Books: The Life and Letters of Thomas Henry Huxley Volume 1
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Leonard Huxley >> The Life and Letters of Thomas Henry Huxley Volume 1
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Ever yours faithfully,
T.H. Huxley.
[The following letter shows how paleontological work was continually
pouring in upon him:--]
Jermyn Street, May 7, 1869.
My dear Darwin,
Do you recollect recommending that the "Nassau," which sailed under
Captain Mayne's command for Magellan's Straits some years ago should
explore a fossiliferous deposit at the Gallegos River?
They visited the place the other day as you will see by Cunningham's
letter which I enclose, and got some fossils which are now in my hands.
The skull to which Cunningham refers, consists of little more than the
jaws, but luckily nearly all the teeth are in place, and prove it to be
an entirely new ungulate mammal with teeth in uninterrupted series like
Anoplotherium, about as big as a small horse.
What a wonderful assemblage of beasts there seems to have been in South
America! I suspect if we could find them all they would make the
classification of the Mammalia into a horrid mess.
Ever yours faithfully,
T.H. Huxley.
[And on July 16, 1869, he writes again to Darwin:--]
To tell you the truth, what with fossils, Ethnology and the great
question of "Darwinismus" which is such a worry to us all, I have lost
sight of the collectors and naturalists "by grace of the dredge," almost
as completely as you have.
[Indeed, the pressure was so great that he resolved to give up the
Hunterian Lectures at the College of Surgeons, as he had already given
up the Fullerian Professorship at the Royal Institution. So he writes to
Professor (afterwards Sir William) Flower:--]
Jermyn Street, June 7, 1869.
PRIVATE, CONFIDENTIAL, PARTICULAR.
My dear Flower,
I have written to Quain [President of the Royal College of Surgeons.] to
tell him that I do not propose to be put in nomination for the Hunterian
Chair this year. I really cannot stand it with the British Association
hanging over my head. So make thy shoulders ready for the gown, and
practise the goose-step in order to march properly behind the mace, and
I will come and hear your inaugural.
Ever yours,
T.H. Huxley.
[The meeting of the Association to which he refers took place at Exeter,
and he writes of it to Darwin (September 28):--]
As usual, your abominable heresies were the means of getting me into all
sorts of hot water at the Association. Three parsons set upon you, and
if you were the most malicious of men you could not have wished them to
have made greater fools of themselves than they did. They got
considerably chaffed, and that was all they were worth. [(It is perhaps
scarcely worth while exhuming these long-forgotten arguments in their
entirety; but anyone curious enough to consult the report of the meeting
preserved in the files of the "Academy," will find, among other things,
an entirely novel theory as to the relation of the Cherubim to
terrestrial creation.)
And to Tyndall, whom an accident had kept in Switzerland:--]
After a sharp fight for Edinburgh, Liverpool was adopted as the place of
meeting for the Association of 1870, and I am to be President; although
the "Times" says that my best friends tremble for me. (I hope you are
not among that particular lot of my best friends.)
I think we shall have a good meeting, and you know you are pledged to
give a lecture even if you come with your leg in a sling.
[The foundation of the Metaphysical Society in 1869 was not without
interest as a sign of the times. As in the new birth of thought which
put a period to the Middle Ages, so in the Victorian Renaissance, a vast
intellectual ferment had taken immediate shape in a fierce struggle with
long established orthodoxy. But whereas Luther displaced Erasmus, and
the earlier reformers fought out the quarrel with the weapons of the
theologian rather than those of the Humanist, the latter-day reformation
was based upon the extension of the domain of positive science, upon the
force of historical criticism, and the sudden reorganisation of
accumulated knowledge in the light of a physical theory adequate to
explain it.
These new facts and the new or re-vivified theories based upon them,
remained to be reckoned with after the first storm of denunciation had
passed by, and the meeting at Sion House in 1867 showed that some at
least of the English clergy besides Colenso and Stanley wished to
understand the real meaning of the new movement. Although the wider
effect of the scientific revival in modifying theological doctrine was
not yet fully apparent, the irreconcilables grew fewer and less noisy,
while the injustice of their attempts to stifle the new doctrine and to
ostracise its supporters became more glaring.
Thus among the supporters of the old order of thought, there was one
section more or less ready to learn of the new. Another, seeing that the
doctrines of which they were firmly convinced were thrust aside by the
rapid advance of the new school, thought, as men not unnaturally think
in the like situation, that the latter did not duly weigh what was said
on their side. Hence this section eagerly entered into the proposal to
found a society which should bring together men of diverse views, and
effect, as they hoped, by personal discussion of the great questions at
issue, in the manner and with the machinery of the learned societies, a
rapprochement unattainable by written debate.
The scheme was first propounded by Mr. James Knowles, then editor of the
"Contemporary Review," now of the "Nineteenth Century," in conversation
with Tennyson and Professor Pritchard (Savilian Professor of Astronomy
at Oxford).
Thus the Society came to be composed of men of the most opposite ways of
thinking and of very various occupations in life. The largest group was
that of churchmen:--ecclesiastical dignitaries such as Thompson, the
Archbishop of York, Ellicott, Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, and Dean
Alford; staunch laymen such as Mr. Gladstone, Lord Selborne, and the
Duke of Argyll; while the liberal school was represented by Dean
Stanley, F.D. Maurice, and Mark Pattison. Three distinguished converts
from the English Church championed Roman Catholic doctrine--Cardinal
Manning, Father Dalgairns, and W.G. Ward, while Unitarianism claimed Dr.
James Martineau. At the opposite pole, in antagonism to Christian
theology and theism generally, stood Professor W.K. Clifford, whose
youthful brilliancy was destined to be cut short by an untimely death.
Positivism was represented by Mr. Frederic Harrison; and Agnosticism by
such men of science or letters as Huxley and Tyndall, Mr. John Morley,
and Mr. Leslie Stephen.
Something was gained, too, by the variety of callings followed by the
different members. While there were professional students of philosophy,
like Professor Henry Sidgwick or Sir Alexander Grant, the Principal of
Edinburgh University, in some the technical knowledge of philosophy was
overlaid by studies in history or letters; in others, by the practical
experience of the law or politics; in others, again, medicine or biology
supplied a powerful psychological instrument. This fact tended to keep
the discussions in touch with reality on many sides.
There was Tennyson, for instance, the only poet who thoroughly
understood the movement of modern science, a stately but silent member;
Mr. Ruskin, J.A. Froude, Shadworth Hodgson, R.H. Hutton of the
"Spectator," James Hinton, and the well-known essayist, W.R. Greg; Sir
James FitzJames Stephen, Sir F. Pollock, Robert Lowe (Lord Sherbrooke),
Sir M.E. Grant Duff, and Lord Arthur Russell; Sir John Lubbock, Dr. W.B.
Carpenter, Sir William Gull, and Sir Andrew Clark.
Of contemporary thinkers of the first rank, neither John Stuart Mill nor
Mr. Herbert Spencer joined the society. The letter of the former
declining the invitation to join (given in the "Life of W.G. Ward" page
299) is extremely characteristic. He considers the object of the
projectors very laudable, "but it is very doubtful whether it will be
realised in practice." The undoubted advantages of oral discussion on
such questions are, he continues, best realised if undertaken in the
manner of the Socratic dialogue, between one and one; but less so in a
mixed assembly. He therefore did not think himself justified in joining
the society at the expense of other occupations for which his time was
already engaged. And he concludes by defending himself against the
charge of not paying fair attention to the arguments of his opponents.
It followed from the composition of the society that the papers read
were less commonly upon technical questions of metaphysics, such as
"Matter and Force" or "The Relation of Will to Thought," than upon those
of more vivid moral or religious interest, such as "What is Death?" "The
Theory of a Soul," "The Ethics of Belief," or "Is God Unknowable," in
which wide scope was given to the emotions as well as the intellect of
each disputant.
The method of the Society was for the paper to be printed and circulated
among the members before the meeting, so that their main criticisms were
ready in advance. The discussions took place after a dinner at which
many of the members would appear; and if the more formal debates were
not more effectual than predicted by J.S. Mill, the informal
discussions, almost conversations, at smaller meetings, and the free
course of talk at the dinner table, did something to realise the primary
objects of the society. The personal rapprochement took place, but not
philosophic compromise or conversion. Whether or not the tone adopted
after this period by the clerical party at large was affected by the
better understanding on the part of their representatives in the
Metaphysical Society of the true aims of their opponents and the honest
and substantial difficulties which stood in the way of reunion, it is
true that the violent denunciations of the sixties decreased in number
and intensity; the right to free expression of reasoned opinion on
serious fact was tacitly acknowledged; and, being less attacked, Huxley
himself began to be regarded in the light of a teacher rather than an
iconoclast. The question began to be not whether such opinions are
wicked, but whether from the point of view of scientific method they are
irrefragably true.
The net philosophical result of the society's work was to distinguish
the essential and the unessential differences between the opposite
parties; the latter were to a great extent cleared up; but the former
remained all the more clearly defined in logical nakedness for the
removal of the side issues and the personal idiosyncrasies which often
obscured the main issues. Indeed, when this point was reached by both
parties, when the origins and consequences of the fundamental principles
on either side had been fully discussed and mutual misunderstandings
removed to the utmost, so that only the fundamentals themselves remained
in debate, there was nothing left to be done. The society, in fact, as
Huxley expressed it,] "died of too much love."
[Indeed, it is to be noticed that, despite the strong antagonism of
principle and deductions from principle which existed among the members,
the rule of mutual toleration was well kept. The state of feeling after
ten years' open struggle seemed likely to produce active collision
between representatives of the opposing schools at close quarters.] "We
all thought it would be a case of Kilkenny cats," [said Huxley many
years afterwards.] "Hats and coats would be left in the hall, but there
would be no owners left to put them on again." [But only one flash of
the sort was elicited. One of the speakers at an early meeting insisted
on the necessity of avoiding anything like moral disapprobation in the
debates. There was a pause; then W.G. Ward said: "While acquiescing in
this condition as a general rule, I think it cannot be expected that
Christian thinkers shall give no sign of the horror with which they
would view the spread of such extreme opinions as those advocated by Mr.
Huxley." Another pause; then Huxley, thus challenged, replied: "As Dr.
Ward has spoken, I must in fairness say that it will be very difficult
for me to conceal my feeling as to the intellectual degradation which
would come of the general acceptance of such views as Dr. Ward holds."
("Life of W.G. Ward" by Wilfrid Ward page 309.)
No amount of argument could have been more effectual in supporting the
claim for mutual toleration than those two speeches, and thenceforward
such forms of criticism were conspicuous by their absence. And where
honesty of conviction was patent, mutual toleration was often replaced
by personal esteem and regard. "Charity, brotherly love," writes Huxley,
"were the chief traits of the Society. We all expended so much charity,
that, had it been money, we should every one have been bankrupt."
The special part played in the society by Huxley was to show that many
of the axioms of current speculation are far from being axiomatic, and
that dogmatic assertion on some of the cardinal points of metaphysic is
unwarranted by the evidence of fact. To find these seeming axioms set
aside as unproven, was, it appears from his "Life," disconcerting to
such members of the society as Cardinal Manning, whose arguments
depended on the unquestioned acceptance of them. It was no doubt the
observation of a similar attitude of mind in Mr. Gladstone towards
metaphysical problems which provoked Huxley to reply, when asked whether
Mr. Gladstone was an expert metaphysician--"An expert in metaphysics? He
does not know the meaning of the word."
In addition to his share in the discussions, Huxley contributed three
papers to the society. The first, read November 17, 1869, was on "The
views of Hume, Kant, and Whately on the logical basis of the doctrine of
the Immortality of the Soul," showing that these thinkers agreed in
holding that no such basis is given by reasoning, a part, for instance,
from revelation. A summary of the argument appears in the essay on Hume
("Collected Essays" 6 201 sq.)
On November 8, 1870, he read a paper, "Has a Frog a Soul? and if so, of
what Nature is that Soul?" Experiment shows that a frog deprived of
consciousness and volition by the removal of the front part of its
brain, will, under the action of various stimuli, perform many acts
which can only be called purposive, such as moving to recover its
balance when the board on which it stands is inclined, or scratching
where it is made uncomfortable, or croaking when pressed in a particular
spot. If its spinal cord be severed, the lower limbs, disconnected from
the brain, will also perform actions of this kind. The question arises,
Is the frog entirely a soulless automaton, performing all its actions
directly in response to external stimuli, only more perfectly and with
more delicate adjustment when its brain remains intact, or is its soul
distributed along its spinal marrow, so that it can be divided into two
parts independent of one another?
The professed metaphysician might perhaps tend to regard such
consideration as irrelevant; but if the starting-point of metaphysics is
to be found in psychology, psychology itself depends to no small extent
upon physiology. This question, however, Huxley did not pretend to
solve. In the existing state of knowledge he believed it to be
insoluble. But he thought it was not without its bearing upon the
supposed relations of soul and body in the human subject, and should
serve to give pause to current theories on the matter.
His third paper, read January 11, 1876, was on the "Evidence of the
Miracle of the Resurrection," in which he argued that there was no valid
evidence of actual death having taken place. His rejection of the
miraculous had led to an invitation from some of his opponents in the
society to write a paper on a definite miracle, and explain his reasons
for not accepting it. His choice of subject was due to two reasons:
firstly, it was a cardinal instance; secondly, it was a miracle not
worked by Christ Himself, and therefore a discussion of its genuineness
could offer no suggestion of personal fraud, and hence would avoid
inflicting gratuitous pain upon believers in it.
This certainty that there exist many questions at present insoluble,
upon which it is intellectually, and indeed morally wrong to assert that
we have real knowledge, had long been with him, but, although he had
earned abundant odium by openly resisting the claims of dogmatic
authority, he had not been compelled to define his philosophical
position until he entered the Metaphysical Society. How he came to
enrich the English language with the name "Agnostic" is explained in his
article "Agnosticism" ("Collected Essays" 5 pages 237-239).
After describing how it came about that his mind] "steadily gravitated
towards the conclusions of Hume and Kant," [so well stated by the latter
as follows:--
The greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure reason
is, after all, merely negative, since it serves not as an organon for
the enlargement (of knowledge), but as a discipline for its
delimitation; and, instead of discovering truth, has only the modest
merit of preventing error:--
he proceeds:--]
When I reached intellectual maturity, and began to ask myself whether I
was an atheist, a theist, or a pantheist; a materialist or an idealist;
a Christian or a freethinker; I found that the more I learned and
reflected, the less ready was the answer; until, at last, I came to the
conclusion that I had neither art nor part with any of these
denominations, except the last. The one thing in which most of these
good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed from them.
They were quite sure they had attained a certain "gnosis"--had, more or
less successfully, solved the problem of existence; while I was quite
sure I had not, and had a pretty strong conviction that the problem was
insoluble. And, with Hume and Kant on my side, I could not think myself
presumptuous in holding fast by that opinion...
This was my situation when I had the good fortune to find a place among
the members of that remarkable confraternity of antagonists, long since
deceased, but of green and pious memory, the Metaphysical Society. Every
variety of philosophical and theological opinion was represented there,
and expressed itself with entire openness; most of my colleagues were
-ists of one sort or another; and, however kind and friendly they might
be, I, the man without a rag of a label to cover himself with, could not
fail to have some of the uneasy feelings which must have beset the
historical fox when, after leaving the trap in which his tail remained,
he presented himself to his normally elongated companions. So I took
thought, and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of
"agnostic." It came into my head as suggestively antithetic to the
"gnostic" of Church history, who professed to know so much about the
very things of which I was ignorant; and I took the earliest opportunity
of parading it at our Society, to show that I, too, had a tail, like the
other foxes. To my great satisfaction, the term took; and when the
"Spectator" had stood godfather to it, any suspicion in the minds of
respectable people that a knowledge of its parentage might have awakened
was, of course, completely lulled.
[As for the dialectical powers he displayed in the debates, it was
generally acknowledged that in this, as well as in the power of
conducting a debate, he shared the pre-eminence with W.G. Ward. Indeed,
a proposal was made that the perpetual presidency in alternate years
should be vested in these two; but time and health forbade.
His part in the debates is thus described in a letter to me from
Professor Henry Sidgwick:--
Dear Mr. Huxley,
I became a member of the Metaphysical Society, I think, at its first
meeting in 1869; and, though my engagements in Cambridge did not allow
me to attend regularly, I retain a very distinct recollection of the
part taken by your father in the debates at which we were present
together. There were several members of the Society with whose
philosophical views I had, on the whole, more sympathy; but there was
certainly no one to whom I found it more pleasant and more instructive
to listen. Indeed I soon came to the conclusion that there was only one
other member of our Society who could be placed on a par with him as a
debater, on the subjects discussed at our meetings; and that was,
curiously enough, a man of the most diametrically opposite
opinions--W.G. Ward, the well-known advocate of Ultramontanism. Ward was
by training, and perhaps by nature, more of a dialectician; but your
father was unrivalled in the clearness, precision, succinctness, and
point of his statements, in his complete and ready grasp of his own
system of philosophical thought, and the quickness and versatility with
which his thought at once assumed the right attitude of defence against
any argument coming from any quarter. I used to think that while others
of us could perhaps find, on the spur of the moment, AN answer more or
less effective to some unexpected attack, your father seemed always able
to find THE answer--I mean the answer that it was reasonable to give,
consistently with his general view, and much the same answer that he
would have given if he had been allowed the fullest time for
deliberation.
The general tone of the Metaphysical Society was one of extreme
consideration for the feelings of opponents, and your father's speaking
formed no exception to the general harmony. At the same time I seem to
remember him as the most combative of all the speakers who took a
leading part in the debates. His habit of never wasting words, and the
edge naturally given to his remarks by his genius for clear and
effective statement, partly account for this impression; still I used to
think that he liked fighting, and occasionally liked to give play to his
sarcastic humour--though always strictly within the limits imposed by
courtesy. I remember that on one occasion when I had read to the Society
an essay on the "Incoherence of Empiricism," I looked forward with some
little anxiety to his criticisms; and when they came, I felt that my
anxiety had not been superfluous; he "went for" the weak points of my
argument in half a dozen trenchant sentences, of which I shall not
forget the impression. It was hard hitting, though perfectly courteous
and fair.
I wish I could remember what he said, but the memory of all the words
uttered in these debates has now vanished from my mind, though I recall
vividly the general impression that I have tried briefly to put down.
Believe me, yours very truly,
Henry Sidgwick.
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