Obligation, and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived,
either from those Words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the End
of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects
within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy.

Subjects Have Liberty To Defend Their Own Bodies,
Even Against Them That Lawfully Invade Them;
First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant
of every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition,
by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent;
It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things,
the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn
before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans
own body, are voyd. Therefore,

Are Not Bound To Hurt Themselves;
If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill,
wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him;
or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing,
without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority,
concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance
of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the
same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained
in these words, "I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions;"
in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former
naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to Kill Me, I am not bound
to Kill my selfe when he commands me. "Tis one thing to say
"Kill me, or my fellow, if you please;" another thing to say,
"I will kill my selfe, or my fellow." It followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe,
or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may
sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute
any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the
Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be
understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey,
frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained;
then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.

Nor To Warfare, Unless They Voluntarily Undertake It
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight
against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his
refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without
Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place:
for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth.
And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse,
not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,)
but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is
on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out
of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly,
but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell,
is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe
a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of
a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell,
but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave.
And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once
the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged;
because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they
have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man,
guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty,
takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us;
and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government.
But in case a great many men together, have already resisted
the Soveraign Power Unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime,
for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not
the Liberty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another?
Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the guilty
man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was indeed injustice in
the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it,
though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act.
And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all.
But the offer of Pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered,
the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting,
or defending the rest, unlawfull.

The Greatest Liberty Of Subjects, Dependeth On
The Silence Of The Law
As for other Lyberties, they depend on the silence of the Law.
In cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject
hath the liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion.
And therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse;
and in some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that
have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient. As for Example,
there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land,
(and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it) by force.
But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible entry, was taken away
by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament. And is some places
of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places,
such Liberty is not allowed.

If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of Debt,
or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any
service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty corporall,
or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; He hath the same Liberty
to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before
such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the
Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue
of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more,
than shall appear to be due by that Law. The sute therefore is not
contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject
hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence,
according to that Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence
of his Power; there lyeth, in that case, no action of Law:
for all that is done by him in Vertue of his Power, is done by
the Authority of every subject, and consequently, he that brings
an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all,
or any of his Subjects; which Grant standing, he is disabled
to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly
renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to another. For in that
he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain termes,
have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood
it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance
of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power;
and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently
all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof;
such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature,
of appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony,
and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.

In What Cases Subjects Are Absolved Of Their Obedience
To Their Soveraign
The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign is understood to
last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which
he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature
to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by
no Covenant be relinquished. The Soveraignty is the Soule of
the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members
doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience
is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own,
or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it,
and his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty,
in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it
in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war;
but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it,
from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality,
by Intestine Discord.

In Case Of Captivity
If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means
of life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and
corporall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor,
he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it,
is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way
to preserve himselfe. The case is the same, if he be deteined
on the same termes, in a forreign country. But if a man be held
in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie;
he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection;
and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.