Books: Leviathan

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The Word Person, Whence
The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have Prosopon,
which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the Disguise,
or Outward Appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage;
and somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face,
as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any
Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters.
So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage
and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act,
or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another,
is said to beare his Person, or act in his name; (in which sence
Cicero useth it where he saies, "Unus Sustineo Tres Personas;
Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my own,
my Adversaries, and the Judges;") and is called in diverse occasions,
diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar,
an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.

Actor, Author
Authority
Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned
by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor;
and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR:
In which case the Actor acteth by Authority. For that which
in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner,
and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Kurios; speaking of Actions,
is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called
Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY.
So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of doing any act:
and Done By Authority, done by Commission, or Licence from him
whose right it is.

Covenants By Authority, Bind The Author
From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant
by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if
he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all
the consequences of the same. And therfore all that hath been
said formerly, (Chap. 14) of the nature of Covenants between
man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are
made by their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority
from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Representer,
not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill.
For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor
consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.

But Not The Actor
When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by command
of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him,
not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the
Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily;
to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth
breach of Covenant.

The Authority Is To Be Shewne
And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation
of the Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely
takes his word; in case such Authority be not made manifest
unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant
made with the Author, is not valid, without his Counter-assurance.
But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect
no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid;
because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the Author.
And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant
obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned,
it obligeth the Actor onely; there being no Author but himselfe.

Things Personated, Inanimate
There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction.
Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be
Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate,
cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors:
Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance,
given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of those things.
And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be
some state of Civill Government.

Irrational;
Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason,
may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors
(during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they
shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable.
Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give
Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a
State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.

False Gods;
An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, my be Personated; as were the
Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed,
were Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights,
which men from time to time dedicated, and consecrated unto them.
But idols cannot be Authors: for a Idol is nothing. The Authority
proceeded from the State: and therefore before introduction of
Civill Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.

The True God
The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses;
who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,)
not in his own name, with Hoc Dicit Moses; but in Gods Name,
with Hoc Dicit Dominus. Secondly, by the son of man, his own Son
our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes,
and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of his Father; not as of
himselfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost,
or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost,
was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded
from them both.

A Multitude Of Men, How One Person
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man,
or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent
of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the
Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented,
that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth
the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be
understood in Multitude.

Every One Is Author
And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many;
they cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing
their Representative faith, or doth in their name; Every man giving
their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular;
and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him
Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what,
and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more,
than they gave him commission to Act.

An Actor May Be Many Men Made One By Plurality Of Voyces.
And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the
greater number, must be considered as the voyce of them all.
For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative,
and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than
enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Negatives,
standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Representative hath.

Representatives, When The Number Is Even, Unprofitable
And a Representative of even number, especially when the number
is not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes
equall, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action.
Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine
a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes,
even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary
condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard;
not to condemne, is to absolve; but on the contrary, to say that
not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a
deliberation of executing presently, or deferring till another time;
For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution,
is a decree of Dilation.

Negative Voyce
Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)
whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away
the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number
is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions,
and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the
greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for may things else,
so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called;
which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the Action
of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action,
or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh
to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time.
And these Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES,
in Latine Fidejussores, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt,
Praedes; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.

PART II

OF COMMON-WEALTH

CHAPTER XVII

OF THE CAUSES, GENERATION, AND DEFINITION OF A COMMON-WEALTH

The End Of Common-wealth, Particular Security
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty,
and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint
upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,)
is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented
life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that
miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent
(as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions of men, when there is
no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of
punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of
these Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Which Is Not To Be Had From The Law Of Nature:
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy,
and (in summe) Doing To Others, As Wee Would Be Done To,) if themselves,
without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed,
are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality,
Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword,
are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.
Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath
then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,)
if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security;
every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art,
for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men
have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another,
has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law
of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was
their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes
of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives,
and instruments of husbandry. And as small Familyes did then; so now
do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their
own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger,
and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders,
endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours,
by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly;
and are rememdbred for it in after ages with honour.

Nor From The Conjunction Of A Few Men Or Familyes
Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives
them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the
one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great,
as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement
to an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security,
is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with
the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy
is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to determine the event
of warre, as to move him to attempt.

Nor From A Great Multitude, Unlesse Directed
By One Judgement:
And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions
be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular
appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection,
neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another.
For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and
application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another;
and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing:
whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that
agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make warre
upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could
suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice,
and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe;
we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then
there neither would be nor need to be any Civill Government,
or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

And That Continually
Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should
last all the time of their life, that they be governed,
and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell,
or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous
endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either
they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for
an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs
by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again
into a Warre amongst themselves.

Why Certain Creatures Without Reason, Or Speech,
Do Neverthelesse Live In Society, Without
Any Coercive Power
It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants,
live sociably one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle
numbred amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction,
than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech,
whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks
expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps
desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity,
which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there
ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre;
but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not
from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private,
they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy
consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing
but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason,
do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration
of their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many,
that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique,
better than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate,
one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction
and Civill warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice,
in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections;
yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent
to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill,
in the likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent
greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their
Peace at their pleasure.

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury,
and Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not
offended with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome,
when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome,
and controule the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men,
is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder
if there be somewhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their
Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them
in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.

The Generation Of A Common-wealth
The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend
them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another,
and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie,
and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves
and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength
upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their
Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say,
to appoint one man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person;
and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of
whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause
to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace
and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will,
and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent,
or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person,
made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner,
as if every man should say to every man, "I Authorise and give up
my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men,
on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise
all his Actions in like manner." This done, the Multitude so united
in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS.
This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God,
our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every
particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much
Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof,
he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home,
and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad.

The Definition Of A Common-wealth
And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which
(to define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude,
by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one
the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all,
as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence."

Soveraigne, And Subject, What
And he that carryeth this Person, as called SOVERAIGNE, and said
to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes.
One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children,
to submit themselves, and their children to his government,
as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by Warre subdueth
his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition.
The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man,
or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected
by him against all others. This later, may be called a Politicall
Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former,
a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak
of a Common-wealth by Institution.

CHAPTER XVIII

OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION

The Act Of Instituting A Common-wealth, What
A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude
of men do Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One,
that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly Of Men, shall be given
by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all,
(that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one,
as well he that Voted For It, as he that Voted Against It,
shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man,
or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own,
to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected
against other men.

The Consequences To Such Institution, Are
I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government
From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights,
and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power
is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are
not obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto.
And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth,
being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements
of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves,
to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without
his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch,
cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the
confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person
from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men:
for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed
Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do,
and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting,
all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man,
which is injustice: and they have also every man given the
Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore
if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own,
and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth
to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such
attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution,
Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice
for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his
own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas
some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign,
a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust:
for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body
that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant,
who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant
with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences,
that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile,
and unmanly disposition.

2. Soveraigne Power Cannot Be Forfeited
Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all,
is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another,
and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant
on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects,
by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection.
That he which is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects
beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the
whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a
severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party,
it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person:
and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men,
those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because
what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof,
is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done
in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular.
Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant
made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other
of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach,
there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie:
it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth
the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to
the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain
to grant Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that
any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition,
proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants
being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain,
or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is,
from the untyed hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath
the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all,
and performed by the strength of them all, in him united.
But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth
any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull
as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Covenant with the
Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions;
which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People.
That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular
Government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder
to the government of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate,
than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

3. No Man Can Without Injustice Protest Against The
Institution Of The Soveraigne Declared By The Major Part.
Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices declared
a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest;
that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do,
or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily
entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled,
he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore
tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne:
and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation
against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant,
and therfore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation,
or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either
submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre
he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed
by any man whatsoever.