Books: Leviathan

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4. The Soveraigns Actions Cannot Be Justly
Accused By The Subject
Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of
all the Actions, and Judgements of the Soveraigne Instituted;
it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of
his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice.
For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein
no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this
Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author
of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth
of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof
he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse
any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do
injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have
Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury
in the proper signification.

5.What Soever The Soveraigne Doth,
Is Unpunishable By The Subject
Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that
hath Soveraigne power can justly be put to death, or otherwise in
any manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject
is author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another,
for the actions committed by himselfe.

6. The Soveraigne Is Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace
And Defence Of His Subjects
And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence
of them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means;
it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath
the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence;
and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same;
and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done,
both beforehand, for the preserving of Peace and Security,
by prevention of discord at home and Hostility from abroad; and,
when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same.
And therefore,

And Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them
Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what
Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace;
and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what,
men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people;
and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they
be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions;
and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well
governing of mens Actions, in order to their Peace, and Concord.
And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but
the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace.
For Doctrine Repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace
and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in
a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of
Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received;
the contrary Truths may be generally offensive; Yet the most sudden,
and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake
the Peace, but onely somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that
are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend,
or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition
not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another;
and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually.
It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power,
to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines,
as a thing necessary to Peace, thereby to prevent Discord
and Civill Warre.

7. The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May
Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject
Can Without Injustice Take It From Him
Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of
prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he
may enjoy and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by
any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men Call Propriety.
For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn)
all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre:
and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on
Soveraign Power, is the Act of the Power, in order to the publique peace.
These Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull
and Unlawfull in the actions of subjects, are the Civill Lawes,
that is to say, the lawes of each Commonwealth in particular;
though the name of Civill Law be now restrained to the antient
Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the head of a
great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts
the Civill Law.

8. To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature
And Decision Of Controversies:
Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature;
that is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies,
which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, or naturall,
or concerning Fact. For without the decision of Controversies,
there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of another;
the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to every
man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his
own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his
private strength, which is the condition of Warre; and contrary to
the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.

9. And Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best:
Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making Warre,
and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say,
of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great
forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end;
and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof.
For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in
their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their
strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted,
therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other
Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore
whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign
Power is alwayes Generallissimo.

10. And Of Choosing All Counsellours, And Ministers,
Both Of Peace, And Warre:
Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Councellours,
Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in peace, and War.
For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is
the common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to
use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

11. And Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No
Former Law hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary:
Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding
with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary
punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Lawe
he hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he
shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve
the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

12. And Of Honour And Order
Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set
upon themselves; what respect they look for from others;
and how little they value other men; from whence continually
arise amongst them, Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre,
to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength
against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour,
and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved,
or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be
force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in execution.
But it hath already been shown, that not onely the whole Militia,
or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all
Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign
therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint
what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what
signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give
to one another.

These Rights Are Indivisible
These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty;
and which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man,
or Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth.
For these are incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony;
to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have
praeemption in Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives,
may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect
his Subject be retained. But if he transferre the Militia,
he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes;
Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain:
or if he give away the government of doctrines, men will be frighted
into rebellion with the feare of Spirits. And so if we consider
any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the holding
of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of
Peace and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted.
And this division is it, whereof it is said, "A kingdome divided in
it selfe cannot stand:" For unlesse this division precede,
division into opposite Armies can never happen. If there had not
first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England,
that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords,
and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided,
and fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that
disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters
about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men
in this point of Soveraign Right, that there be few now (in England,)
that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so
generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue,
till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar
be better taught than they have hetherto been.

And Can By No Grant Passe Away Without Direct
Renouncing Of The Soveraign Power
And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows
necessarily, that in whatsoever, words any of them seem to be
granted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct
termes renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the
Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has
granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored,
as inseparably annexed thereunto.

The Power And Honour Of Subjects Vanisheth In The
Presence Of The Power Soveraign
This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed
to the Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them,
that say of Soveraign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores,
of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be
Universis Minores, of lesse power than them all together.
For if by All Together, they mean not the collective body as one person,
then All Together, and Every One, signifie the same; and the speech
is absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as one Person
(which person the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all together,
is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is absurd;
which absurdity they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in
an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not;
and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be
greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty
is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke,
and Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Master,
the Servants are equall, and without any honour at all; So are
the Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign. And though they
shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight;
yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in
presence of the Sun.

Soveraigne Power Not Hurtfull As The Want Of It,
And The Hurt Proceeds For The Greatest Part From Not
Submitting Readily, To A Lesse
But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is
very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other
irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power
in their hands. And commonly they that live under a Monarch,
think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the
government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly, attribute
all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas the
Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them,
is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be
without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest,
that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the people
in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries,
and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that
dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes,
and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge:
nor considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign Governours,
proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect
in the dammage, or weakening of their subjects, in whose vigor,
consisteth their own selves, that unwillingly contributing to
their own defence, make it necessary for their Governours to draw
from them what they can in time of Peace, that they may have means
on any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage
on their Enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable
multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Self-love,)
through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance;
but are destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Morall
and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang
over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.

CHAPTER XIX

OF THE SEVERALL KINDS OF COMMON-WEALTH BY INSTITUTION,
AND OF SUCCESSION TO THE SOVERAIGNE POWER

The Different Formes Of Common-wealths But Three
The difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of
the Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one
of the Multitude. And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man,
or in an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either
Every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but Certain men
distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three
kinds of Common-wealth. For the Representative must needs be One man,
or More: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part.
When the Representative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY:
when an Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY,
or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it
is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none:
for either One, or More, or All must have the Soveraign Power
(which I have shewn to be indivisible) entire.

Tyranny And Oligarchy, But Different Names Of Monarchy,
And Aristocracy
There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy;
as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But they are not the names of other Formes
of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that
are discontented under Monarchy, call it Tyranny; and they that
are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: so also,
they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy,
(which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes,
that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same
reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind,
when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed
by the Governours.

Subordinate Representatives Dangerous
It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may,
if they please, give Authority to One Man, to represent them every one;
as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever;
and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good,
to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other Representative.
Therefore, where there is already erected a Soveraign Power,
there can be no other Representative of the same people,
but onely to certain particular ends, by the Soveraign limited.
For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every man to have his
person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another,
must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace)
is indivisible, and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition
of Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted.
And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly,
inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies,
with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore
hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute
Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same
in a Monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth,
should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy,
he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years,
was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every
one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King;
was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative;
that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men,
which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions,
and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which may serve
as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute
Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office,
and to take heed how they admit of any other generall Representation
upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the truth
committed to them.

Comparison Of Monarchy, With Soveraign Assemblyes
The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth,
consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference
of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security
of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare
Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; First, that whosoever beareth
the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it,
beareth also his own naturall Person. And though he be carefull
in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more,
or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe,
his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique
interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private:
for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason.
From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest
are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced.
Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique.
The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches,
strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich,
nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore,
or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention,
to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy,
or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much
to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious,
as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action,
or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when,
and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men
versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or
quality soever, and as long before the time of action, and with
as much secrecy, as he will. But when a Soveraigne Assembly
has need of Counsell, none are admitted but such as have a Right
thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who
have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge;
and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may,
and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it.
For the Understanding is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned,
but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can
receive Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no
other Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies,
besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number.
For the absence of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken,
continue firme, (which may happen by security, negligence,
or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of
the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy,
or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height,
as may produce a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Subject,
by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer,
may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and
inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen,
where the Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: for their power
is the same; and they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be
seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming
one an others Flatterers, serve one anothers Covetousnesse
and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the Favorites of an Assembly,
are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch.
Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well
succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say,
Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt,
have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence
(such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution
more resembles Justice.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie
may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between
Good and Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Power,
must be in the hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men,
which are to governe by his right, and in his name; as Curators,
and Protectors of his Person, and Authority. But to say there
is inconvenience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power,
into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that
all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill Warre.
And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from
the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour,
and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this
inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we
call Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch,
hath appointed who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor,
either expressely by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling
the Custome in that case received: And then such inconvenience
(if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the
Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government,
where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights
of Soveraignty, is the same. Or else the precedent Monarch,
hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law
of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition
shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation
of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue
by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh
his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant into the power of those,
that can promote themselves by his destruction, or dammage,
is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient provision being taken,
against all just quarrell, about the Government under a Child,
if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace,
it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the
ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side,
there is no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in
a great Assembly, which is not, as to consultations of Peace,
and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the same condition, as if
the Government were in a Child. For as a Child wants the judgement
to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated
to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed:
So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell
of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need
of a Tutor, or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority:
So also (in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly,
in all great dangers and troubles, have need of Custodes Libertatis;
that is of Dictators, or Protectors of their Authoritie; which are
as much as Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit
the entire exercise of their Power; and have (at the end of that time)
been oftner deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors,
Regents, or any other Tutors.