Books: Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, V14
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Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne >> Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, V14
"The next day the Emperor spoke to me of the previous night's
conversation. 'I suspected,' he said, 'that the wretch was in
correspondence with Vienna. I have had a banker's clerk arrested on his
return from that city. He has acknowledged that he brought a letter for
Fouche from Metternich, and that the answer was to be sent at a fixed
time to Bale, where a man was to wait for the bearer on the bridge: I
sent for Fouche a few days ago, and kept him three hours long in my
garden, hoping that in the course of a friendly conversation he would
mention that letter to me, but he said nothing. At last, yesterday
evening, I myself opened the subject.' (Here the Emperor repeated to me
the words I had heard the night before, 'You are a traitor,' etc.) He
acknowledged, in fact, continued the Emperor, 'that he had received such
a letter, but that it was not signed and that he had looked upon it as a
mystification. He showed it me. Now that letter was evidently an
answer, in which the writer again declared that he would listen to
nothing more concerning the Emperor, but that, his person excepted, it
would be easy to agree to all the rest. I expected that the Emperor
would conclude his narrative by expressing his anger against Fouche, but
our conversation turned on some other subject, and he talked no more of
him.
"Two days afterwards I went to Fouche to solicit the return to Paris of
an officer of musqueteers who had been banished far from his family. I
found him at breakfast, and sat down next to him. Facing him sat a
stranger. 'Do you see this man?' he said to me; pointing with his spoon
to the stranger; 'he is an aristocrat, a Bourbonist, a Chouan; it is the
Abbe -----, one of the editors of the Journal des Debats--a sworn enemy
to Napoleon, a fanatic partisan of the Bourbons; he is one of our men.
I looked, at him. At every fresh epithet of the Minister the Abbe bowed
his head down to his plate with a smile of cheerfulness and self-
complacency, and with a sort of leer. I never saw a more ignoble
countenance. Fouche explained to me, on leaving the breakfast table,
in what manner all these valets of literature were men of his, and while
I acknowledged to myself that the system might be necessary, I scarcely
knew who were really more despicable--the wretches who thus sold
themselves to the highest bidder, or the minister who boasted of having
bought them, as if their acquisition were a glorious conquest. Judging
that the Emperor had spoken to me of the scene I have described above,
Fouche said to me, 'The Emperor's temper is soured by the resistance he
finds, and he thinks it is my fault. He does not know that I have no
power but by public opinion. To morrow I might hang before my door
twenty persons obnoxious to public opinion, though I should not be able
to imprison for four-and-twenty hours any individual favoured by it.
As I am never in a hurry to speak I remained silent, but reflecting on
what the Emperor had said concerning Fouche I found the comparison of
their two speeches remarkable. The master could have his minister hanged
with public applause, and the minister could hang--whom? Perhaps the
master himself, and with the same approbation. What a singular
situation!--and I believe they were both in the right; so far public
opinion, equitable in regard to Fouche, had swerved concerning the
Emperor."
The wrath of Napoleon was confined to the Lower House, the Peers, from
the nature of their composition, being complacent and passive enough.
The vast majority of them were in fact mere shadows gathered round the
solid persons of Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome Bonaparte, and Sieyes,
Carnot, and the military men of the Revolution. As a political body
Napoleon despised them himself, and yet he wanted the nation to respect
them. But respect was impossible, and the volatile Parisians made the
Peers a constant object of their witticisms. The punsters of Paris made
the following somewhat ingenious play upon words. Lallemand, Labedogure,
Drouot, and Ney they called Las Quatre Pairs fides (perfides), which in
pronunciation may equally mean the four faithful peers or the four
perfidious men. The infamous Vandamme and another were called Pair-
siffles, the biased peers, or the biased pair, or (persiffles) men made
objects of derision. It was thus the lower orders behaved while the,
existence of France was at stake.
By this time the thunder-cloud of war had gathered and was ready to
burst. Short as the time at his disposal was Napoleon prepared to meet
it with his accustomed energy. Firearms formed one of the most important
objects of attention. There were sufficient sabres, but muskets were
wanting. The Imperial factories could, in ordinary times, furnish
monthly 20,000 stands of new arms; by the extraordinary activity and
inducements offered this number was doubled. Workmen were also employed
in repairing the old muskets. There was displayed at this momentous
period the same activity in the capital as in 1793, and better directed,
though without the same ultimate success. The clothing of the army was
another difficulty, and this was got over by advancing large sums of
money to the cloth manufacturers beforehand. The contractors delivered
20,000 cavalry horses before the 1st of June, 10,000 trained horses had
been furnished by the dismounted gendarmerie. Twelve thousand artillery
horses were also delivered by the 1st of June, in addition to 6000 which
the army already had.
The facility with which the Ministers of Finance and of the Treasury
provided for all these expenses astonished everybody, as it was necessary
to pay for everything in ready money. The system of public works was at
the same time resumed throughout France. "It is easy to see," said the
workmen, "that 'the great contractor' is returned; all was dead, now
everything revives."
"We have just learnt," says a writer who was at Brussels at this time,
"that Napoleon had left the capital of France on the 12th; on the 15th
the frequent arrival of couriers excited extreme anxiety, and towards
evening General Muffing presented himself at the hotel of the Duke of
Wellington with despatches from Blucher. We were all aware that the
enemy was in movement, and the ignorant could not solve the enigma of the
Duke going tranquilly to the ball at the Duke of Richmond's--his coolness
was above their comprehension. Had he remained at his own hotel a panic
would have probably ensued amongst the inhabitants, which would have
embarrassed the intended movement of the British division of the army.
"I returned home late, and we were still talking over our uneasiness when
we heard the trumpets sound. Before the sun had risen in full splendour
I heard martial music approaching, and soon beheld from my windows the
5th reserve of the British army passing; the Highland brigade were the
first in advance, led by their noble thanes, the bagpipes playing their
several pibrochs; they were succeeded by the 28th, their bugles' note
falling more blithely upon the ear. Each regiment passed in succession
with its band playing."
The gallant Duke of Brunswick was at a ball at the assembly-rooms in the
Rue Ducale on the night of the 15th of June when the French guns, which
he was one of the first to hear, were clearly distinguished at Brussels.
"Upon receiving the information that a powerful French force was
advancing in the direction of Charleroi. 'Then it is high time for me to
be off,' he exclaimed, and immediately quitted, the ball-room."
"At four the whole disposable force under the Duke off Wellington was
collected together, but in such haste that many of the officers had no
time to change their silk stockings and dancing-shoes; and some, quite
overcome by drowsiness, were seen lying asleep about the ramparts, still
holding, however, with a firm hand, the reins of their horses, which were
grazing by their sides.
"About five o'clock the word march' was heard in ail directions, and
instantly the whole mass appeared to move simultaneously. I conversed
with several of the officers previous to their departure, and not one
appeared to have the slightest idea of an approaching engagement.
"The Duke of Wellington and his staff did not quit Brussels till past
eleven o'clock, and it was not till some time after they were gone that
it was generally known the whole French army, including a strong corps of
cavalry, was within a few miles of Quatre Bras."
CHAPTER VIII.
--[Like the preceding, this chapter first appeared in the 1836
edition, and is not from the pen of M. de Bourrienne.]--
1815.
THE BATTLES OF LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS.
The moment for striking a decisive blow had now come, and accordingly,
early on the morning of the 15th, the whole of the French army was in
motion. The 2d corps proceeded to Marchiennes to attack the Prussian
outposts at Thuin and Lobes, in order to secure the communication across
the Sambre between those places. The 3d corps, covered by General
Pajol's cavalry, advanced upon Charleroi, followed by the Imperial Guard
and the 6th corps, with the necessary detachments of pontoniers. The
remainder of the cavalry, under Grouchy, also advanced upon Charleroi, on
the flanks of the 3d and 6th corps. The 4th corps was ordered to march
upon the bridge of Chatelet.
On the approach of the French advanced guards an incessant skirmish was
maintained during the whole morning with the Prussians, who, after losing
many men, were compelled to yield to superior numbers. General Zieten,
finding it impossible, from the extent of frontier he had to cover, to
cheek the advance of the French, fell back towards Fleurus by the road to
Charleroi, resolutely contesting the advance of the enemy wherever it was
possible. In the repeated attacks sustained by him he suffered
considerable loss. It was nearly mid-day before a passage through
Charleroi was secured by the French army, and General Zieten continued
his retreat upon Fleurus, where he took up his position for the night.
Upon Zieten's abandoning, in the course of his retreat, the chaussee
which leads to Brussels through Quatre Bras, Marshal Ney, who had only
just been put in command on the left of the French army, was ordered to
advance by this road upon Gosselies, and found at Frasnes part of the
Duke of Wellington's army, composed of Nassau troops under the command of
Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who, after some skirmishing, maintained
his position. "Notwithstanding all the exertions of the French at a
moment when time was of such importance, they had only been able to
advance about fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen
hours of daylight."
It was the intention of Napoleon during his operations on this day to
effect a separation between the English and Prussian armies, in which he
had nearly succeeded. Napoleon's plan for this purpose, and the
execution of it by his army, were alike admirable, but it is hardly
probable that the Allied generals were taken by surprise, as it was the
only likely course which Napoleon could have taken. His line of
operation was on the direct road to Brussels, and there were no fortified
works to impede his progress, while from the nature of the country his
numerous and excellent cavalry could be employed with great effect.
In the French accounts Marshal Ney was much blamed for not occupying
Quatre Bras with the whole of his force on the evening of the 16th. "Ney
might probably have driven back the Nassau troops at Quatre Bras, and
occupied that important position, but hearing a heavy cannonade on his
right flank, where General Zieten had taken up his position, he thought
it necessary to halt and detach a division in the direction of Fleurus.
He was severely censured by Napoleon for not having literally followed
his orders and pushed on to Quatre Bras." This accusation forms a
curious contrast with that made against Grouchy, upon whom Napoleon threw
the blame of the defeat at Waterloo, because he strictly fulfilled his
orders, by pressing the Prussians at Wavre, unheeding the cannonade on
his left, which might have led him to conjecture that the more important
contest between the Emperor and Wellington was at that moment raging.
It was at six o'clock in the evening of the 16th that the Drake of
Wellington received the first information of the advance of the French
army; but it was not, however, until ten o'clock that positive news
reached him that the French army had moved upon the line of the Sambre.
This information induced him to push forward reinforcements on Quatre
Bras, at which place he himself arrived at an early hour on the 16th, and
immediately proceeded to Bry, to devise measures with Marshal Blucher in
order to combine their efforts. From the movement of considerable masses
of the French in front of the Prussians it was evident that their first
grand attack would be directed against them. That this was Napoleon's
object on the 16th maybe seen by his orders to Ney and Grouchy to turn
the right of the Prussians, and drive the British from their position at
Quatre Bras, and then to march down the chaussee upon Bry in order
effectually to separate the two armies. Ney was accordingly detached for
this purpose with 43,000 men. In the event of the success of Marshal Ney
he would have been enabled to detach a portion of his forces for the
purpose of making a flank attack upon the Prussians in the rear of St.
Amend, whilst Napoleon in person was directing his main efforts against
that village the strongest in the Prussian position. Ney's reserve was
at Frasnes, disposable either for the purpose of supporting the attack on
Quatre Bras or that at St. Amand; and in case of Ney's complete success
to turn the Prussian right flank by marching on Bry.
CHAPTER IX.
1815
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.
One of the most important struggles of modern times was now about to
commence--a struggle which for many years was to decide the fate of
Europe. Napoleon and Wellington at length stood opposite one another.
They had never met; the military reputation of each was of the highest
kind,
--[For full details of the Waterloo campaign see Siborne's History
of the War in France and Belgium in 1815, giving the English
contemporary account; Chesney's Waterloo Lectures, the best English
modern account, which has been accepted by the Prussians as pretty
nearly representing their view; and Waterloo by Lieutenant-Colonel
Prince Edouard de la Tour d'Auvergne (Paris, Plon, 1870), which may
be taken as the French modern account.
In judging this campaign the reader must guard himself from looking
on it as fought by two different armies-the English and the
Prussian-whose achievements are to be weighed against one another.
Wellington and Blucher were acting in a complete unison rare even
when two different corps of the same nation are concerned, but
practically unexampled in the case of two armies of different
nations. Thus the two forces became one army, divided into two
wings, one, the left (or Prussian wing) having been defeated by the
main body of the French at Ligny on the 16th of June, the right (or
English wing) retreated to hold the position at Waterloo, where the
left (or Prussian wing) was to join it, and the united force was to
crash the enemy. Thus there is no question as to whether the
Prussian army saved the English by their arrival, or whether the
English saved the Prussians by their resistance at Waterloo. Each
army executed well and gallantly its part in a concerted operation.
The English would never have fought at Waterloo if they had not
relied on the arrival of the Prussians. Had the Prussians not come
up on the afternoon of the 18th of June the English would have been
exposed to the same great peril of having alone to deal with the
mass of the French army, as the Prussians would have had to face if
they had found the English in full retreat. To investigate the
relative performances of the two armies is lunch the same as to
decide the respective merits of the two Prussian armies at Sadowa,
where one held the Austrians until the other arrived. Also in
reading the many interesting personal accounts of the campaign it
most be remembered that opinions about the chance of success in a
defensive struggle are apt to warp with the observer's position, as
indeed General Grant has remarked in answer to criticisms on his
army's state at the end of the first day of the battle of Shiloh or
'Pittsburg Landing. The man placed in the front rank or fighting
line sees attack after attack beaten off. He sees only part of his
own losses, am most of the wounded disappear, and he also knows
something of the enemy's loss by seeing the dead in front of him.
Warmed by the contest, he thus believes in success. The man placed
in rear or advancing with reinforcements, having nothing of the
excitement of the struggle, sees only the long and increasing column
of wounded, stragglers, and perhaps of fliers. He sees his
companion fall without being able to answer the fire. He sees
nothing of the corresponding loss of the enemy, and he is apt to
take a most desponding view of the situation. Thus Englishmen
reading the accounts of men who fought at Waterloo are too ready to
disbelieve representations of what was taking place in the rear of
the army, and to think Thackeray's life-like picture in Vanity Fair
of the state of Brussels must be overdrawn. Indeed, in this very
battle of Waterloo, Zieten began to retreat when his help was most
required, because one of his aides de camp told him that the right
wing of the English was in full retreat. "This inexperienced young
man," says Muffling, p. 248, "had mistaken the great number of
wounded going, or being taken, to the rear to be dressed, for
fugitives, and accordingly made a false report." Further, reserves
do not say much of their part or, sometimes, no part of the fight,
and few people know that at least two English regiments actually
present on the field of Waterloo hardly fired a shot till the last
advance.
The Duke described the army as the worst he ever commanded, and said
that if he had had his Peninsular men, the fight would have been
over much sooner. But the Duke, sticking to ideas now obsolete, had
no picked corps. Each man, trusting in and trusted by his comrades,
fought under his own officers and under his own regimental colours.
Whatever they did not know, the men knew how to die, and at the end
of the day a heap of dead told where each regiment and battery had
stood.]--
the career of both had been marked by signal victory; Napoleon had
carried his triumphant legions across the stupendous Alps, over the north
of Italy, throughout Prussia, Austria, Russia, and even to the foot of
the Pyramids, while Wellington, who had been early distinguished in
India, had won immortal renown in the Peninsula, where he had defeated,
one after another, the favourite generals of Napoleon. He was now to
make trial of his prowess against their Master.
Among the most critical events of modern times the battle of Waterloo
stands conspicuous. This sanguinary encounter at last stopped the
torrent of the ruthless and predatory ambition of the French, by which so
many countries had been desolated. With the peace which immediately
succeeded it confidence was restored to Europe.
CHAPTER X.
1815
Interview with Lavallette--Proceedings in the French Chambers--
Second abdication of Napoleon--He retires to Rochefort, negotiates
with Captain Maitland, and finally embarks in the 'Bellerophon'.
One of the first public men to see Napoleon after his return from
Waterloo was Lavallette. "I flew," says he, "to the Elysee to see the
Emperor: he summoned me into his closet, and as soon as he saw me, he
came to meet me with a frightful epileptic 'laugh. `Oh, my God!' he
said, raising his eyes to heaven, and walking two or three times up and
down the room. This appearance of despair was however very short. He
soon recovered his coolness, and asked me what was going forward in the
Chamber of Representatives. I could not attempt to hide that party
spirit was there carried to a high pitch, and that the majority seemed
determined to require his abdication, and to pronounce it themselves if
he did not concede willingly. 'How is that?' he said. 'If proper
measures are not taken the enemy will be before the gates of Paris in
eight days. Alas!' he added, 'have I accustomed them to such great
victories that they knew not how to bear one day's misfortune? What will
become of poor France? I have done all I could for her!' He then heaved
a deep sigh. Somebody asked to speak to him, and I left him, with a
direction to come back at a later hour.
"I passed the day in seeking information among all my friends and
acquaintances. I found in all of them either the greatest dejection or
an extravagant joy, which they disguised by feigned alarm and pity for
myself, which I repulsed with great indignation. Nothing favourable was
to be expected from the Chamber of Representatives. They all said they
wished for liberty, but, between two enemies who appeared ready to
destroy it, they preferred the foreigners, the friends of the Bourbons,
to Napoleon, who might still have prolonged the struggle, but that he
alone would not find means to save them and erect the edifice of liberty.
The Chamber of Peers presented a much sadder spectacle. Except the
intrepid Thibaudeau, who till, the last moment expressed himself with
admirable energy against the Bourbons, almost all the others thought of
nothing else but getting out of the dilemma with the least loss they
could. Some took no pains to hide their wish of bending again under the
Bourbon yoke."
On the evening of Napoleon's return to Paris he sent for Benjamin
Constant to come to him at the Elysee about seven o'clock. The Chambers
had decreed their permanence, and proposals for abdication had reached
the Emperor. He was serious but calm. In reply to some words on the
disaster of Waterloo he said, "The question no longer concerns me, but
France. They wish me to abdicate. Have they calculated upon the
inevitable consequences of this abdication? It is round me, round my
name, that the army rallies: to separate me from it is to disband it.
If I abdicate to-day, in two days' time you will no longer have an army.
These poor fellows do not understand all your subtleties. Is it believed
that axioms in metaphysics, declarations of right, harangues from the
tribune, will put a stop to the disbanding of an army? To reject me when
I landed at Cannes I can conceive possible; to abandon me now is what I
do not understand. It is not when the enemy is at twenty-five leagues'
distance that any Government can be overturned with impunity. Does any
one imagine that the Foreign Powers will be won over by fine words? If
they had dethroned me fifteen days ago there would have been some spirit
in it; but as it is, I make part of what strangers attack, I make part,
then, of what France is bound to defend. In giving me up she gives up
herself, she avows her weakness, she acknowledges herself conquered, she
courts the insolence of the conqueror. It is not the love of liberty
which deposes me, but Waterloo; it is fear, and a fear of which your
enemies will take advantage. And then what title has the Chamber to
demand my abdication? It goes out of its lawful sphere in doing so; it
has no authority. It is my right, it is my duty to dissolve it."
"He then hastily ran over the possible consequences of such a step.
Separated from the Chambers, he could only be considered as a military
chief: but the army would be for him; that would always join him who can
lead it against foreign banners, and to this might be added all that part
of the population which is equally powerful and easily, led in such a
state of things. As if chance intended to strengthen Napoleon in this
train of thought, while he was speaking the avenue of Marigny resounded
with the cries of 'Vive l'Empereur!' A crowd of men, chiefly of the poor
and labouring class, pressed forward into the avenue, full of wild
enthusiasm, and trying to scale the walls to make an offer to Napoleon to
rally round and defend him. Bonaparte for some time looked attentively
at this group. 'You see it is so,' said he; "those are not the men whom
I have loaded with honours and riches. What do these people owe me? I
found them--I left them--poor. The instinct of necessity enlightens
them; the voice of the country speaks by their months; and if I choose,
if I permit it, in an hour the refractory Chambers will have ceased to
exist. But the life of a man is not worth purchasing at such a price: I
did not return from the Isle of Elba that Paris should be inundated with
blood: He did not like the idea of flight. 'Why should I not stay
here?' he repeated. 'What do you suppose they would do to a man disarmed
like me? I will go to Malmaison: I can live there in retirement with
some friends, who most certainly will come to see me only for my own
sake.'