Books: The Orations of Lysias
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Lysias >> The Orations of Lysias
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77. But I know not why we should grieve. For we were not unaware that we
were mortal. So why should we now mourn for those (who have suffered)
what we have long realized we should suffer, or why be so downcast at
natural occurrences, in the knowledge that death is the common experience
of the evil and the good? For he (_Death_) neither overlooks the
base nor loves the good, but comes equally to all. 78. For if it is
possible for men who escaped dangers by word to be immortal for all time,
the living would bewail the dead for all time. But now nature, subject to
diseases and old age and the divinity who presides over our fates are
inexorable. 79. So it is fitting to regard those men most fortunate, who
have met their end, risking their lives for the noblest and best things,
not entrusting themselves to fortune, nor waiting the appointed death,
but choosing the noblest. For memories of them are undying, and their
honors envied by all men. 80. They are mourned as mortal for nature's
sake, but are sung of immortal for their valor. For they are publicly
buried, and for them are held contests of strength and wisdom and wealth,
as if those dying in war are to receive the same honor as the immortals.
81. Thus I praise their death and envy (them), and they are the ones of
all men who I believe are the happiest in coming into the world, who,
though in possession of mortal bodies, have left an immortal memory for
their valor. But yet we must observe the usual customs and keeping our
ancestral rites, mourn the dead.
ORATION V.
FOR CALLIAS.
1. If Callias were contending for anything else than for his freedom,
gentlemen of the jury, I should be satisfied with what the others have
said. But now I think it would be a shame not to aid Callias as well as I
can, as far as justice warrants it, for he demands and begs me (for the
service), and is a friend of mine and (was) of my father as long as he
lived, and many business transactions took place between us. 2. I used to
think that he so conducted himself in the city as to obtain some honor at
your hands much rather than be brought into such danger on such a charge
(as this). But now designing men make life no less dangerous for the
innocent than for wrong-doers.
3. And you ought not to reward as trustworthy the testimony of his
slaves, and as unreliable the evidence of these men, when you recall that
no one, either a private citizen or an official, ever brought an action
against Callias, but while living in this city, he benefited you in many
ways, and he has reached this time of life without incurring any charge
at all. These, on the other hand, while they have suffered greatly during
their lives, and gone through much misery, just as if they worked much
good, make speeches on questions of freedom. And I do not wonder. 4. For
they know that if they are caught in lies they will have no worse lot
than at present, and if they pull the wool over your eyes they will be
freed from their present miseries. Moreover, it is not right to consider
as trustworthy, either as accusers or witnesses, such men as give
testimony about others at a great gain to themselves, but much rather
such only who run some risk by aiding public interests. 5. Also it seems
to me fair to consider that the trial is not confined to these men, but
is of importance to all in the city. For these are not the only ones who
own slaves, but all other citizens also. And the (slaves), fixing their
attention on the fate of these, will no longer watch to see what good
action they may do to their masters to gain their freedom, but what
slanderous accusation they may make (to obtain it).
ORATION VII.
THE OLIVE TREE.
1. I used to think, (members of the) Boule, that it was possible, if one
wished, to keep quiet, and not to be troubled with lawsuits and vexatious
business; but I have now fallen in with such unlooked-for charges and
such villainous accusers that, were it possible, it seems to me even
unborn generations must fear for what is before them. For through this
sort of men those who have done no wrong are in as great danger as those
who have committed the greatest crimes. 2. The trial is the more
perplexing to me, as I was first charged on the indictment with having
cut down a sacred olive on my land; and my accusers went to the men who
had bought the fruit of the olives, making inquiries. As they could find
no proof against me in this way, they now charge me with having cut down
an old stump, thinking that this charge will be the hardest for me to
gainsay, and the easiest for them to prove what they wish. 3. And I am
compelled, on matter which they have brought into court fully worked up,
to fight for the enjoyment of country and property, having only heard the
charges at the same moment as you who are to decide the case. So I shall
tell you everything from the beginning.
4. The place formerly belonged to Peisander. When his estate was
confiscated, it was given by the people to Apollodorus of Megara. He
farmed it some time and a little while before the time of the Thirty,
Anticles bought it of him and let it. And I bought it of Anticles in time
of peace. 5. So I think, (members of the) Boule, that it is my duty to
prove that when I bought the place there was not an olive tree nor stump
upon it. For, if before that time there had been ten thousand olives, I
don't think I could justly be made to suffer for it. If the olives were
not injured by me, I could not be held accountable for the crimes of
others. 6. You all know that among the other evils caused by the war was
this, that while estates at a distance from the city used to be plundered
by the Lacedaemonians, the estates near it used to be sacked by our own
citizens. Would it be at all just for me to pay the penalty for the
damage done by our public disasters? Especially as the place, on account
of its confiscation, was abandoned for more than three years. 7. It is
not to be wondered at if olive trees were destroyed at a time when it was
impossible for us to protect our own property. You know, (members of the)
Boule, especially such of you as have charge of these things, that there
were at that time many places thick with olives, both private and sacred
ones, most of which have now been cut down, and the land has become bare.
You would not think of inflicting punishment on those who owned the place
in peace and war, when it was other people who out them down. 8. If those
who farmed the place at different times of the period are not held
responsible, all the more ought those who did not buy until the peace, be
considered harmless by you.
9. However much I might say about the place before I bought it, I think I
have said enough. Within five days after I obtained the place I let it
out to Callistratus in the archonship of Pythodorus. 10. He farmed it two
years, receiving no olive tree, sacred or otherwise, nor any olive stump.
Demetrius had it the third year. In the fourth year I let it to Alcias, a
freedman of Antisthenes who has been dead three years. Finally, Proteus
hired it. Come here, witnesses.
WITNESSES.
11. When that time elapsed I farmed it myself. My accuser says that it
was during the archonship of Sumiades that I out down the olive. But
those who farmed it before I did, and hired it many years of me, assure
you that there was no olive on the place. What can be clearer than that
my accuser is lying? It could not be possible if there were no tree
there, that I, farming the place last, cut it down.
12. Formerly, (members of the) Boule, when men said that I was sharp and
careful, and would do nothing without a plan and purpose, I was annoyed
and preferred that they should speak of me as they ought; now, however, I
should like all of you to have this opinion about me, that you may
believe that I took good care to see--since (as he says) I was taking
such matters in hand--what profit there was in cutting it down, and what
penalty for so doing, what good I should have had if I escaped detection,
and what I should have suffered at your hands if I was detected. 13. For
men do not do things of this kind out of lawlessness, but for gain. And
it is fitting for you to see to it that the prosecutors make their charge
on this ground, proving what advantage (the accused have) in doing this
wrong. 14. (Nicomachus) cannot show that I did it on account of my
poverty, nor that the value of the place was lessened for me by the olive
being there, nor that it interfered with the vines, or was near the
house, nor that I was ignorant of the danger I was in before you for
doing it. But I can show you that a tremendous penalty would have been
the result, had I cut it down. 15. For I was cutting the olive in broad
daylight, as though, so far from keeping it a secret from all, it was
necessary for every Athenian to know it. If the deed had been merely a
disgrace, perhaps a chance passer-by would not have troubled himself
about it. I was risking not disgrace, but great punishment. 16. Should I
not be the most wretched of all men if my slaves, being acquainted with
my crime, became no longer my slaves, but my masters for the rest of my
life? For I could not punish them for the greatest offense they might
choose to give. For they would know well that it was in their power, by
turning informers, to be revenged on me and get their own freedom. 17.
Supposing it had entered my head to disregard my slaves, how should I
have dared, when so many persons had rented the place, and every one of
them would have known it, to cut down the olive merely for gain?
Especially since, as there is no limit to the liability of those who
farmed the place, it equally concerned them all that the stump should
remain intact, so that if any one charged them they could transfer the
charge to their successor. They have evidently cleared me, and if they
have lied have become participants in the crime.
18. Again, supposing I had squared matters with them, how could I have
bribed all who are present or the neighbors, who not only know about each
other's public affairs, but also about those we try to keep a secret from
all. Some of these are my friends, but others are not on good terms with
me. 19. These my accuser should have brought as witnesses, and not made
the charge at random. He says I stood near while my slaves cut out the
stump and the driver put the stump in his cart and went away with the
wood. 20. Then was the time, Nicomachus, for you to summon the witnesses
who were there and show up the crime. You would have left me no escape,
and if I were hated by you, you would have had revenge in this way. If
you did it from patriotism, having (21) exposed me in this manner, you
would not seem to be an informer, and if you desired gain, in this way
could you have obtained most. As the crime was clear I should have had no
means of safety if I did not bribe you. As you did none of these things,
you seem, by your assertions, to be destroying me, having said in the
prosecution that no one wishes to testify on account of my influence and
wealth. 22. If, when you said you saw me cutting down the olive, you had
brought the nine archons or some one else from the Areopagus, no further
witnesses would be needed. For thus the very men who judge the case would
have known that you spoke the truth. 23. I am placed in a very unfair
position. If he had produced witnesses he would have expected you to
believe them, but since he has none he thinks to turn this to my
disadvantage. And I do not wonder at this. For in a case like this he
would not lack witnesses and arguments at the same time. But I do not
think you hold the same opinion he does. 24. You know that there were in
the country, in other places of mine, many olives and burnt stumps which,
if I had set my heart, upon it, it would have been much easier for me to
injure, cut down and encroach upon, as my crime was likely to be less
apparent on account of the number of trees. 25. Thus I make them as much
account as my country and other possessions, running the risk I do of
losing both. I shall bring before you as witnesses those men who act as
inspectors every month, and send collectors every year. No one of these
men ever fined me for farming the ground about the olive. 26. It is very
probable that taking such care about the small fines I should pay no
attention whatever to my bodily safety. Am I shown to take such care of
the many olives, against which I might have committed the trespass, but
called to account for the very olive which it was not possible to dig up
without detection? 27. Was it not easier for me, (members of the) Boule,
to break the laws during the Democracy than under the Thirty? I do not
say this because I had any influence at that time or as being now in a
position of distrust, but it was easier for any one who wished to do
wrong then than it is now. I am not charged with doing this or any
other wrong during that time. 28. Unless I of all men had been most
ill-disposed to myself, how could I have attempted to cut an olive from a
piece of ground on which there was not a single tree except, as he says,
the stump of one olive, about which the road ran on both sides, with
neighbors dwelling on all sides, and perfectly open to the view of all?
Would any one have been so utterly reckless, such, being the case, as to
have done such a deed? 29. I think it strange that those men appointed by
the city to look after the sacred olives never fined me for encroaching
upon the trees nor brought me to trial on the charge of cutting them
down, but that this man, who is not a neighbor, nor an inspector, nor old
enough to know about such things, has entered me on the indictment as
having destroyed an olive.
30. I wish you not to place more trust in the assertions of my accuser
than you do in the facts themselves, nor accept the word of my personal
enemies in matters which you yourself know about, but to form your
opinions from what I have told you and from the rest of my conduct as a
citizen. 31. For I did everything allotted to me in a grander manner than
I was compelled to do by the state: equipped a trireme, supplied a
chorus, and performed all my other duties more expensively than the rest
of the citizens. 32. If I had done these things in a moderate way, and
not expensively, I should not be fighting against exile and for my
possessions, but should be worth more and not unjustly be on trial for my
life. If I had committed the crime with which he charges me I should have
gained nothing, but only brought myself into difficulty. 33. You all
would agree that it is more just to accept weighty proofs in a great case
and to regard as more trustworthy those things to which the whole city
testifies, than those which the prosecutor alone asserts.
34. Look at the case, (members of the) Boule, from what took place
besides. I went to him, and in the presence of witnesses said that I now
had all the slaves of which I had been possessed at the time I bought the
place, and I was ready, if he wished, to give them up to be tortured,
thinking that this would be the strongest test of his assertions and of
the facts. 35. But he would not take them, saying that there was no
trusting slaves. It seems to me strange that slaves when tortured make
damning statements about themselves, knowing well that it will kill them,
but prefer to be tortured than to inform on their masters to whom they
are naturally ill-disposed, when by doing so they could free themselves.
36. If Nicomachus had asked for them, and I had refused to give them up,
it would be evident that I thought them conscious of my guilt. As he did
not wish to take them when offered, you rightly can have the same opinion
about him, for the danger was not by any means evenly divided. 37. Had
they denounced me, there would have been no escape for me. If they had
not testified what he wished he would have suffered no penalty. So that
it devolved a great deal more on him to take them than on me to offer
them. But I was thus zealous, thinking it was for my interest to have you
learn the truth of the matter either from the evidence of slaves or
freedmen or facts.
38. Consider then, (members of the) Boule, whether you ought to trust me
for whom many persons have given testimony, or my accuser for whom no one
dares testify, and whether it is more likely that he lied when there was
no risk to himself, or that in the face of such great danger I committed
the act, and whether you think he made the accusation merely for the good
of the city or as an informer.
39. For I think you know that Nicomachus, induced by my personal enemies,
brought the case into court, not hoping to prove me guilty, but expecting
to be bribed. For, in proportion as such charges are most easily imputed
and most difficult to refute, so much the more do all men endeavor to
avoid them. 40. I, (members of the) Boule, did not think it right (to
shun trial), but when he brought the charge submitted myself entirely to
your disposal, nor did I try to conciliate any one of my enemies who
speak evil of me rather than praise themselves. No one ever attempted to
do me any open injury, but set on me men of such a character as these in
whom you cannot justly place any confidence. 41. I should be the most
wretched of all men if I were driven unjustly into exile, childless and
alone, leaving my home desolate, my mother in need of everything,
deprived of my country on the most disgraceful charges, although I have
been engaged in many sea-fights and many battles, and have conducted
myself in an orderly manner both under the Democracy and under the
Oligarchy.
42. I do not know, (members of the) Boule, that it is necessary for me to
say anything more. I have shown you that there was not an olive on the
place, and I have brought witnesses and proof. You must judge the case,
bearing in mind that you should learn from this man why, when it was
possible to catch me in the act, he brings the accusation after so long a
time, (43) and why, although bringing no witness, he wants you to trust
his mere assertions when he could have arrested me in the act, and why,
although I offered him all the slaves who he says were present, he
refused to take them.
ORATION IX.
POLYAENUS.
1. What purpose have the prosecutors in disregarding the main point, and
trying to attack my character? Are they not aware that they should speak
about the question at issue? Or do they indeed understand this, but
thinking to divert your attention, present more arguments in regard to
every sort of matter than about what they should (speak)? 2. I see
clearly that they speak, not because they have a small opinion of me, but
of their case. I should not be surprised if they supposed that you would
be persuaded by their slanders and convict me. 3. I did think, gentlemen
of the jury, that my trial was in regard to the accusation, not in regard
to my character. But since the prosecutors attack that, I must make my
defense on all sides. First then, I shall tell you about the writ.
4. Two years ago I came to the city, but lived here only two months when
I was put on the list for military service. When I found out it had been
done, I immediately surmised I had been chosen for no honest reason. So I
went to the Strategus and showed I had served, but I met with no
satisfaction. I was angered at their insults, but held my peace. 5. And
not knowing what to do, and consulting a citizen about my course of
action, I found out that they threatened me with imprisonment, saying
that (I), Polyaenus, had lived in the city no less time than Callicrates.
This conversation had been held at the bank of Philias. 6. So Ctesicles,
the archon, and his associates imposed a fine upon me contrary to law,
upon the accusation of some one that I spoke evil of them, the law really
declaring "if any one speak evil of the government in council." They made
the accusation, but did not attempt to enforce the penalty, but at the
end of their term of office entered it on the register and gave it to the
stewards (of the treasury). 7. The stewards however held a different view
of the matter, and calling up those who gave them the item, demanded the
reason for the charge. After they had heard what had happened, and
understood the treatment I had received, at first they tried to persuade
them to drop the matter, showing that it was not right for any citizen to
be registered as owing a fine; but being unable to persuade them
otherwise, they ran the risk (of being called to account) by you and
decided to cancel the fine. 8. That I was then released by the stewards,
you are well aware. But although believing that in reality I have been
cleared from the charge by this showing, yet I will bring further laws
and other pleas.
LAWS.
9. You have heard that the law expressly states that a fine is imposed on
those who speak evil in the council; but I have brought witnesses that I
did not enter the place of assembly, nor ought I to have been fined
unjustly, nor could I with justice pay that amount. 10. For if it was
plain I did not enter the council, and the law states that those who
misbehave within it are to be fined, I am shown not to have transgressed
in any way, but to have been fined unreasonably from motives of personal
dislike without ill-doing (on my part). 11. And they were conscious that
they acted wrongly; for they neither submitted an account of the matter
nor came to the courts and established their proceedings as legal by a
(judicial) vote. But then, even if these men fined me legally, and
established their accusation before you, as the stewards remitted the
fine, really I should have been acquitted of the charge. 12. For if they
were competent to enforce or remit the fine, I would not with reason have
to pay the money, though fined legally; and if it is possible for them to
remit and they give account of their doings, if they have proceeded
illegally, they will easily obtain the penalty which they deserve.
13. You know now how I was transferred and fined; but you ought to know
not only the reason for the charge, but the pretext for their enmity. For
I was a friend of Sostratus before incurring their hatred, knowing that
he had materially benefited the state. 14. But although his friend, I
never took advantage of his power to punish an enemy nor aid a friend.
For during his life I remained inactive through necessity and on account
of my age, and when he died neither by word and deed did I injure any of
his accusers, and I can say so much, from which I should deserve much
more gratitude from my opponents than ill-treatment. Their enmity they
showed for the reasons which have been given, although (in reality) they
had no reason for enmity. 15. So while on oath to enroll those who had
not served, they violated their oaths and proposed to the assembly to
deliberate about my freedom, (16) fining me on the ground that I spoke
evil of the government, and utterly disregarding justice, being bound to
injure me on some plea or other. What would they have done if they were
really going to injure me greatly and benefit themselves, they who care
so little for their unfairness (even) when neither of these objects is
accomplished? 17. For they had small opinion of your assembly and had no
respect for the gods, but behaved so contemptuously and illegally as not
to attempt to defend their acts, and at last, thinking they had not
punished me sufficiently, finally banished me from the city. 18. While
acting so illegally and violently, they did not care to conceal their
unfairness, but bringing me up again on the same charges, though I have
done no wrong, they accuse and revile me, bringing charges not at all
corresponding to my habits, but which harmonize and accord with their own
characters.
19. These men are then eager in every way for me to meet punishment; but
do not, I beg you, be swayed by their slanders and condemn me, nor set
aside those who came to a better and juster decision. For these have
acted both in accord with custom and precedent, and evidently have done
no wrong, caring most for justice. 20. So if these (_the
prosecutors_) act illegally, I would be somewhat disturbed,
considering it is established to treat enemies ill and friends well; but
if I did not meet fair treatment at your hands, I should be much more
troubled. For then I should not seem to have been ill-treated through
private enmity, but through the viciousness of the state. 21. Nominally I
am contending about the writ, but actually about my citizenship. For with
fair treatment I would remain in the city (for I trust to your decision);
but if, being brought up by these men, I should be unjustly convicted, I
should have to leave the city. What hope would I have to buoy me up in
living with you, or why should I intend (to do so), knowing the desire of
my accusers, and not knowing at whose hands to expect justice? Care then
more for justice (than for anything else) and bear in mind that you grant
pardon about charges evidently unjust, and do not allow those who have
committed no wrong to meet through individual malice the most unfair
treatment.
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