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ORATION XXV.

REPLY TO "THE OVERTHROW OF THE DEMOCRACY."

1. I can easily excuse your anger, gentlemen of the jury, as you hear
such words and recall the past, towards all alike who remained in the
town; but I wonder at the accusers who neglect their own interests to
attend to other men's. And although clearly knowing who were guilty and
who not, they try to persuade you to be angry at all of us. 2. If then
they suppose they have made accusation about everything done by the
Thirty to the state, I think they are unable to speak, for they have not
told the smallest part of what they did. But if they make accusation
about these as if it concerned me, I will prove that they are all wrong,
and that I conducted myself as the best member of the Piraeus party would
have done if he remained in the town. 3. I beg you, gentlemen of the
jury, not to share the opinions of the informers. For it is their habit
to charge men who are perfectly innocent, for they get the most from
these, but it is your duty to give civil rights impartially to those who
are upright; for so you would have the most adherents for the existing
order of things. 4. And 1 beg you, gentlemen of the jury, if I shall
prove I am the cause of no calamity, and have benefited the state in many
ways, both, in person and by contributions, that I may obtain at your
hands the favor which not only those who have done good work, but those
who have done no wrong, should receive. 5. So I think it a great proof,
that if the accusers could convict me of private wrong they would not
accuse me of the crimes of the Thirty, and they would not think it
necessary to accuse others of their deeds, but to provide the offenders
themselves. But now they think the anger against them is sufficient to
destroy even the innocent. 6. But I do not think it is just if persons
have greatly aided the state, that others should gain honors and thanks
from you, nor if any have injured (the state) that the innocent should be
falsely accused and slandered on their account; for the present enemies
of the state are sufficient and think it a great gain if men are unjustly
slandered.

7. And I will try to show you what citizens I think are likely to favor
an oligarchy and a democracy. For from this you too will know, and I
shall make my defense by proving, that I have no reason to be ill-
disposed to the state's interest, either on the ground of what I did
under the oligarchy or the democracy. 8. Now in the first place, you must
bear in mind that no one favors an oligarchical or a democratic form of
government naturally, but whatever form of government is for a man's
advantage, that one he wishes to establish. Hence it rests largely with
you that as many as possible should be in favor of things as they now
stand. And that this is so, is not difficult for you to see from the
past. 9. For see, gentlemen of the jury, how often the leaders of both
parties have changed. Did not Phrynichus and Peisander and the other
demagogues of their party, after wronging you many times, in fear of the
punishment resulting from their deeds, establish the first oligarchy,
while many of the Four Hundred united with the Piraeus party, and some of
those who exiled them became themselves members of the Thirty? And some
of those who enlisted for Eleusis started out with you and besieged their
own party. 10. It is very easy to see, gentlemen of the jury, that the
differences between men are not at all dependent on the form of
government, but due to personal advantages. So you should examine
citizens with this in view, considering what their political relations
were, and inquiring what they gained by a change in conditions. In this
way you will judge most fairly about them. 11. So I believe that the men
who were dishonored under the democracy after rendering their accounts,
or were deprived of property or suffered some other misfortune, (that
these) are likely to desire a revolution, in the hope that the change
will result to their advantage. But about the men who did much good for
the state and no evil, to whom your thanks were due rather than
punishment, (about these) you should accept no accusations, even if every
one says they incline to the oligarchy. 12. To me, gentlemen of the jury,
neither in private or public affairs did any disadvantage come on account
of which. I was anxious to exchange existing evils for a different form
of government. For I have been trierarch five times, and four times I
have been in naval engagements, and have paid many extra taxes in war,
and have furnished the other contributions no less than other citizens.
13. Accordingly on this account I expended more than those appointed by
the state, that I might stand better with you, and if any misfortune came
to me that I could defend myself better. I was deprived of all advantages
from these things under the oligarchy. For they did not think that those
who had benefited the state should gain favor from themselves, but they
honored those who had Injured you most, taking this as assurance from us.
All should remember these things, and not trust the words of these men,
but from the facts investigate what each, man did. 14. For I, gentlemen
of the jury, was not of the party of the Four Hundred. Let any one who
wishes step out and confute me; nor indeed will any one prove that while
the Thirty were in power I either took part in the government nor held
any office. So if I was unwilling when I could hold office, I should
receive your honor, but if those then in power did not allow me to share
in the government, is it not evident that I prove the falsehoods of my
accusers?

15. Besides, gentlemen of the jury, you should also consider the other
things I did. For I conducted myself in the misfortunes of the state in
such a way that if all had held the same ideas as I, no one of you would
have met with any misfortune. For under the oligarchy no one will be
shown to have been arrested by me, nor did I punish one of my enemies,
nor reward a friend. 16. It is not right to wonder at this. For to act
uprightly at that time was difficult, and easy for one who wished to do
wrong. Besides, I shall not be proved to have enrolled any Athenian on
the list, nor to have decided against any, nor to have become more
wealthy from your failures. Accordingly if you are angry against those
who are responsible for what has happened, it is fitting that you should
consider those as noble men who have done no wrong. 17. Now, gentlemen of
the jury, I think I have given the greatest pledge to the democracy
about, myself. For the man who made no slip when so great an opportunity
offered is just the one who will be anxious to be of use, knowing well
that if he (_I_) does wrong, he (_I_) will pay the penalty at
once. But I am always so disposed as not to desire a revolution in time
of the oligarchy, and in the democracy to spend all I have zealously for
your interests.

18. But I think, gentlemen of the jury, that it would not be just for you
to hate those who under the oligarchy were not unfortunate, when you had
reason for anger towards those who did not flee as your enemies, but
rather those who banished you, and not those who were anxious to save
their property, but those who robbed others, not those who remained in
the town for their own safety, but those who wished to destroy others and
share in authority. But if you think it necessary to destroy those whom
they (_the oligarchy_) passed by in their career of wrong, no one of
the citizens will be left out.

19. And from these considerations, gentlemen of the jury, you should
reason, for you all know that in the former democracy many of the leaders
of the state stole public funds, some accepted bribes while the state was
in a critical state, and some by giving information made the allies
revolt. And if the Thirty punished these alone, you would think them good
men; but now because I thought the people were suffering from the wrong
these men committed, you are angry, believing it to be a terrible thing
that the wrongs of a few should come upon all the state. 20. So it is not
right to use those measures in which you see they are wrong, nor to
consider those things just when you inflict them on others, which you
believe you suffered unjustly. But you are to have the same opinion about
these when you come back to authority that you had about yourselves when
in exile. For under these conditions you will bring about the greatest
harmony, and the state will be increased, and you will legislate to the
greatest discomfiture of your enemies.

21. But you must remember, gentlemen of the jury, what happened in the
time of the Thirty, that the mistakes of your enemies may make you
legislate better for yourselves. For when you heard that the men in the
town were of one opinion, you had small hope of returning, thinking that
our harmony was the greatest hindrance in your exile; (22) but when you
learned that three thousand were revolting, and the rest of the citizens
had been banished from the town, and the Thirty were divided in opinion,
more being anxious for you than acting against you, then you expected to
return and punish your enemies. For you prayed the gods for just what you
saw them doing, believing you would be saved through the baseness of the
Thirty rather than return through the power of the exiles. 23. Therefore,
gentlemen of the jury, you must in the light of previous experiences plan
for the future, and believe those are most patriotic who wish to
harmonize you, and abide by their oaths and pledges, thinking that this
course of action is safest for the state, and the most unfortunate for
their enemies. For nothing would be harder for them than this, to learn
that we are sharing in authority, and to perceive that the citizens are
on such terms that no accusation can be made among them. 24. But ft is
right to know, gentlemen of the jury, that the exiles wish to slander and
dishonor as many of the other citizens as they can, in the hope that
those wronged by you will become their allies, and they expect that the
informers will stand well with you and come to great influence in the
state. For they believe that their baseness is safety for themselves.

25. It is worth, while to recall what was done after the Four Hundred.
For you will understand that what they advised never was for your
advantage, but what I advise is for the lasting advantage of both forms
of government. For you know, Epigenes and Demophanes and Cleisthenes as
private citizens enjoyed the privileges of the state, but in their
political career were responsible for the gravest errors. 26. For they
persuaded you to condemn to death some without a trial, to confiscate
unjustly the property of many, and to banish citizens and deprive them of
their civil rights. For they were such men as to let the guilty go for a
bribe, and to ruin the innocent by bringing information to you. And they
did not cease until they brought the state to a state of confusion and
utter ruin, and had raised themselves from poverty to wealth. 27. But you
were in such a condition that you received the exiles, restored civil
rights and swore to keep the peace. And finally you would more willingly
have aided the informer in the democracy than the leaders in the
oligarchy. Naturally too, gentlemen of the jury. For it is evident to all
that the democracy arose from the unjust conduct of men in the oligarchy,
and that the oligarchy was twice established because of the informers in
the democracy. So there is no use in taking these men as counselors, for
their advice has never been an aid. 28. And It should be realized that
those of the Piraeus party who have the greatest reputation, and risked
the most and benefited you most, advised the people to be faithful to
their oaths and agreements, considering that this was the safeguard of
the democracy. For it will bring security to the city party for the past,
and for the Piraeus party their form of government will remain the
longest time. 29. These are the ones you should trust with much more
reason than those who in exile were brought back through others and
become informers on their return. But I think, gentlemen of the jury,
that some of those who remained in the city evidently share my opinions,
both under the democracy and the oligarchy, as many as are citizens. 30.
And it is a matter for speculation what they would have done, had they
been allowed to become members of the Thirty, as they now under a
democracy do the same things as they (_the Thirty_), and suddenly
became wealthy men, never giving any account of the many offices they
hold, but they arouse, suspicion instead of harmony, have declared war
and not peace, and through them we have lost the confidence of the
Greeks. 31. They are responsible for such evils and many others, and
differ from the Thirty only that those during the oligarchy desired what
these do, while these men under the democracy desire what those do, and
both parties think it a duty to wrong whomsoever they wish, as if all
other men were guilty, while they themselves were the noblest men. 32.
Yet they are not so much to be wondered at as you, because you know the
democracy exists, while that happens which they wish, and the men are
punished, not who are wronging the people, but are not giving up their
property. 33. And they would rather have the city small than great
through others, considering that because of the dangers of the Piraeus
party they can do what they please, and if you are afterwards aided by
others they will injure these, while the former will gain greater power.
So by this very fear they stand in the way if any advantage comes to you
through others. 34. It is not hard to understand if one wishes; and these
are not anxious to escape notice, but they are ashamed not to seem base,
while you yourselves see and hear from others.

But we, gentlemen of the jury, think it our duty to abide by our
agreements and oaths, and likewise when we see the guilty paying the
penalty we pity them, remembering what was done, but when you clearly
punish the innocent as the guilty, you will bring suspicion upon us all
by the same vote.

ORATION XXVIII.

ERGOCLES.

1. The accusations are so many and so terrible, men of Athens, that I
think Ergocles could not pay, even by several deaths, a sufficient
penalty to the state for each of his deeds. For he is shown to have
betrayed cities, wronged foreign residents and citizens, and from poverty
raised himself to wealth from your resources. 2. And how could they
obtain pardon, when you see your ships which they command dispersing
through lack of funds, becoming few out of many, and these poor and needy
men sailing in them and so quickly gaining the wealth of the citizens? It
is for you, men of Athens, to be enraged against them; (3) for it would
be strange if you yourselves, so burdened by taxes, should grant pardon
to thieves and corrupt men now, but formerly, when your estates were
large as well as the state revenue, you punished with death men who
desired your property.

4. And I think you all are agreed if Thrasyboulus had announced to you he
was going to sail out with triremes, and would hand over these old ones
in place of new ones, and the risks would be yours, but the profits
belong to his friends, and he would make you poorer through the tributes,
but would make Ergocles and his followers the richest of citizens, no one
of you would have trust him to have the ships and sail out. 5. Especially
as soon as you passed a vote that he was to keep account of the money
taken from the cities, and that his fellow-commanders were to sail home
to give their accounts, Ergocles said that you were extortionate and were
holding to the old laws, and he advised Thrasyboulus to seize Byzantium,
and to keep the ships, and marry the daughter of Seuthes. 6. "That you
may thwart their extortions," he said, "for you will make them fear for
themselves, and no longer sit at home plotting against you and your
friends." So, fellow Athenians, as soon as they had their fill, and were
enjoying what belonged to you, they considered themselves aliens of the
state. 7. For as soon as they are rich they hate you, and they do not
prepare themselves to obey, but to rule you, and fearing for what they
have stolen, they are ready to seize fortified places, to set up an
oligarchy, and to do everything to place you daily in the greatest
danger; for thus they think that you will no longer pay attention to
their offenses, but that, fearing for yourselves and the state, you will
keep quiet in regard to them. 8. So Thrasyboulus, fellow Athenians (for I
need to say nothing further about him), did well to die as he did; for it
was not right for him to live planning such deeds, nor to be put to death
at your hands after his former good services to you, but to be freed from
the state as he was. 9. And we see these men on account of the assembly
of day before yesterday not sparing their money, but trying to purchase
their lives from the orators, and from their enemies, and from the
Prytanes, and bribing many Athenians. Against this charge you should
defend yourselves by punishing this man, and should show all men that
there is not enough money to weaken you so that you do not punish
offenders. 10. For remember, fellow Athenians, that this trial does not
concern Ergocles alone, but all the state. For now you will show your
leaders whether it is necessary to be just, or whether, after stealing as
much as possible of your funds, (they can) procure safety for themselves
by the same means as they now attempt (to use). It is to be clearly
known, fellow Athenians, (11) whoever in such lack of resources on your
side either betrays cities, or embezzles funds, or bribes (others), is
the sort of man to betray the walls and fleet to the enemy, and changes
our democracy to an oligarchy. It is not right for you to submit to their
schemes, but to establish a precedent to all men, and let no
considerations of gain, compassion, or anything else be of more
importance to you than their punishment.

12. I believe that Ergocles, fellow Athenians, will not attempt to defend
himself about Halicarnassus, and his office, and what he has done, but
lie will say that he came from Phyle, and was on the democratic side, and
shared your dangers. But I, fellow Athenians, think otherwise about these
things. 13. But those who aim for freedom and justice, and wish to
strengthen the laws, and hate wrong-doers I do not call bad citizens, nor
do I say that the exile of the party may not be fairly taken into
account; but against those who came down, and under the democracy annoyed
the people, and increased their own estates from your resources, we
should be more indignant than against the Thirty. 14. For these were
elected for this very purpose, that they might injure you if possible;
but to these men you entrusted yourselves, that they might make the city
great and free. Nothing of the sort has resulted for you, but as far as
these are concerned, you have been placed in greatest danger, so that,
there is more cause for pitying yourselves than them, and your children
and wives, that you are ill-treated by such fellows. 15. For when we have
made up our minds that we are in safety, we suffer more from our leaders
than from the enemy. Actually you all know that we have no hope of safety
if once unsuccessful. So it is right for you to take courage and inflict
the greatest penalty upon these men, and show the rest of Greece that you
punish offenders, and you will make your leaders better. 16. This then is
my advice to you; and it is necessary for you to know that if you follow
my advice you will legislate wisely, and if not, the rest of the citizens
will become baser. And besides, fellow Athenians, if you acquit them,
they will not thank you, but the bribes they have given, and the money
they have embezzled. 17. And moreover, men of Athens, the Halicarnassians
and the others who have been swindled by them, if you inflict the
severest penalty upon them, will think they were ruined by these fellows,
but that you came to their aid; but if you acquit them, they will think
you connived at their ill-treatment. So it is right for you to remember
all these facts, and to favor your friends, and exact punishment from the
offenders.

ORATION XXX.

NICOMACHUS.

1. It has been the case, gentlemen of the jury, that some men coming up
for trial appeared guilty, and yet by showing the valor of their
ancestors and their own services have obtained pardon from you. As you
accept this from defendants, if they show they have performed any service
to the state, I beg you also to listen to the prosecution, if they make
evident the baseness of the defendant. 2. It would take too long to tell
you that the father of Nicomachus was a public slave, and what sort of a
life this man led when a young man, and what age he was when he was
enrolled in his phratria; but while he was copyist of the laws, who does
not know how he injured the state? For when he was commanded to
transcribe the laws of Solon in four months, he made himself the lawgiver
instead of Solon, and instead of four months he gave himself the office
for six years, and while taking pay daily, he wrote some laws, and erased
some. 3. He brought matters to such a pass that we had the laws dealt out
to us by his hand, and plaintiffs and defendants quoted opposing laws in
the courts, both claiming they derived them from Nicomachus. And although
the Archons fined him and summoned him to court, he would not hand over
the laws, and the city got into the greatest difficulties before he was
deposed from his office and rendered the account of what he had done. 4.
And as he paid no penalty for that, what sort of an office has he now
established for himself? He who has written for four years when he could
have finished in thirty days? Then, though it was defined from what he
was to copy, he took matters into his own hands, and while having so much
in charge, he was the only official who did not render an account. 5. But
others give in an account of their office according to the Prytany, but
you, Nicomachus, did not think it necessary to send in yours for four
years, but you think you alone of all the citizens can hold office for a
long time, and not hand in an account, nor obey decrees, nor consider the
laws, but here you write, and there you erase, and have reached such a
pitch of arrogance as to think the property of the state is yours,
although, you are the state's slave. 6. Now it is necessary, gentlemen of
the jury, for you to bear in mind who the ancestors of Nicomachus were,
and how ungratefully he has treated you contrary to law, and to punish
him, and as you did not exact the penalty for each offense, now punish
him for them all. 7. And perhaps, gentlemen of the jury, since he cannot
defend himself, he will try to slander me. It is only then I think you
will believe what he says about me when in giving my defense I shall be
unable to prove his. But if he tries to speak as (he did) in the Boule,
you will be told I was one of the Four Hundred. From the talk of these
men, the Four Hundred will become more than a thousand. For slanderers
bring this up against men who were children at that time, and those who
were out of the city. 8. And I was so far from being one of the Four
Hundred, that I was not even one of the Five Thousand. It seems to me to
be a strange thing that if in a private suit I had so plainly convicted
him of ill-doing, he would not have thought of escaping by such a
defense, but now when the trial is in regard to state affairs he thinks
by accusing me to escape paying the penalty to you.

9. Besides, I think it strange that Nicomachus believe in trumping up old
scores against others as offenders, when I shall show that he had plots
against the people. Now hear me; for it is just, gentlemen of the jury,
to receive such a defense in regard to such men as say now they are
devoted to the people, when once they tried to ruin the people. 10. And
when the revolution was being brought about at the defeat of the fleet,
Cleophon charges the Boule, claiming that it was conspiring and not
acting for the best interests of the state. And Satyrus of Kephisia, a
member of the Boule, persuade the Boule to bind him and throw him into
prison. And they, wishing to destroy him, (11) and fearing that they
might not kill kill in prison, persuaded Nicomachides to bring up a law
that the Boule, too, must vote in judicial matters. And this basest of
all men evidently joined the plot, and on the day of the trial produced
the law. 12. One might accuse Cleophon, gentlemen at the jury, on other
accounts; but all are agreed that the men who were bent on destroying the
people wished above all to get him out of the way, and that Satyrus and
Chremon, who were members of the Thirty, accused Cleophon not because
they were incensed at him on your account, but that they might injure you
after having put him to death. 13. And this they accomplished through the
law which Nicomachus proposed. You should consider this, even as many of
you as thought Cleophon a bad citizen, that perhaps some one of those put
to death by the Thirty was base, but nevertheless that on account of such
you should be angry at the Thirty, that they killed these not for their
crimes, but on party grounds. 14. If he defends himself on these grounds,
remember this, that at such a crisis he produced the law by which the
revolution occurred, and he aided those who destroyed the democracy, and
made it possible for the Boule of that time to vote on judicial matters,
(the Boule) in which Satyrus and Chremon had great influence, and
Strombichides, and Calliades, and many other noble citizens perished.

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