Books: Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, V3

L >> Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne >> Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, V3

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I confine myself to these details of this act of dreadful necessity, of
which I was an eye-witness. Others, who, like myself, saw it, have
fortunately spared me the recital of the sanguinary result. This
atrocious scene, when I think of it, still makes me shudder, as it did on
the day I beheld it; and I would wish it were possible for me to forget
it, rather than be compelled to describe it. All the horrors imagination
can conceive, relative to that day of blood, would fall short of the
reality.

I have related the truth, the whole truth. I was present at all the
discussions, all the conferences, all the deliberations. I had not, as
may be supposed, a deliberative voice; but I am bound to declare that.
the situation of the army, the scarcity of food, our small numerical
strength, in the midst of a country where every individual was an enemy,
would have induced me to vote in the affirmative of the proposition which
was carried into effect, if I had a vote to give. It was necessary to be
on the spot in order to understand the horrible necessity which existed.

War, unfortunately, presents too many occasions on which a law, immutable
in all ages, and common to all nations, requires that private interests
should be sacrificed to a great general interest, and that even humanity
should he forgotten. It is for posterity to judge whether this terrible
situation was that in which Bonaparte was placed. For my own part, I
have a perfect conviction that be could not do otherwise than yield to
the dire necessity of the case. It was the advice of the council, whose
opinion was unanimous in favour of the execution, that governed him,
Indeed I ought in truth to say, that he yielded only in the last
extremity, and was one of those, perhaps, who beheld the massacre with
the deepest pain.

After the siege of Jaffe the plague began to exhibit itself with a little
more virulence. We lost between seven and eight hundred, men by the
contagion during the campaign of Syria'

--[Sir Walter Scott says, that Heaven seat this pestilence amongst
us to avenge the massacre of Jaffa]--

During our march on St. Jean d'Acre, which was commenced on the l4th of
March, the army neither obtained the brilliant triumphs nor encountered
the numerous obstacles spoken of in certain works. Nothing of importance
occurred but a rash skirmish of General Lannes who, in spite of contrary
orders, from Bonaparte, obstinately pursued a troop of mountaineers into
the passes of Nabloua. On returning, he found the mountaineers placed in
ambush in great numbers amongst rocks, the windings of which they were
well, acquainted with, whence they fired close upon our troops; whose
situation rendered them unable to defend themselves. During the time of
this foolish and useless enterprise; especially while the firing was
brisk, Bonaparte, exhibited much impatience, and it must be confessed,
his anger was but natural: The Nablousians halted at the openings of the
mountain defiles. Bonaparte reproached Lannes bitterly for having
uselessly exposed himself, and "sacrificed, without any object, a number
of brave men." Lannes excused himself by saying that the mountaineers
had defied him, and he wished to chastise the rabble. "We are not in a
condition to play the swaggerer," replied Napoleon.

In four days we arrived before St. Jean d'Acre, where we learned that
Djezzar had cut off the head of our envoy, Mailly-de-Chateau-Renaud, and
thrown his body into the sea in a sack. This cruel pasha was guilty of a
great number of similar executions. The waves frequently drove dead
bodies towards the coast, and we came upon them whilst bathing.

The details: of the siege of Acre are well known. Although surrounded by
a wall, flanked with strong towers, and having, besides, a broad-and deep
ditch defended by works this little fortress did not appear likely to
hold out against French valour and the skill of our corps of engineers
and artillery; but the ease and rapidity with which Jaffa had been taken
occasioned us to overlook in some degree the comparative strength of the
two places, and the difference of their respective situations. At Jaffa
we had sufficient artillery: at St. Jean d'Acre we had not. At Jaffa we
had to deal only with a garrison left to itself: at St. Jean d'Acre we
were opposed by a garrison strengthened by reinforcements of men and
supplies of provisions, supported by the English fleet, and assisted by
European Science. Sir Sidney Smith was, beyond doubt, the man who did us
the greatest injury.

--[Sir Sidney Smith was the only Englishman besides the Duke of
Wellington who defeated Napoleon in military operations. The third
Englishman opposed to him, Sir John Moore, was compelled to make a
precipitate retreat through the weakness of his force]--

Much has been said respecting his communications with the General-in-
Chief. The reproaches which the latter cast upon him for endeavouring to
seduce the soldiers and officers of the army by tempting offers were the
more singular, even if they were well founded, inasmuch as these means
are frequently employed by leaders in war.

--[At one time the French General was so disturbed by them as to
endeavour to put a stop to them; which object he effected by
interdicting all communication with the English, and signifying, in
an order of the day, that their Commodore was a madman. This, being
believed in the army, so enraged Sir Sidney Smith, that in his wrath
he sent a challenge to Napoleon. The latter replied, that he had
too many weighty affairs on his hands to trouble himself in so
trifling a matter. Had it, indeed, been the great Marlborough, it
might have been worthy his attention. Still, if the English sailor
was absolutely bent upon fighting, he would send him a bravo from
the army, and show them a smell portion of neutral ground, where the
mad Commodore might land, and satisfy his humour to the full.--
Editor of l836 edition.)]--

As to the embarking of French prisoners on board a vessel in which the
plague existed, the improbability of the circumstance alone, but
especially the notorious facts of the case, repell this odious
accusation. I observed the conduct of Sir Sidney Smith closely at the
time, and I remarked in him a chivalric spirit, which sometimes hurried
him into trifling eccentricities; but I affirm that his behaviour towards
the French was that of a gallant enemy. I have seen many letters, in
which the writers informed him that they "were very sensible of the good
treatment which the French experienced when they fell into his hands."
Let any one examine Sir Sidney's conduct before the capitulation of El-
Arish, and after its rupture, and then they can judge of his character.

--[Napoleon, when at St. Helena, in speaking of the siege of Acre,
said,--Sidney Smith is a brave officer. He displayed considerable
ability in the treaty for the evacuation of Egypt by the French. He
took advantage of the discontent which he found to prevail amongst
the French troops at being so long away from France, and other
circumstances. He manifested great honour in sending immediately to
Kleber the refusal of Lord Keith to ratify the treaty, which saved
the French army; if he had kept it a secret seven or eight days
longer, Cairo would have been given up to the Turks, and the French
army necessarily obliged to surrender to the English. He also
showed great humanity and honour in all his proceedings towards the
French who felt into his hands. He landed at Havre, for some
'sotttice' of a bet he had made, according to some, to go to the
theatre; others said it was for espionage; however that may be, he
was arrested and confined in the Temple as a spy; and at one time it
was intended to try and execute him. Shortly after I returned from
Italy he wrote to me from his prison, to request that I would
intercede for him; but, under the circumstances in which he was
taken, I could do nothing for him. He is active, intelligent,
intriguing, and indefatigable; but I believe that he is 'mezzo
pazo'.

"The chief cause of the failure at Acre was, that he took all my
battering train, which was on board of several small vessels.
Had it not been for that, I would have taken Acre in spite of him.
He behaved very bravely, and was well seconded by Phillipeaux, a
Frenchman of talent, who had studied with me as an engineer. There
was a Major Douglas also, who behaved very gallantly. The
acquisition of five or six hundred seamen as gunners was a great
advantage to the Turks, whose spirits they revived, and whom they
showed how to defend the fortress. But he committed a great fault
in making sorties, which cost the lives of two or three hundred
brave fellows without the possibility of success. For it was
impossible he could succeed against the number of the French who
were before Acre. I would lay a wage that he lost half of his crew
in them. He dispersed Proclamations amongst my troops, which
certainly shook some of them, and I in consequence published an
order, stating that he was read, and forbidding all communication
with him. Some days after he sent, by means of a flag of truce,
a lieutenant or a midshipman with a letter containing a challenge to
me to meet him at some place he pointed out in order to fight a
duel. I laughed at this, sad sent him back an intimation that when
he brought Marlborough to fight me I would meet him. Not,
withstanding this, I like the character of the man." (Voices from
St. Helena, vol. 4 ,p. 208).]--

All our manoeuvres, our works, and attacks were made with that levity and
carelessness which over-confidence inspires. Kleber, whilst walking with
me one day in the lines of our camp, frequently expressed his surprise
and discontent. "The trenches," said, he, "do not come up to my knees."
Besieging artillery was, of necessity, required: we commenced with field
artillery. This encouraged the besieged, who perceived the weakness of
our resources. The besieging artillery, consisting only of three twenty-
four pounders and six, eighteen pounders, was not brought up until the
end of April, and before that period threw assaults had taken place with
very serious loss. On the 4th of May our powder began to fail us. This
cruel event obliged us to slacken our fire. We also wanted shot; and an
order of the day fixed a price to be given for all balls, according to
their calibre, which might be picked up after being fired from the
fortress or the two ships of the line, the 'Tiger' and 'Theseus', which
were stationed on each side of the harbour: These two vessels embarrassed
the communication, between the camp and the trenches; but though they
made much noise, they did little harm. A ball from one of them; killed
an officer on the evening the siege was raised.

The enemy had within the walls some excellent riflemen, chiefly
Albanians. They placed stones, one over the other, on the walls, put
their firearms through the interstices, and thus, completely sheltered,
fired with destructive precision.

On the 9th of April General Caffarelli, so well known for his courage and
talents, was passing through the trench, his hand resting as he stooped
on his hip, to preserve the equilibrium which his wooden leg, impaired;
his elbow only was raised above the trench. He was warned that the
enemy's shot, fired close upon us did not miss the smallest object.
He paid no attention to any observation of this kind, and in a few
instants his elbow joint was fractured. Amputation of the arm was judged
indispensable. The General survived the operation eighteen days.
Bonaparte went regularly twice a day to his tent. By his order, added to
my friendship for Caffarelli, I scarcely ever quitted him. Shortly
before he expired he said to me, "My dear Bourrienne, be so good as to
read to me Voltaire's preface to 'Esprit des Lois'." When I returned to
the tent of the General-in-Chief he asked, "How is Caffarelli?" I
replied, "He is near his end; but he asked me to read him Voltaire's
preface to the 'Esprit de Lois', he has just fallen asleep." Bonaparte
said, "Bah! to wish to hear that preface? how singular!" He went to see
Caffarelli, but he was still asleep. I returned to him that evening and
received his last breath. He died with the utmost composure. His death.
was equally regretted by the soldiers and the men of science, who
accompanied us. It was a just regret due to that distinguished man, in
whom very extensive information was united with great courage and amiable
disposition.

On the 10th of May; when an assault took place, Bonaparte proceeded at an
early hour to the trenches.

--[Sir Sidney Smith, in his Official report of the assault of the
8th of May, says that Napoleon was distinctly seen directing the
operation.]--

Croisier, who was mentioned on our arrival at Damanhour and on the
capture of Jaffa, had in vain courted death since the commencement of the
siege. Life had become insupportable to him since the unfortunate affair
at Jaffa. He as usual accompanied his General to the trenches.
Believing that the termination of the siege, which was supposed to be
near, would postpone indefinitely the death which he sought, he mounted a
battery. In this situation his tall figure uselessly provoked all, the
enemy's shots. "Croisier, come down, I command you; you have no business
there," cried Bonaparte, in a loud and imperative tone. Croisier
remained without making any reply. A moment after a ball passed through
his right leg. Amputation was not considered, indispensable. On the day
of our departure he was placed on a litters which was borne by sixteen
men alternately, eight at a time. I received his farewell between Gaza
and El-Arish, where, he died of tetanus. His modest tomb will not be
often visited.

The siege of St. Jean d'Acre lasted sixty days. During that time eight-
assaults and-twelve sorties took place. In the assault of the 8th of May
more than 200 men penetrated into the town. Victory was already shouted;
but the breach having been taken in reverse by the Turks, it was not
approached without some degree of hesitation, and the men who had entered
were not supported. The streets were barricaded. The cries, the
howlings of the women, who ran trough the streets throwing, according to
the custom of the country, dust in the, air, excited the male inhabitants
to a desperate resistance, which rendered unavailing, this short
occupation of the town, by a handful of men, who, finding themselves left
without assistance, retreated towards the breach. Many who could not
reach it perished in the town.

During this assault Duroc, who was in the trench, was wounded in the
right thigh by the a splinter from a shell fired against the
fortifications. Fortunately this accident only carried away the flesh
from the bone, which remained untouched. He had a tent in common with
several other 'aides de camp'; but for his better accommodation I gave
him mine, and I scarcely ever quitted him. Entering his tent one day
about noon, I found him in a profound sleep. The excessive heat had
compelled him to throw off all covering, and part of his wound was
exposed. I perceived a scorpion which had crawled up the leg of the
camp-bed and approached very near to the wound. I was just in time to
hurl it to the ground. The sudden motion of my hand awoke Duroc.

We often bathed in the sea. Sometimes the English, perhaps after taking
a double allowance of grog, would fire at our heads, which appeared above
water. I am not aware that any accident was occasioned by their
cannonade; but as we were beyond reach of their guns, we paid scarcely
any attention to the firing. It was seen a subject of amusement to us.

Had our attack on St. Jean d'Acre been less precipitate, and had the
siege been undertaken according to the rules of war; the place would not
have held out three days; one assault, like that of the 8th of May, would
have been sufficient. If, in the situation in which we were on the day
when we first came in sight of the ramparts of Acre; we had made a less
inconsiderate estimate of the strength of the place; if we had likewise
taken into consideration the active co-operation of the English and the
Ottoman Porte; our absolute want of artillery of sufficient calibre; our
scarcity of gunpowder and the difficulty of procuring food; we certainly
should not have undertaken the siege; and that would have been by far the
wisest course.

Towards the end of the siege the General-in-Chief received intelligence
of some trifling insurrections in northern Egypt. An angel had excited
them, and the heavenly messenger, who had condescended to assume a name,
was called the Mahdi, or El Mohdy. This religious extravagance, however,
did not last long, and tranquillity was soon restored. All that the
fanatic Mahdi, who shrouded himself in mystery, succeeded in doing was to
attack our rear by some vagabonds, whose illusions were dissipated by a
few musket shots.

CHAPTER XIX.

1799.

The siege of Acre raised--Attention to names is bulletins--Gigantic
project-- The Druses--Mount Caramel--The wounded and infected--
Order to march on foot--Loss of our cannon--A Nablousian fires at
Bonaparte--Return to Jaffa--Bonaparte visits the plague hospital--
A potion given to the sick--Bonaparte's statement at St. Helena.

The siege of St. Jean d'Acre was raised on the 20th of May. It cost us a
loss of nearly 3000 men, in killed, deaths by the plague, or wounds. A
great number were wounded mortally. In those veracious documents, the
bulletins, the French loss was made 500 killed, and 1000 wounded, and the
enemy's more than 15,000.

Our bulletins may form curious materials for history; but their value
certainly will not depend on the credit due to their details. Bonaparte
attached the greatest importance to those documents; generally drawing
them up himself, or correcting them, when written by another hand, if the
composition did not please him.

It must be confessed that at that time nothing so much flattered self-
love as being mentioned in a bulletin. Bonaparte was well aware of this;
he knew that to insert a name in a bulletin was conferring a great
honour, and that its exclusion was a severe disappointment. General
Berthier, to whom I had expressed a strong desire to examine the works of
the siege, took me over them; but notwithstanding his promise of secrecy;
he mentioned the circumstance to the General-in-Chief, who had desired me
not to approach the works. "What did you go there for?" said Bonaparte
to me, with some severity; "that is not your place." I replied that
Berthier told me that no assault would take place that day; and he
believed there would be no sortie, as the garrison had made one the
preceding evening. "What matters that? There might have been another.
Those who have nothing to do in such places are always the first victims.
Let every man mind his own business. Wounded or killed, I would not even
have noticed you in the bulletin. You could have been laughed at, and
that justly."

Bonaparte; not having at this time experienced reverses, having
continually proceeded from triumph to triumph, confidently anticipated
the taking of St, Jean d'Acre. In his letters to the generals in Egypt
he fixed the 25th of April for the accomplishment of that event. He
reckoned that the grand assault against the tower could not be made
before that day; it took place, however, twenty-four hours sooner. He
wrote to Desaix on the 19th of April, "I count on being master of Acre in
six days." On the 2d of May he told Junot, "Our 18 and 24 pounders have
arrived. We hope to enter Acre in a few days. The fire of their
artillery is completely extinguished." Letters have been printed, dated
30th Floreal' (19th. May), in which he announces to, Dugua and to
Poussielque that they can rely on his being in Acre on 6th Floreal
(25th April). Some mistake has evidently been made. "The slightest
circumstances produce the greatest events," said Napoleon, according to
the Memorial of St. Helena; "had St. Jean d'Acre fallen, I should have
changed the face of the world." And again, "The fate of the East lay in
that small town."

This idea is not one which he first began to entertain at St. Helena; he
often repeated the very same words at St. Jean d'Acre. On the shore of
Ptolemes gigantic projects agitated him, as, doubtless, regret for not
having carried them into execution tormented him at St. Helena.

Almost every evening Bonaparte and myself used to walk together, at a
little distance from the sea-shore. The day after the unfortunate
assault of the 8th of May Bonaparte, afflicted at seeing the blood of so
many brave men uselessly shed, said to me, "Bourrienne, I see that this
wretched place has cost me a number of men, and wasted much time. But
things are too far advanced not to attempt a last effort. If I succeed,
as I expect, I shall find in the town the pasha's treasures, and arms for
300,000 men. I will stir up and arm the people of Syria, who are
disgusted at the ferocity of Djezzar, and who, as you know, pray for his
destruction at every assault. I shall then march upon Damascus and.
Aleppo. On advancing into the country, the discontented will flock round
my standard, and swell my army. I will announce to the people the
abolition of servitude and of the tyrannical governments of the pashas.
I shall arrive at Constantinople with large masses of soldiers. I shall
overturn the Turkish empire, and found in the East a new and grand
empire, which will fix my place in the records of posterity. Perhaps
I shall return to Paris by Adrianople, or by Vienna, after having
annihilated the house of Austria." After I had made some observations
which these grand projects naturally suggested, he replied, "What! do you
not see that the Druses only wait for the fall of Acre to rise in
rebellion? Have not the keys of Damascus already been offered me?
I only stay till these walls fall because until then I can derive no
advantage from this large town. By the operation which I meditate I
cutoff all kind of succour from the beys, and secure the conquest of
Egypt. I will have Desaix nominated commander-in-chief; but if I do
not succeed in the last assault I am about to attempt, I set off
directly. Time presses,--I shall not be at Cairo before the middle of
June; the winds will then lie favourable for ships bound to Egypt, from
the north. Constantinople will send troops to Alexandria and Rosetta.
I must be there. As for the army, which will arrive afterwards by land,
I do not fear it this year. I will cause everything to be destroyed, all
the way, to the entrance of the desert. I will render the passage of an
army impossible for two years. Troops cannot exist amoung ruins."

As soon as I returned to my tent I committed to paper this conversation,
which was then quite fresh in my memory, and, I ,may venture to say that
every word I put down is correct. I may add, that during the siege our
camp was, constantly filled with the inhabitants, who invoked Heaven to
favour our arms, and prayed fervently at every assaualt for our success,
many of them on their knees, with their faces to the city. The people of
Damascus, too, had offered the keys to Bonaparte. Thus everything
contributed to make him confident in his favourite plan.

The troops left St. Jean d'Acre on the 20th of May, taking advantage of
the night to avoid a sortie from the besieged, and to conceal the retreat
of the army, which had to march three leagues along the shore, exposed to
the fire of the English vessels lying in the roads of Mount Carmel. The
removal of the wounded and sick commenced on the. 18th and 19th of May.

Bonaparte then made a proclamation, which from one end to the other
offends against truth. It has been published in many works. The season of
the year for hostile landing is there very dexterously placed in the
foreground; all the rest is a deceitful exaggeration. It must be observed
that the proclamations which Bonaparte regarded as calculated to dazzle
an ever too credulous public were amplifications often ridiculous and
incomprehensible upon the spot, and which only excited the laughter of
men of common sense. In all Bonaparte's correspondence there is an
endeavour to disguise his reverses, and impose on the public, and even on
his own generals. For example, he wrote to General Dugua, commandant of
Cairo, on the 15th of February, "I will bring you plenty of prisoners and
flags! "One would almost be inclined to say that he had resolved, during
his stay in the East, thus to pay a tribute to the country of fables.

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