Books: Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, v3
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Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne >> Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, v3
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We reached Ouardan, to the north of Gizeh, on the evening of the 16th;
on the 19th we arrived at Rahmalianie'h, and on the 23d at Alexandria,
where every preparation was made for that memorable battle which, though
it did not repair the immense losses and fatal consequences of the naval
conflict of the same name, will always recall to the memory of Frenchmen
one of the most brilliant achievements of their arms.
--[As M. de Bourrienne gives no details of the battle, the
following extract from the Due do Rovigo's Memoirs, tome i, p. 167,
will supply the deficiency:
"General Bonaparte left Cairo in the utmost haste to place himself
at the head of the troops which he had ordered to quit their
cantonments and march down to the coast.
Whilst the General was making these arrangements and coming in
person from Cairo, the troops on board the Turkish fleet had
effected a landing and taken possession of the fort of Aboukir, and
of a redoubt placed behind the village of that name which ought to
have been put into a state of defence six months before, but had
been completely neglected.
"The Turks had nearly destroyed the weak garrisons that occupied
those two military points when General Marmont (who commanded at
Alexandria) came to their relief. This general, seeing the two
posts in the power of the Turks, returned to shut himself up in
Alexandria, where he would probably have been blockaded by the
Turkish army had it not been for the arrival of General Bonaparte
with his forces, who was very angry when he saw that the fort and
redoubt had been taken; but he did not blame Marmont for retreating
to Alexandria with the forces at his disposal.
"General Bonaparte arrived at midnight with his guides and the
remaining part of his army, and ordered the Turks to be attacked the
next morning. In this battle, as in the preceding ones, the attack,
the encounter, and the rout were occurrences of a moment, and the
result of a single movement on the part of our troops. The whole
Turkish army plunged into the sea to regain its ships, leaving
behind them everything they had brought on shore.
"Whilst this event was occurring on the seashore a pasha had left
the field of battle with a corps of about 3000 men in order to throw
himself, into the fort of Aboukir. They soon felt the extremities
of thirst, which compelled them, after the lapse of a few days, to
surrender unconditionally to General Menou, who was left to close,
the operations connected with the recently defeated Turkish army."
After the-battle, which took place on the 25th of July, Bonaparte sent a
flag of truce on board the English Admiral's ship. Our intercourse was
full of politeness, such as might be expected in the communications of
the people of two civilised nations. The English Admiral gave the flag
of truce some presents in exchange for some we sent, and likewise a copy
of the French Gazette of Frankfort, dated 10th of June 1799. For ten
months we had received no news from France. Bonaparte glanced over this
journal with an eagerness which may easily be conceived.
--[The French, on their return from St. Jean d'Acre were totally
ignorant of all that had taken place in Europe far several months.
Napoleon, eager to obtain Intelligence, sent a flag of trace on
board the Turkish admiral's ship, under the pretence of treating for
the ransom of the Prisoners taken at Aboukir, not doubting but the
envoy would be stopped by Sir Sidney Smith, who carefully prevented
all direct communication between the French and the Turks.
Accordingly the French flag of truce received directions from Sir
Sidney to go on board his ship. He experienced the handsomest
treatment; and the English commander having, among other things,
ascertained that the disasters of Italy were quite unknown to
Napoleon, indulged in the malicious pleasure of sending him a file
of newspapers. Napoleon spent the whole night in his tent perusing
the papers; and he came to the determination of immediately
proceeding to Europe to repair the disasters of France; and if
possible, to save her from destruction (Memorial de Sainte Helene).
"Heavens!" said he to me, "my presentiment is verified: the fools have
lost Italy. All the fruits of our victories are gone! I must leave
Egypt!"
He sent for Berthier, to whom he communicated the news, adding that
things were going on very badly in France--that he wished to return home
--that he (Berthier) should go along with him, and that, for the present,
only he, Gantheaume, and I were in the secret. He recommended Berthier
to be prudent, not to betray any symptoms of joy, nor to purchase or sell
anything, and concluded by assuring him that he depended on him. "I can
answer," said he, "for myself and for Bourrienne." Berthier promised to
be secret, and he kept his word. He had had enough of Egypt, and he so
ardently longed to return to France, that there was little reason to fear
he would disappoint himself by any indiscretion.
Gantheaume arrived, and Bonaparte gave him orders to fit out the two
frigates, the 'Muiron' and the 'Carree', and the two small vessels, the
'Revanche' and the 'Fortune', with a two months' supply of provisions for
from four to five hundred men. He enjoined his secrecy as to the object
of these preparations, and desired him to act with such circumspection
that the English cruisers might have no knowledge of what was going on.
He afterwards arranged with Gantheaume the course he wished to take. No
details escaped his attention.
Bonaparte concealed his preparations with much care, but still some vague
rumours crept abroad. General Dueua, the commandant of Cairo, whom he
had just left for the purpose of embarking, wrote to him on the 18th of
August to the following effect:
I have this moment heard that it is reported at the Institute you
are about to return to France, taking with you Monge, Berthollet,
Berthier, Lannes, and Murat. This news has spread like lightning
through the city, and I should not be at all surprised if it produce
an unfavourable effect, which, however, I hope you will obviate.
Bonaparte embarked five days after the receipt of Dugua's letter, and, as
may be supposed; without replying to it.
On the 18th of August he wrote to the divan of Cairo as follows:
I set out to-morrow for Menouf, whence I intend to make various
excursions in the Delta, in order that I may myself witness the acts
of oppression which are committed there, and acquire some knowledge
of the people.
He told the army but half the truth:
The news from Europe (said he) has determined me to proceed to
France. I leave the command of the army to General Kleber. The
army shall hear from me forthwith. At present I can say no more.
It costs me much pain to quit troops to whom I am so strongly
attached. But my absence will be but temporary, and the general I
leave in command has the confidence of the Government as well as
mine.
I have now shown the true cause of General Bonaparte's departure for
Europe. This circumstance, in itself perfectly natural, has been the
subject of the most ridiculous conjectures to those who always wish to
assign extraordinary causes for simple events. There is no truth
whatever in the assertion of his having planned his departure before the
battle of Aboukir. Such an idea never crossed his mind. He had no
thought whatever of his departure for France when he made the journey to
the Pyramids, nor even when he received the news of the landing of the
Anglo-Turkish force.
At the end of December 1798 Bonaparte thus wrote to the Directory: "We
are without any news from France. No courier has arrived since the month
of June."
Some writers have stated that we received news by the way of Tunis,
Algiers, or Morocco; but there is no contradicting a positive fact. At
that period I had been with Bonaparte more than two years, and during
that time not a single despatch on any occasion arrived of the contents
of which I was ignorant. How then should the news alluded to have
escaped me?
--[Details on the question of the correspondence of Napoleon with
France while he was to Egypt will be found in Colonel Iung's work,
Lucien Bonaparte (Paris. Charpentler, 1882), tome i. pp. 251-274.
It seems most probable that Napoleon was in occasional communication
with his family and with some of the Directors byway of Tunis and
Tripoli. It would not be his interest to let his army or perhaps
even Bourrienne know of the disasters in Italy till he found that
they were sure to hear of them through the English. This would
explain his affected ignorance till such a late date. On the 11th
of April Barras received a despatch by which Napoleon stated his
intention of returning to France if the news brought by Hamelin was
confirmed. On the 26th of May 1799 three of the Directors, Barras,
Rewbell, and La Reveillier-Lepeaux, wrote to Napoleon that Admiral
Bruix had been ordered to attempt every means of bringing back his
army. On the 15th of July Napoleon seems to have received this and
other letters. On the 20th of July he warns Admiral Gantheaume to
be ready to start. On the 11th of September the Directors formally
approved the recall of the army from Egypt. Thus at the time
Napoleon landed in France (on the 8th October), his intended return
had been long known to and approved by the majority of the
Directors, and had at last been formally ordered by the Directory.
At the most he anticipated the order. He cannot be said to have
deserted his post. Lantrey (tome i. p. 411) remarks that the
existence and receipt of the letter from Joseph denied by Bourrienne
is proved by Miot (the commissary, the brother of Miot de Melito)
and by Joseph himself. Talleyrand thanks the French Consul at
Tripoli for sending news from Egypt, and for letting Bonaparte know
what passed in Europe. See also Ragusa (Marmont),tome i. p. 441,
writing on 24th December 1798: "I have found an Arab of whom I am
sure, and who shall start to-morrow for Derne . . . . This means
can be need to send a letter to Tripoli, for boats often go there."
Almost all those who endeavour to avert from Bonaparte the reproach of
desertion quote a letter from the Directory, dated the 26th of May 1799.
This letter may certainly have been written, but it never reached its
destination. Why then should it be put upon record?
The circumstance I have stated above determined the resolution of
Bonaparte, and made him look upon Egypt as, an exhausted field of glory,
which it was high time he had quitted, to play another part in France.
On his departure from Europe Bonaparte felt that his reputation was
tottering. He wished to do something to raise up his glory, and to fix
upon him the attention of the world. This object he had in great part
accomplished; for, in spite of serious disasters, the French flag waved
over the cataracts of the Nile and the ruins of Memphis, and the battles
of the Pyramids, and Aboukir were calculated in no small degree to
dazzle; the imagination. Cairo and Alexandria too were ours. Finding.
that the glory of his arms no longer supported the feeble power of the
Directory, he was anxious to see whether: he could not share it, or
appropriate it to himself.
A great deal has been said about letters and Secret communications from
the Directory, but Bonaparte needed no such thing. He could do what he
pleased: there was no power to check him; such had been the nature of
his arrangements an leaving France. He followed only the dictates of his
own will, and probably, had not the fleet been destroyed; he would have
departed from Egypt much sooner. To will and to do were with him one and
the same thing. The latitude he enjoyed was the result of his verbal
agreement with the Directory, whose instructions and plans he did not
wish should impede his operations.
Bonaparte left Alexandria on the 5th of August, and on the 10th arrived
at Cairo. He at first circulated the report of a journey to Upper Egypt.
This seemed so much the more reasonable, as he had really entertained
that design before he went to the Pyramids, and the fact was known to the
army and the inhabitants of Cairo. Up to this time our secret had been
studiously kept. However, General Lanusse, the commandant at Menouf,
where we arrived on the 20th of August, suspected it. "You are going to
France," said he to me. My negative reply confirmed his suspicion. This
almost induced me to believe the General-in-Chief had been the first to
make the disclosure. General Lanusse, though he envied our good fortune,
made no complaints. He expressed his sincere wishes for our prosperous
voyage, but never opened his mouth on the subject to any one.
On the 21st of August we reached the wells of Birkett. The Arabs had
rendered the water unfit for use, but the General-in-Chief was resolved
to quench his thirst, and for this purpose squeezed the juice of several
lemons into a glass of the water; but he could not swallow it without
holding his nose and exhibiting strong feelings of disgust.
The next day we reached Alexandria, where the General informed all those,
who had accompanied him from Cairo that France was their destination.
At this announcement joy was pictured in every countenance.
General Kleber, to whose command Bonaparte had resigned the army, was
invited to come from Damietta to Rosette to confer with the General-in-
Chief on affairs of extreme importance. Bonaparte, in making an
appointment which he never intended to keep, hoped to escape the
unwelcome freedom of Kleber's reproaches. He afterwards wrote to him all
he had to say; and the cause he assigned for not keeping his appointment
was, that his fear of being observed by the English cruisers had forced
him to depart three days earlier than he intended. But when he wrote
Bonaparte well knew that he would be at sea before Kleber could receive
his letter. Kleber, in his letter to the Directory, complained bitterly
of this deception. The singular fate that befell this letter will be
seen by and by.
CHAPTER XXI
1799.
Our departure from Egypt--Nocturnal embarkation--M. Parseval
Grandmaison--On course--Adverse winds--Fear of the English--
Favourable weather--Vingt-et-un-Chess--We land at Ajaccio--
Bonaparte's pretended relations--Family domains--Want of money--
Battle of Novi--Death of Joubert--Visionary schemes--Purchase of a
boat--Departure from Corsica--The English squadron--Our escape--
The roads of Frejus--Our landing in France--The plague or the
Austrians--Joy of the people--The sanitary laws--Bonaparte falsely
accused.
We were now to return to our country--again to cross the sea, to us so
pregnant with danger--Caesar and his fortune were once more to embark.
But Caesar was not now advancing to the East to add Egypt to the
conquests of the Republic. He was revolving in his mind vast schemes,
unawed by the idea of venturing everything to chance in his own favour
the Government for which he had fought. The hope of conquering the most
celebrated country of the East no longer excited the imagination, as on
our departure from France. Our last visionary dream had vanished before
the walls of St. Jean d'Acre, and we were leaving on the burning sands of
Egypt most of our companions in arms. An inconceivable destiny seemed to
urge us on, and we were obliged to obey its decrees.
On the 23d of August we embarked on board two frigates, the 'Muiron'
--[Named after Bonaparte's aide de camp filled in the Italian
campaign]--
and 'Carrere'. Our number was between four and five hundred. Such was
our squadron, and such the formidable army with which Bonaparte had
resolved, as he wrote to the divan of Cairo, "to annihilate all his
enemies." This boasting might impose on those who did not see the real
state of things; but what were we to think of it? What Bonaparte himself
thought the day after.
The night was dark when we embarked in the frigates which lay at a
considerable distance from the port of Alexandria; but by the faint light
of the stars we perceived a corvette, which appeared to be observing our
silent nocturnal embarkation.
--[The horses of the escort had been left to run loose on the beach,
and all was perfect stillness in Alexandria, when the advanced posts
of the town were alarmed by the wild galloping of horses, which from
a natural instinct, were returning to Alexandria through the desert.
The picket ran to arms on seeing horses ready saddled and bridled,
which were soon discovered to belong to the regiment of guides.
They at first thought that a misfortune had happened to some
detachment in its pursuit of the Arabs. With these horses came also
those of the generals who had embarked with General Bonaparte; so
that Alexandria was for a time in considerable alarm. The cavalry
was ordered to proceed in all haste in the direction whence the
horses came, and every one was giving himself up to the most gloomy
conjectures, when the cavalry returned to the city with the Turkish
groom, who was bringing back General Bonaparte's horse to Alexandria
(Memoirs of the Due de Rovigo, tome i. p. 182).
Next morning, just as we were on the point of setting sail, we saw.
coming from the port of Alexandria a boat, on board of which was M.
Parseval Grandmaison. This excellent man, who was beloved by all of us,
was not included among the persons whose, return to France had been
determined by the General-in-Chief. In his anxiety to get off Bonaparte
would not hear of taking him on board. It will readily be conceived how
urgent were the entreaties of Parseval; but he would have sued in vain
had not Gantheaume, Bionge, Berthollet, and I interceded for him. With
some difficulty we overcame Bonaparte's resistance, and our colleague of
the Egyptian Institute got on board after the wind had filled our sails.
It has been erroneously said that Admiral Gantheaume had full control of
the frigates, as if any one could command when Bonaparte was present.
On the contrary, Bonaparte declared to the admiral, in my hearing, that
he would not take the ordinary course and get into the open sea. "Keep
close along the coast of the Mediterranean," said he, "on the, African
side, until you get south of Sardinia. I have here a handful of brave
fellows and a few pieces of artillery; if the. English should appear I
will run ashore, and with my, party, make my way by land to Oran, Tunis,
or some other port, whence we may find an opportunity of getting home."
This, was his irrevocable determination.
For twenty-one days adverse winds, blowing from west or north-west, drove
us continually on the coast of Syria, or in the direction of Alexandria.
At one time it was even proposed that we should again put into the port;
but Bonaparte declared he would rather, brave every danger than do so.
During the day we tacked to a certain distance northward, and in the
evening we stood towards Africa, until we came within, sight of the
coast. Finally after no less than twenty-one days of impatience and
disappointment, a favourable east wind carried us past that point of
Africa on which Carthage formerly stood, and we soon doubled Sardinia.
We kept very near the western coast of that island, where Bonaparte had
determined to land in case of our falling in with the English, squadron.
From, thence his plan was to reach Corsica, and there to await a
favourable opportunity of returning to France.
Everything had contributed to render our voyage dull and monotonous; and,
besides, we were not entirely without uneasiness as to the steps which
might be taken by the Directory, for it was certain that the publication
of the intercepted correspondence must have occasioned many unpleasant
disclosures. Bonaparte used often to walk on deck to superintend the
execution of his orders. The smallest sail that appeared in view excited
his alarm.
The fear of falling into the hands of the English never forsook him.
That was what he dreaded most of all, and yet, at a subsequent period, he
trusted to the generosity of his enemies.
However, in spite of our well-founded alarm, there were some moments in
which we sought to amuse ourselves, or, to use a common expression, to
kill time. Cards afforded us s source of recreation, and even this
frivolous amusement served to develop the character of Bonaparte. In
general he was not fond of cards; but if he did play, vingt-et-un was his
favourite game, because it is more rapid than many others, and because,
in short, it afforded him an opportunity of cheating. For example, he
would ask for a card; if it proved a bad one he would say nothing, but
lay it down on the table and wait till the dealer had drawn his. If the
dealer produced a good card, then Bonaparte would throw aside his hand,
without showing it, and give up his stake. If, on the contrary, the
dealer's card made him exceed twenty-one, Bonaparte also threw his cards
aside without showing them, and asked for the payment of his stake. He
was much diverted by these little tricks, especially when they were
played off undetected; and I confess that even then we were courtiers
enough to humour him, and wink at his cheating. I must, however, mention
that he never appropriated to himself the fruit of these little
dishonesties, for at the end of the game he gave up all his winnings, and
they were equally divided. Gain, as may readily be supposed, was not his
object; but he always expected that fortune would grant him an ace or a
ten at the right moment with the same confidence with which he looked for
fine weather on the day of battle. If he were disappointed he wished
nobody to know it.
Bonaparte also played at chess, but very seldom, because he was only a
third-rate player, and he did not like to be beaten at that game, which,
I know not why, is said to bear a resemblance to the grand game of war.
At this latter game Bonaparte certainly feared no adversary. This
reminds me that when we were leaving Passeriano he announced his
intention of passing through Mantua.
He was told that the commandant of that town, I believe General Beauvoir,
was a great chess-player, and he expressed a wish to play a game with
him: General Beauvoir asked him to point out any particular pawn with
which he would be checkmated; adding, that if the pawn were taken, he,
Bonaparte, should be declared the winner. Bonaparte pointed out the last
pawn on the left of his adversary. A mark was put upon it, and it turned
out that he actually was checkmated with that very pawn. Bonaparte was
not very well pleased at this. He liked to play with me because, though
rather a better player than himself, I was not always able to beat him.
As soon as a game was decided in his favour he declined playing any
longer; preferring to rest on his laurels.
The favourable wind which had constantly prevailed after the first twenty
days of our voyage still continued while we kept along the coast of
Sardinia; but after we had passed that island the wind again blew
violently from the west, and on the 1st of October we were forced to
enter the Gulf of Ajaccio. We sailed again next day but we found it
impossible to work our way out of the gulf. We were therefore obliged to
put into the port and land at Ajaccio. Adverse winds obliged us to
remain there until the 7th of October. It may readily be imagined how
much this delay annoyed Bonaparte. He sometimes expressed his
impatience, as if he could enforce the obedience of the elements as well
as of men. He was losing time, and time was everything to him.
There was one circumstance which seemed to annoy him as much as any of
his more serious vexations. "What will become of me," said he, "if the
English, who are cruising hereabout, should learn that I have landed in
Corsica? I shall be forced to stay here. That I could never endure. I
have a torrent of relations pouring upon me." His great reputation had
certainly prodigiously augmented the number of his family. He was over
whelmed with visits, congratulations, and requests. The whole town was
in a commotion. Every one of its inhabitants wished to claim him as
their cousin; and from the-prodigious number of his pretended godsons and
goddaughters, it might have been supposed that he had held one-fourth of
the children of Ajaccio at the baptismal font.
Bonaparte frequently walked with us in the neighbourhood of Ajaccio; and
when in all the plenitude of his power he did not count his crowns with
greater pleasure than he evinced in pointing out to us the little domains
of his ancestors.
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