Books: Meditations
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Marcus Aurelius >> Meditations
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XXVII. Within a while the earth shall cover us all, and then she
herself shall have her change. And then the course will be,
from one period of eternity unto another, and so a perpetual eternity.
Now can any man that shall consider with himself in his mind
the several rollings or successions of so many changes and alterations,
and the swiftness of all these rulings; can he otherwise
but contemn in his heart and despise all worldly things?
The cause of the universe is as it were a strong torrent,
it carrieth all away.
XXVIII. And these your professed politicians, the only true
practical philosophers of the world, (as they think of themselves)
so full of affected gravity, or such professed lovers of virtue
and honesty, what wretches be they in very deed; how vile and
contemptible in themselves? O man! what ado doest thou keep?
Do what thy nature doth now require. Resolve upon it, if thou mayest:
and take no thought, whether anybody shall know it or no.
Yea, but sayest thou, I must not expect a Plato's commonwealth.
If they profit though never so little, I must be content;
and think much even of that little progress. Doth then any of them
forsake their former false opinions that I should think they profit?
For without a change of opinions, alas! what is all that ostentation,
but mere wretchedness of slavish. minds, that groan privately,
and yet would make a show of obedience to reason, and truth? Go too
now and tell me of Alexander and Philippus, and Demetrius Phalereus.
Whether they understood what the common nature requireth, and could rule
themselves or no, they know best themselves. But if they kept a life,
and swaggered; I (God be thanked) am not bound to imitate them.
The effect of true philosophy is, unaffected simplicity and modesty.
Persuade me not to ostentation and vainglory.
XXIX. From some high place as it were to look down, and to behold
here flocks, and there sacrifices, without number; and all kind
of navigation; some in a rough and stormy sea, and some in a calm:
the general differences, or different estates of things, some, that are
now first upon being; the several and mutual relations of those things
that are together; and some other things that are at their last.
Their lives also, who were long ago, and theirs who shall be hereafter,
and the present estate and life of those many nations of barbarians
that are now in the world, thou must likewise consider in thy mind.
And how many there be, who never so much as heard of thy name, how many
that will soon forget it; how many who but even now did commend thee,
within a very little while perchance will speak ill of tbee.
So that neither fame, nor honour, nor anything else that this world
doth afford, is worth the while. The sum then of all; whatsoever doth
happen unto thee, whereof God is the cause, to accept it contentedly:
whatsoever thou doest, whereof thou thyself art the cause, to do
it justly: which will be, if both in thy resolution and in thy action
thou have no further end, than to do good unto others, as being that,
which by thy natural constitution, as a man, thou art bound unto.
XXX. Many of those things that trouble and straiten thee, it is in thy
power to cut off, as wholly depending from mere conceit and opinion;
and then thou shalt have room enough.
XXXI. To comprehend the whole world together in thy mind,
and the whole course of this present age to represent it
unto thyself, and to fix thy thoughts upon the sudden change
of every particular object. How short the time is from
the generation of anything, unto the dissolution of the same;
but how immense and infinite both that which was before
the generation, and that which after the generation of it shall be.
All things that thou seest, will soon be perished, and they
that see their corruptions, will soon vanish away themselves.
He that dieth a hundred years old, and he that dieth young,
shall come all to one.
XXXII. What are their minds and understandings; and what the things
that they apply themselves unto: what do they love, and what do they
hate for? Fancy to thyself the estate of their souls openly to be seen.
When they think they hurt them shrewdly, whom they speak ill of; and when
they think they do them a very good turn, whom they commend and extol:
O how full are they then of conceit, and opinion!
XXXIII. Loss and corruption, is in very deed nothing else but change
and alteration; and that is it, which the nature of the universe
doth most delight in, by which, and according to which,
whatsoever is done, is well done. For that was the estate
of worldly things from the beginning, and so shall it ever be.
Or wouldest. thou rather say, that all things in the world have gone
ill from the beginning for so many ages, and shall ever go ill?
And then among so many deities, could no divine power be found
all this while, that could rectify the things of the world?
Or is the world, to incessant woes and miseries, for ever condemned?
XXXIV. How base and putrid, every common matter is! Water, dust, and from
the mixture of these bones, and all that loathsome stuff that our
bodies do consist of: so subject to be infected, and corrupted.
And again those other things that are so much prized and admired,
as marble stones, what are they, but as it were the kernels
of the earth ? gold and silver, what are they, but as the more
gross faeces of the earth? Thy most royal apparel, for matter,
it is but as it were the hair of a silly sheep, and for colour,
the very blood of a shell-fish; of this nature are all other things.
Thy life itself, is some such thing too; a mere exhalation
of blood: and it also, apt to be changed into some other
common thing. XXXV. Will this querulousness, this murmuring,
this complaining and dissembling never be at an end? What then
is it, that troubleth thee? Doth any new thing happen unto thee?
What doest thou so wonder at? At the cause, or the matter?
Behold either by itself, is either of that weight and moment indeed?
And besides these, there is not anything. But thy duty towards
the Gods also, it is time thou shouldst acquit thyself of it
with more goodness and simplicity.
XXXVI. It is all one to see these things for a hundred of years
together or but for three years.
XXXVII. If he have sinned, his is the harm, not mine.
But perchance he hath not.
XXXVIII. Either all things by the providence of reason happen
unto every particular, as a part of one general body ;
and then it is against reason that a part should complain
of anything that happens for the good of the whole; or if,
according to Epicurus, atoms be the cause of all things and that life
be nothing else but an accidentary confusion of things, and death
nothing else, but a mere dispersion and so of all other things:
what doest thou trouble thyself for?
XXXIX. Sayest thou unto that rational part, Thou art dead;
corruption hath taken hold on thee? Doth it then also void excrements?
Doth it like either oxen, or sheep, graze or feed; that it also should
be mortal, as well as the body?
XL. Either the Gods can do nothing for us at all, or they can
still and allay all the distractions and distempers of thy mind.
If they can do nothing, why doest thou pray? If they can,
why wouldst not thou rather pray, that they will grant unto thee,
that thou mayst neither fear, nor lust after any of those worldly
things which cause these distractions and distempers of it?
Why not rather, that thou mayst not at either their absence or presence,
be grieved and discontented: than either that thou mayst obtain them,
or that thou mayst avoid them? For certainly it must needs be,
that if the Gods can help us in anything, they may in this kind also.
But thou wilt say perchance, 'In those things the Gods have given
me my liberty: and it is in mine own power to do what I will.'
But if thou mayst use this liberty, rather to set thy mind at
true liberty, than wilfully with baseness and servility of mind
to affect those things, which either to compass or to avoid
is not in thy power, wert not thou better? And as for the Gods,
who hath told thee, that they may not help us up even in those things
that they have put in our own power? whether it be so or no,
thou shalt soon perceive, if thou wilt but try thyself and pray.
One prayeth that he may compass his desire, to lie with such or
such a one, pray thou that thou mayst not lust to lie with her.
Another how he may be rid of such a one; pray thou that thou
mayst so patiently bear with him, as that thou have no such need
to be rid of him. Another, that he may not lose his child.
Pray thou that thou mayst not fear to lose him. To this end
and purpose, let all thy prayer be, and see what will be the event.
XLI. 'In my sickness' (saith Epicurus of himself:)
'my discourses were not concerning the nature of my disease,
neither was that, to them that came to visit me, the subject
of my talk; but in the consideration and contemplation of that,
which was of especial weight and moment, was all my time bestowed
and spent, and among others in this very thing, how my mind,
by a natural and unavoidable sympathy partaking in some sort
with the present indisposition of my body, might nevertheless
keep herself free from trouble, and in present possession
of her own proper happiness. Neither did I leave the ordering
of my body to the physicians altogether to do with me what
they would, as though I expected any great matter from them,
or as though I thought it a matter of such great consequence,
by their means to recover my health: for my present estate,
methought, liked me very well, and gave me good content.'
Whether therefore in sickness (if thou chance to sicken)
or in what other kind of extremity soever, endeavour thou also
to be in thy mind so affected, as he doth report of himself:
not to depart from thy philosophy for anything that can
befall thee, nor to give ear to the discourses of silly people,
and mere naturalists. XLII. It is common to all trades
and professions to mind and intend that only, which now they
are about, and the instrument whereby they work.
XLIII. When at any time thou art offended with any one's impudency,
put presently this question to thyself: 'What? Is it then possible,
that there should not be any impudent men in the world!
Certainly it is not possible.' Desire not then that which
is impossible. For this one, (thou must think) whosoever he be,
is one of those impudent ones, that the world cannot be without.
So of the subtile and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of every
one that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thyself.
For whilst in general thou dost thus reason with thyself,
that the kind of them must needs be in the world, thou wilt
be the better able to use meekness towards every particular.
This also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every
such occasion, presently to consider with thyself, what proper
virtue nature hath furnished man with, against such a vice,
or to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind.
As for example, against the unthankful, it hath given goodness
and meekness, as an antidote, and so against another vicious
in another kind some other peculiar faculty. And generally,
is it not in thy power to instruct him better, that is in an error?
For whosoever sinneth, doth in that decline from his purposed end,
and is certainly deceived, And again, what art thou the worse
for his sin? For thou shalt not find that any one of these,
against whom thou art incensed, hath in very deed done
anything whereby thy mind (the only true subject of thy hurt
and evil) can be made worse than it was. And what a matter
of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is unlearned,
do the deeds of one that is unlearned? Should not thou rather
blame thyself, who, when upon very good grounds of reason,
thou mightst have thought it very probable, that such a thing
would by such a one be committed, didst not only not foresee it,
but moreover dost wonder at it, that such a thing should be.
But then especially, when thou dost find fault with either
an unthankful, or a false man, must thou reflect upon thyself.
For without all question, thou thyself art much in fault,
if either of one that were of such a disposition,
thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee:
or when unto any thou didst a good turn, thou didst not
there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end;
nor didst not think that from the action itself thou hadst
received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done.
For what wouldst thou have more? Unto him that is a man,
thou hast done a good turn: doth not that suffice thee?
What thy nature required, that hast thou done. Must thou
be rewarded for it? As if either the eye for that it seeth,
or the feet that they go, should require satisfaction.
For as these being by nature appointed for such an use,
can challenge no more, than that they may work according
to their natural constitution: so man being born to do
good unto others whensoever he doth a real good unto any
by helping them out of error; or though but in middle things,
as in matter of wealth, life, preferment, and the like, doth help
to further their desires he doth that for which he was made,
and therefore can require no more.
THE TENTH BOOK
I. O my soul, the time I trust will be, when thou shalt be good,
simple, single, more open and visible, than that body by which it
is enclosed. Thou wilt one day be sensible of their happincss,
whose end is love, and their affections dead to all worldly things.
Thou shalt one day be full, and in want of no external thing:
not seeking pleasure from anything, either living or insensible,
that this world can afford; neither wanting time for the continuation
of thy pleasure, nor place and opportunity, nor the favour either
of the weather or of men. When thou shalt have content in thy
present estate, and all things present shall add to thy content:
when thou shalt persuade thyself, that thou hast all things;
all for thy good, and all by the providence of the Gods:
and of things future also shalt be as confident, that all will do well,
as tending to the maintenance and preservation in some sort, of his
perfect welfare and happiness, who is perfection of life, of goodness,
and beauty; who begets all things, and containeth all things in himself,
and in himself doth recollect all things from all places that
are dissolved, that of them he may beget others again like unto them.
Such one day shall be thy disposition, that thou shalt be able,
both in regard of the Gods, and in regard of men, so to fit and order
thy conversation, as neither to complain of them at any time,
for anything that they do; nor to do anything thyself, for which thou
mayest justly be condemned.
II. As one who is altogether governed by nature, let it be thy care
to observe what it is that thy nature in general doth require.
That done, if thou find not that thy nature, as thou art a living
sensible creature, will be the worse for it, thou mayest proceed.
Next then thou must examine, what thy nature as thou art a living
sensible creature, doth require. And that, whatsoever it be,
thou mayest admit of and do it, if thy nature as thou art
a reasonable living creature, will not be the worse for it.
Now whatsoever is reasonable, is also sociable, Keep thyself
to these rules, and trouble not thyself about idle things.
III. Whatsoever doth happen unto thee, thou art naturally
by thy natural constitution either able, or not able to bear.
If thou beest able, be not offended, but bear it according
to thy natural constitution, or as nature hath enabled thee.
If thou beest not able, be not offended. For it will
soon make an end of thee, and itself, (whatsoever it be)
at the same time end with thee. But remember, that whatsoever
by the strength of opinion, grounded upon a certain apprehension
of both true profit and duty, thou canst conceive tolerable;
that thou art able to bear that by thy natural constitution.
IV. Him that offends, to teach with love and meek ness, and to show
him his error. But if thou canst not, then to blame thyself;
or rather not thyself neither, if thy will and endeavours have
not been wanting.
V. Whatsoever it be that happens unto thee, it is that which from all
time was appointed unto thee. For by the same coherence of causes,
by which thy substance from all eternity was appointed to be,
was also whatsoever should happen unto it, destinated and appointed.
VI. Either with Epicurus, we must fondly imagine the atoms
to be the cause of all things, or we must needs grant a nature.
Let this then be thy first ground, that thou art
part of that universe, which is governed by nature.
Then secondly, that to those parts that are of the same kind
and nature as thou art, thou hast relation of kindred.
For of these, if I shall always be mindful, first as I am
a part, I shall never be displeased with anything, that falls
to my particular share of the common chances of the world.
For nothing that is behoveful unto the whole, can be truly
hurtful to that which is part of it. For this being the common
privilege of all natures, that they contain nothing in themselves
that is hurtful unto them; it cannot be that the nature of
the universe (whose privilege beyond other particular natures,
is, that she cannot against her will by any higher external
cause be constrained,) should beget anything and cherish it
in her bosom that should tend to her own hurt and prejudice.
As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an universe,
I shall not be displeased with anything that happens.
And as I have relation of kindred to those parts that are
of the same kind and nature that I am, so I shall be careful
to do nothing that is prejudicial to the community, but in
all my deliberations shall they that are of my kind ever be;
and the common good, that, which all my intentions and
resolutions shall drive unto, as that which is contrary unto it,
I shall by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid.
These things once so fixed and concluded, as thou wouldst
think him a happy citizen, whose constant study and practice
were for the good and benefit of his fellow citizens,
and the carriage of the city such towards him, that he were
well pleased with it ; so must it needs be with thee,
that thou shalt live a happy life.
VII. All parts of the world, (all things I mean that are contained
within the whole world, must of necessity at some time or other come
to corruption. Alteration I should say, to speak truly and properly;
but that I may be the better understood, I am content at this time
to use that more common word. Now say I, if so be that this be both
hurtful unto them, and yet unavoidable, would not, thinkest thou,
the whole itself be in a sweet case, all the parts of it being
subject to alteration, yea and by their making itself fitted
for corruption, as consisting of things different and contrary?
And did nature then either of herself thus project and purpose
the affliction and misery of her parts, and therefore of purpose
so made them, not only that haply they might, but of necessity
that they should fall into evil; or did not she know what she did,
when she made them? For either of these two to say, is equally absurd.
But to let pass nature in general, and to reason of things
particular according to their own particular natures; how absurd
and ridiculous is it, first to say that all parts of the whole are,
by their proper natural constitution, subject to alteration; and then
when any such thing doth happen, as when one doth fall sick and dieth,
to take on and wonder as though some strange thing had happened?
Though this besides might move not so grievously to take on
when any such thing doth happen, that whatsoever is dissolved,
it is dissolved into those things, whereof it was compounded.
For every dissolution is either a mere dispersion, of the elements
into those elements again whereof everything did consist,
or a change, of that which is more solid into earth;
and of that which is pure and subtile or spiritual, into air.
So that by this means nothing is lost, but all resumed again into
those rational generative seeds of the universe; and this universe,
either after a certain period of time to lie consumed by fire,
or by continual changes to be renewed, and so for ever to endure.
Now that solid and spiritual that we speak of, thou must not conceive
it to be that very same, which at first was, when thou wert born.
For alas! all this that now thou art in either kind, either for matter
of substance, or of life, hath but two or three days ago partly from
meats eaten, and partly from air breathed in, received all its influx,
being the same then in no other respect, than a running river,
maintained by the perpetual influx and new supply of waters, is the same.
That therefore which thou hast since received, not that which came
from thy mother, is that which comes to change and corruption.
But suppose that that for the general substance, and more solid part
of it, should still cleave unto thee never so close, yet what is
that to the proper qualities and affections of it, by which persons
are distinguished, which certainly are quite different?
VIII. Now that thou hast taken these names upon thee of good,
modest, true; of emfrwn, sumfrwn, uperfrwn; take heed lest
at any times by doing anything that is contrary, thou be but
improperly so called, and lose thy right to these appellations.
Or if thou do, return unto them again with all possible speed.
And remember, that the word emfrwn notes unto thee an intent
and intelligent consideration of every object that presents
itself unto thee, without distraction. And the word emfrwn
a ready and contented acceptation of whatsoever by the appointment
of the common nature, happens unto thee. And the word sumfrwn,
a super-extension, or a transcendent, and outreaching disposition
of thy mind, whereby it passeth by all bodily pains and pleasures,
honour and credit, death and whatsoever is of the same nature,
as matters of absolute indifferency, and in no wise to be stood
upon by a wise man. These then if inviolably thou shalt observe,
and shalt not be ambitious to be so called by others, both thou
thyself shalt become a new man, and thou shalt begin a new life.
For to continue such as hitherto thou hast been, to undergo those
distractions and distempers as thou must needs for such a life
as hitherto thou hast lived, is the part of one that is very foolish,
and is overfond of his life. Whom a man might compare to one of those
half-eaten wretches, matched in the amphitheatre with wild beasts;
who as full as they are all the body over with wounds and blood,
desire for a great favour, that they may be reserved till the next day,
then also, and in the same estate to be exposed to the same nails
and teeth as before. Away therefore, ship thyself; and from
the troubles and distractions of thy former life convey thyself
as it were unto these few names; and if thou canst abide in them,
or be constant in the practice and possession of them, continue there
as glad and joyful as one that were translated unto some such place
of bliss and happiness as that which by Hesiod and Plato is called
the Islands of the Blessed, by others called the Elysian Fields.
And whensoever thou findest thyself; that thou art in danger of a relapse,
and that thou art not able to master and overcome those difficulties
and temptations that present themselves in thy present station:
get thee into any private corner, where thou mayst be better able.
Or if that will not serve forsake even thy life rather.
But so that it be not in passion but in a plain voluntary modest way:
this being the only commendable action of thy whole life that thus
thou art departed, or this having been the main work and business
of thy whole life, that thou mightest thus depart. Now for the better
remembrance of those names that we have spoken of, thou shalt find
it a very good help, to remember the Gods as often as may be:
and that, the thing which they require at our hands of as many of us,
as are by nature reasonable creation is not that with fair words,
and outward show of piety and devotion we should flatter them,
but that we should become like unto them: and that as all other
natural creatures, the fig tree for example; the dog the bee:
both do, all of them, and apply themselves unto that.
which by their natural constitution, is proper unto them;
so man likewise should do that, which by his nature, as he is a man,
belongs unto him.
IX. Toys and fooleries at home, wars abroad: sometimes terror,
sometimes torpor, or stupid sloth : this is thy daily slavery.
By little and little, if thou doest not better look to it,
those sacred dogmata will be blotted out of thy mind.
How many things be there, which when as a mere naturalist,
thou hast barely considered of according to their nature,
thou doest let pass without any further use? Whereas thou
shouldst in all things so join action and contemplation, that thou
mightest both at the same time attend all present occasions,
to perform everything duly and carefully and yet so intend
the contemplative part too, that no part of that delight
and pleasure, which the contemplative knowledge of everything
according to its true nature doth of itself afford,
might be lost. Or, that the true and contemn plative knowledge
of everything according to its own nature, might of itself,
(action being subject to many lets and impediments)
afford unto thee sufficient pleasure and happiness.
Not apparent indeed, but not concealed. And when shalt thou attain
to the happiness of true simplicity, and unaffected gravity?
When shalt thou rejoice in the certain knowledge of every
particular object according to its true nature: as what the matter
and substance of it is; what use it is for in the world:
how long it can subsist: what things it doth consist of:
who they be that are capable of it, and who they that can give it,
and take it away?
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