Books: Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, v12
L >>
Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne >> Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, v12
Pages:
1 |
2 |
3 | 4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9
I observed from the expression of Caulaincourt's countenance that my
question had made an impression on him, and affectionately pressing my
hand he said, I would do as you do: Enough. I will arrange the business
with the Emperor." This reply seemed to remove a weight from my mind,
and I left Caulaincourt with feelings of gratitude. I felt fully assured
that he would settle the business satisfactorily, and in this conjecture
I was not deceived, for I heard no more of the matter.
I must here go forward a year to relate another occurrence in which the
Due de Vicence and I were concerned. When, in March 1815, the King
appointed me Prefect of Police, M. de Caulaincourt sent to me a
confidential person to inquire whether he ran any risk in remaining in
Paris, or whether he had better remove. He had been told that his name
was inscribed in a list of individuals whom I had received orders to
arrest. Delighted at this proof of confidence, I returned the following
answer by the Due de Vicence's messenger: "Tell M. de Caulaincourt that I
do not know where he lives. He need be under no apprehension: I will
answer for him."
During the campaign of 1813 the Allies, after driving the French out of
Saxony and obliging them to retreat towards the Rhine, besieged Hamburg,
where Davoust was shut up with a garrison of 30,000 men, resolutely
determined to make it a second Saragossa. From the month of September
every day augmented the number of the Allied troops, who were already
making rapid progress on the left bank of the Elbe. Davoust endeavoured
to fortify Hamburg an so extended a scale that, in the opinion of the
most experienced military men, it would have required a garrison of
60,000 men to defend it in a regular and protracted siege. At the
commencement of the siege Davoust lost Vandamme, who was killed in a
sortie at the head of a numerous corps which was inconsiderately
sacrificed.
It is but justice to admit that Davoust displayed great activity in the
defence, and began by laying in large supplies.
--[Vandamme fought under Grouchy in 1815, and died several years
afterwards. This killing him at Hamburg is one of the curious
mistakes seized on by the Bonapartists to deny the authenticity of
these Memoirs.]--
General Bertrand was directed to construct a bridge to form a
communication between Hamburg and Haarburg by joining the islands of the
Elbe to the Continent along a total distance of about two leagues. This
bridge was to be built of wood, and Davoust seized upon all the timber-
yards to supply materials for its construction. In the space of eighty-
three days the bridge was finished. It was a very magnificent structure,
its length being 2529 toises, exclusive of the lines of junction, formed
on the two islands.
The inhabitants were dreadfully oppressed, but all the cruel measures and
precautions of the French were ineffectual, for the Allies advanced in
great force and occupied Westphalia, which movement obliged the Governor
of Hamburg to recall to the town the different detachments scattered
round Hamburg.
At Lubeck the departure of the French troops was marked by blood. Before
they evacuated the town, an old man, and a butcher named Prahl, were
condemned to be shot. The butcher's crime consisted in having said, in
speaking of the French, "Der teufel hohle sie" (the devil take them).
The old man fortunately escaped his threatened fate, but, notwithstanding
the entreaties and tears of the inhabitants, the sentence upon Prahl was
carried into execution.
The garrison of Hamburg was composed of French, Italian, and Dutch
troops. Their number at first amounted to 30,000, but sickness made
great-havoc among them. From sixty to eighty perished daily in the
hospitals. When the garrison evacuated Hamburg in May 1814 it was
reduced to about 15,000 men. In the month of December provisions began
to diminish, and there was no possibility of renewing the supply. The
poor were first of all made to leave the town, and afterwards all persons
who were not usefully employed. It is no exaggeration to estimate at
50,000 the number of persons who were thus exiled. The colonel
commanding the gendarmerie at Hamburg notified to the exiled inhabitants
that those who did not leave the town within the prescribed time would
receive fifty blows with a cane and afterwards be driven out. But if
penance may be commuted with priests so it may with gendarmes.
Delinquents contrived to purchase their escape from the bastinado by a
sum of money, and French gallantry substituted with respect to females
the birch for the cane. I saw an order directing all female servants to
be examined as to their health unless they could produce certificates
from their masters. On the 25th of December the Government granted
twenty-four hours longer to persons who were ordered to quit the town;
and two days after this indulgence an ordinance was published declaring
that those who should return to the town after once leaving it were to be
considered as rebels and accomplices of the enemy, and as such condemned
to death by a prevotal court. But this was not enough. At the end of
December people, without distinction of sex or age, were dragged from
their beds and conveyed out of the town on a cold night, when the
thermometer was between sixteen or eighteen degrees; and it was affirmed
that several old men perished in this removal. Those who survived were
left on the outside of the Altona gates. At Altona they all found refuge
and assistance. On Christmas-day 7000 of these unfortunate persons were
received in the house of M. Rainville, formerly aide de camp to
Dumouriez, and who left France together with that general. His house,
which was at Holstein, was usually the scene of brilliant entertainments,
but it was converted into the abode of misery, mourning, and death. All
possible attention was bestowed on the unfortunate outlaws; but few
profited by it, and what is worse, the inhabitants of Altona suffered for
their generosity. Many of the unfortunate persons were affected with the
epidemic disease which was raging in Hamburg, and which in consequence
broke out at Altona.
All means of raising money in Hamburg being exhausted, a seizure was made
of the funds of the Bank of that city, which yet contained from seven to
eight millions of marks. Were those who ordered this measure not aware
that to seize on the funds of some of the citizens of Hamburg was an
injury to all foreigners who had funds in the Bank? Such is a brief
statement of the vexations and cruelties which long oppressed this
unfortunate city. Napoleon accused Hamburg of Anglomania, and by ruining
her he thought to ruin England. Hamburg, feeble and bereft of her
sources, could only complain, like Jerusalem when besieged by Titus:
"Plorans, plorcatrit in nocte."
CHAPTER XXXII.
1813-1814.
Prince Eugene and the affairs of Italy--The army of Italy on the
frontiers of Austria--Eugene's regret at the defection of the
Bavarians--Murat's dissimulation and perfidy--His treaty with
Austria--Hostilities followed by a declaration of war--Murat
abandoned by the French generals--Proclamation from Paris--Murat's
success--Gigantic scheme of Napoleon--Napoleon advised to join the
Jacobins--His refusal--Armament of the National Guard--The Emperor's
farewell to the officers--The Congress of Chatillon--Refusal of an
armistice--Napoleon's character displayed in his negotiations--
Opening of the Congress--Discussions--Rupture of the Conferences.
I wars now proceed to notice the affairs of Italy and the principal
events of the Viceroyalty of Eugene. In order to throw together all that
I have to say about the Viceroy I must anticipate the order of time.
After the campaign of 1812, when Eugene revisited Italy, he was promptly
informed of the more than doubtful dispositions of Austria towards
France. He then made preparations for raising an army capable of
defending the country which the Emperor had committed to his safeguard.
Napoleon was fully aware how much advantage he would derive from the
presence on the northern frontiers of Italy of an army sufficiently
strong to harass Austria, in case she should draw aside the transparent
veil which still covered her policy. Eugene did all that depended on him
to meet the Emperor's wishes; but in spite of his efforts the army of
Italy was, after all; only an imaginary army to those who could compare
the number of men actually enrolled with the numbers stated in the lists.
When, in July 1813, the Viceroy was informed of the turn taken by the
negotiations at the shadow of a Congress assembled at Prague, he had no
longer any doubt of the renewal of hostilities; and foreseeing an attack
on Italy he resolved as speedily as possible to approach the frontiers of
Austria. He had succeeded in assembling an army composed of French and
Italians, and amounting to 45,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry. On the
renewal of hostilities the Viceroy's headquarters were at Udine. Down to
the month of April 1814 he succeeded in maintaining a formidable
attitude, and in defending the entrance of his kingdom by dint of that
military talent which was to be expected in a man bred in the great
school of Napoleon, and whom the army looked up to as one of its most
skillful generals.
During the great and unfortunate events of 1813 all eyes had been fixed
on Germany and the Rhine; but the defection of Murat for a time diverted
attention to Italy. That event did not so very much surprise me, for I
had not forgotten my conversation with the King of Naples in the Champs
Elysees, with which I have made the reader acquainted. At first Murat's
defection was thought incredible by every one, and it highly excited
Bonaparte's indignation. Another defection which occurred about the same
period deeply distressed Eugene, for although raised to the rank of a
prince, and almost a sovereign, he was still a man, and an excellent man.
He was united to the Princess Amelia of Bavaria, who was as amiable and
as much beloved as he, and he had the deep mortification to count the
subjects of his father-in-law among the enemies whom he would probably
have to combat. Fearing lest he should be harassed by the Bavarians on
the side of the Tyrol, Eugene commenced his retrograde movement in the
autumn of 1813. He at first fell back on the Tagliamento, and
successively on the Adige. On reaching that river the army of Italy was
considerably diminished, in spite of all Eugene's care of his troops.
About the end of November Eugene learned that a Neapolitan corps was
advancing upon Upper Italy, part taking the direction of Rome, and part
that of Ancona. The object of the King of Naples was to take advantage
of the situation of Europe, and he was duped by the promises held out to
him as the reward of his treason. Murat seemed to have adopted the
artful policy of Austria; for not only had he determined to join the
coalition, but he was even maintaining communications with England and
Austria, while at the same time he was making protestations of fidelity
to his engagements with Napoleon.
When first informed of Murat's treason by the Viceroy the Emperor refused
to believe it. "No," he exclaimed to those about him, "it cannot be!
Murat, to whom I have given my sister! Murat, to whom I have given a
throne! Eugene must be misinformed. It is impossible that Murat has
declared himself against me!" It was, however, not only possible but
true. Gradually throwing aside the dissimulation beneath which he had
concealed his designs, Murat seemed inclined to renew the policy of Italy
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the art of deceiving
was deemed by the Italian Governments the most sublime effort of genius.
Without any declaration of war, Murat ordered the Neapolitan General who
occupied Rome to assume the supreme command in the Roman States, and to
take possession of the country. General Miollis, who commanded the
French troops in Rome, could only throw himself, with his handful of men,
into the Castle of St. Angelo, the famous mole of Adrian, in which was
long preserved the treasury of Sixtus V. The French General soon found
himself blockaded by the Neapolitan troops, who also blockaded Civita
Vecchia and Ancona.
The treaty concluded between Murat and Austria was definitively signed on
the 11th of January 1814. As soon as he was informed of it the Viceroy,
certain that he should soon have to engage with the Neapolitans, was
obliged to renounce the preservation of the line of the Adige, the
Neapolitan army being in the rear of his right wing. He accordingly
ordered a retrograde movement to the other side of the Mincio, where his
army was cantoned. In this position Prince Eugene, on the 8th of
February, had to engage with the Austrians, who had come up with him, and
the victory of the Mincio arrested, for some time, the invasion of the
Austrian army and its junction with the Neapolitan troops.
It was not until eight days after that Murat officially declared war
against the Emperor; and immediately several general and superior
officers, and many French troops, who were in his service, abandoned him,
and repaired to the headquarters of the Viceroy. Murat made endeavours
to detain them; they replied, that as he had declared war against France,
no Frenchman who loved his country could remain in his service. "Do you
think," returned he, "that my heart is lees French than yours? On the
contrary, I am much to be pitied. I hear of nothing but the disasters of
the Grand Army. I have been obliged to enter into a treaty with the
Austrians, and an arrangement with the English, commanded by Lord
Bentinck, in order to save my Kingdom from a threatened landing of the
English and the Sicilians, which would infallibly have excited an
insurrection."
There could not be a more ingenuous confession of the antipathy which
Joachim knew the Neapolitans to entertain towards his person and
government. His address to the French was ineffectual. It was easy to
foresee what would ensue. The Viceroy soon received an official
communication from Napoleon's War Minister, accompanied by an Imperial
decree, recalling all the French who were in the service of Joachim, and
declaring that all who were taken with arms in their hands should be
tried by a courtmartial as traitors to their country. Murat commenced by
gaining advantages which could not be disputed. His troops almost
immediately took possession of Leghorn and the citadel of Ancona, and the
French were obliged to evacuate Tuscany.
The defection of Murat overthrew one of Bonaparte's gigantic conceptions.
He had planned that Murat and Eugene with their combined forces should
march on the rear of the Allies, while he, disputing the soil of France
with the invaders, should multiply obstacles to their advance; the King
of Naples and the Viceroy of Italy were to march upon Vienna and make
Austria tremble in the heart of her capital before the timid million of
her Allies, who measured their steps as they approached Paris, should
desecrate by their presence the capital of France. When informed of the
vast project, which, however, was but the dream of a moment, I
immediately recognised that eagle glance, that power of discovering great
resources in great calamities, so peculiar to Bonaparte.
Napoleon was yet Emperor of France; but he who had imposed on all Europe
treaties of peace no less disastrous than the wars which had preceded
them, could not now obtain an armistice; and Caulaincourt, who was sent
to treat for one at the camp of the Allies, spent twenty days at
Luneville before he could even obtain permission to pass the advanced
posts of the invading army. In vain did Caulaincourt entreat Napoleon to
sacrifice, or at least resign temporarily, a portion of that glory
acquired in so many battles, and which nothing could efface in history.
Napoleon replied, "I will sign whatever you wish. To obtain peace I will
exact no condition; but I will not dictate my own humiliation." This
concession, of course, amounted to a determination not to sign or to
grant anything.
In the first fortnight of January 1814 one-third of France was invaded,
and it was proposed to form a new Congress, to be held at Chatillon-sur-
Seine. The situation of Napoleon grew daily worse and worse. He was
advised to seek extraordinary resources in the interior of the Empire,
and was reminded of the fourteen armies which rose, as if by enchantment,
to defend France at the commencement of the Revolution. Finally, a
reconciliation with the Jacobins, a party who had power to call up masses
to aid him, was recommended. For a moment he was inclined to adopt this
advice. He rode on horseback through the surburbs of St. Antoine and St.
Marceau, courted the populace, affectionately replied to their
acclamations, and he thought he saw the possibility of turning to account
the attachment which the people evinced for him. On his return to the
Palace some prudent persons ventured to represent to him that, instead of
courting this absurd sort of popularity it would be more advisable to
rely on the nobility and the higher classes of society. "Gentlemen,"
replied he, "you may say what you please, but in the situation in which I
stand my only nobility is the rabble of the faubourgs, and I know of no
rabble but the nobility whom I have created." This was a strange
compliment to all ranks, for it was only saying that they were all rabble
together.
At this time the Jacobins were disposed to exert every effort to serve
him; but they required to have their own way, and to be allowed freely to
excite and foster revolutionary sentiments. The press, which groaned
under the most odious and intolerable censorship, was to be wholly
resigned to them. I do not state these facts from hearsay. I happened
by chance to be present at two conferences in which were set forward
projects infected with the odour of the clubs, and these projects were
supported with the more assurance because their success was regarded as
certain. Though I had not seen Napoleon since my departure for Hamburg,
yet I was sufficiently assured of his feeling towards the Jacobins to be
convinced that he would have nothing to do with them. I was not wrong.
On hearing of the price they set on their services he said, " This is-too
much; I shall have a chance of deliverance in battle, but I shall have
none with these furious blockheads. There can be nothing in common
between the demagogic principles of '93 and the monarchy, between clubs
of madmen and a regular Ministry, between a Committee of Public Safety
and an Emperor, between revolutionary tribunals and established laws.
If fall I must, I will not bequeath France to the Revolution from which I
have delivered her."
These were golden words, and Napoleon thought of a more noble and truly
national mode of parrying the danger which threatened him. He ordered
the enrolment of the National Guard of Paris, which was placed under the
command of Marshal Moncey. A better choice could not have been made, but
the staff of the National Guard was a focus of hidden intrigues, in which
the defence of Paris was less thought about than the means of taking
advantage of Napoleon's overthrow. I was made a captain in this Guard,
and, like the rest of the officers, I was summoned to the Tuileries, on
the 23d of January, when the Emperor took leave of the National Guard
previously to his departure from Paris to join the army.
Napoleon entered with the Empress. He advanced with a dignified step,
leading by the hand his son, who was not yet three years old. It was
long since I had seen him. He had grown very corpulent, and I remarked
on his pale countenance an expression of melancholy and irritability.
The habitual movement of the muscles of his neck was more decided and
more frequent than formerly. I shall not attempt to describe what were
my feelings during this ceremony, when I again saw, after a long
separation, the friend of my youth, who had become master of Europe,
and was now on the point of sinking beneath the efforts of his enemies.
There was something melancholy in this solemn and impressive ceremony.
I have rarely witnessed such profound silence in so numerous an assembly.
At length Napoleon, in a voice as firm and sonorous as when he used to
harangue his troops in Italy or in Egypt, but without that air of
confidence which then beamed on his countenance, delivered to the
assembled officers an address which was published in all the journals of
the time. At the commencement of this address he said, "I set out this
night to take the command of the army. On quitting the capital I
confidently leave behind me my wife and my son, in whom so many hopes are
centred." I listened attentively to Napoleon's address, and, though he
delivered it firmly, he either felt or feigned emotion. Whether or not
the emotion was sincere on his part, it was shared by many present; and
for my own part I confess that my feelings were deeply moved when he
uttered the words, "I leave you my wife and my son." At that moment my
eyes were fixed on the young Prince, and the interest with which he
inspired me was equally unconnected with the splendour which surrounded
and the misfortunes which threatened him. I beheld in the interesting
child not the King of Rome but the son of my old friend. All day long
afterwards I could not help feeling depressed while comparing the
farewell scene of the morning with the day on which we took possession of
the Tuileries. How many centuries seemed the fourteen years which
separated the two events.
It may be worth while to remind those who are curious in comparing dates
that Napoleon, the successor of Louis XVI., and who had become the nephew
of that monarch by his marriage with the niece of Marie Antoinette, took
leave of the National Guard of Paris on the anniversary of the fatal 21st
of January, after twenty-five years of successive terror, fear, hope,
glory, and misfortune.
Meanwhile, a Congress was opened at Chatillon-sur-Seine, at which were
assembled the Duke of Vicenza on the part of France, Lords Aderdeen and
Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart as the representatives of England, Count
Razumowsky on the part of Russia, Count Stadion for Austria, and Count
Humboldt for Prussia. Before the opening of the Congress, the Duke of
Vicenza, in conformity with the Emperor's orders, demanded an armistice,
which is almost invariably granted during negotiations for peace; but it
was now too late: the Allies had long since determined not to listen to
any such demand. They therefore answered the Duke of Vicenza's
application by requiring that the propositions for peace should be
immediately signed. But these were not the propositions of Frankfort.
The Allies established as their bases the limits of the old French
monarchy. They conceived themselves authorised in so doing by their
success and by their situation.
To estimate rightly Napoleon's conduct during the negotiations for peace
which took place in the conferences at Chatillon it is necessary to bear
in mind the organisation he had received from nature and the ideas with
which that organisation had imbued him at an early period of life. If
the last negotiations of his expiring reign be examined with due
attention and impartiality it will appear evident that the causes of his
fall arose out of his character. I cannot range myself among those
adulators who have accused the persons about him with having dissuaded
him from peace. Did he not say at St. Helena, in speaking of the
negotiations at Chatillon, "A thunderbolt alone could have saved us: to
treat, to conclude, was to yield foolishly to the enemy." These words
forcibly portray Napoleon's character. It must also be borne in mind how
much he was captivated by the immortality of the great names which
history has bequeathed to our admiration, and which are perpetuated from
generation to generation. Napoleon was resolved that his name should re-
echo in ages to come, from the palace to the cottage. To live without
fame appeared to him an anticipated death. If, however, in this thirst
for glory, not for notoriety, he conceived the wish to surpass Alexander
and Caesar, he never desired the renown of Erostratus, and I will say
again what I have said before, that if he committed actions to be
condemned, it was because he considered them as steps which helped him to
place himself on the summit of immortality on which he wished to place
his name. Witness what he wrote to his brother Jerome, "Better never, to
have lived than to live without glory;" witness also what he wrote later
to his brother Louis, "It is better to die as a King than to live as a
Prince." How often in the days of my intimacy with Bonaparte has he not
said to me, "Who knows the names of those kings who have passed from the
thrones on which chance or birth seated them? They lived and died
unnoticed. The learned, perhaps, may find them mentioned in old
archives, and a medal or a coin dug from the earth may reveal to
antiquarians the existence of a sovereign of whom they had never before
heard. But, on the contrary, when we hear the names of Cyrus, Alexander,
Caesar, Mahomet, Charlemagne, Henry IV., and Louis XIV., we are
immediately among our intimate acquaintance." I must add, that when
Napoleon thus spoke to me in the gardens of Malmaison he only repeated
what had often fallen from him in his youth, for his character and his
ideas never varied; the change was in the objects to which they were
applied.
Pages:
1 |
2 |
3 | 4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9