Books: Human Nature and Other Sermons
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Joseph Butler >> Human Nature and Other Sermons
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11 This etext was prepared from the 1887 Cassell & Co. edition by
David Price, email ccx074@coventry.ac.uk.
HUMAN NATURE AND OTHER SERMONS
by Joseph Butler
INTRODUCTION.
Joseph Butler was born in 1692, youngest of eight children of a
linendraper at Wantage, in Berkshire. His father was a
Presbyterian, and after education at the Wantage Free Grammar School
Joseph Butler was sent to be educated for the Presbyterian ministry
in a training academy at Gloucester, which was afterwards removed to
Tewkesbury. There he had a friend and comrade, Secker, who
afterwards became Archbishop of Canterbury. Butler and Secker
inquired actively, and there was foreshadowing of his future in the
fact that in 1713, at the age of twenty-one, Butler was engaged in
anonymous discussion with Samuel Clarke upon his book on the a
priori demonstration of the Divine Existence and Attributes.
When the time drew near for call to the ministry, Butler, like his
friend Secker, had reasoned himself into accordance with the
teaching of the Church of England. Butler's father did not oppose
his strong desire to enter the Church, and he was entered in 1714 at
Oriel College, Oxford. At college a strong friendship was
established between Butler and a fellow-student, Edward Talbot,
whose father was a Bishop, formerly of Oxford and Salisbury, then of
Durham. Through Talbot's influence Butler obtained in 1718 the
office of Preacher in the Rolls Chapel, which he held for the next
eight years. In 1722 Talbot died, and on his death-bed urged his
father on behalf of his friend Butler. The Bishop accordingly
presented Joseph Butler to the living of Houghton-le-Spring. But it
was found that costs of dilapidations were beyond his means at
Houghton, and Butler had a dangerous regard for building works. He
was preferred two years afterwards to the living of Stanhope, which
then became vacant, and which yielded a substantial income. Butler
sought nothing for himself, his simplicity of character, real worth,
and rare intellectual power, secured him friends, and the love of
two of them--Talbot first, and afterwards Secker, who made his own
way in the Church, and became strong enough to put his friend as
well as himself in the way of worldly advancement, secured for
Butler all the patronage he had, until the Queen also became his
active friend.
Joseph Butler was seven years at Stanhope, quietly devoted to his
parish duties, preaching, studying, and writing his "Analogy of
Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of
Nature." In 1727, while still at Stanhope, he was appointed to a
stall in Durham Cathedral. Secker, having become chaplain to the
Queen, encouraged her in admiration of Butler's sermons. He told
her that the author was not dead, but buried, and secured her active
interest in his behalf. From Talbot, who had become Lord
Chancellor, Secker had no difficulty in obtaining for Butler a
chaplaincy which exempted him from the necessity of residence at
Stanhope. Butler, in accepting it, stipulated for permission to
live and work in his parish for six months in every year. Next he
was made chaplain to the King, and Rector of St. James's, upon which
he gave up Stanhope. In 1736 Queen Caroline appointed him her Clerk
of the Closet, an office which gave Butler the duty of attendance
upon her for two hours every evening. In that year he published his
"Analogy," of which the purpose was to meet, on its own ground, the
scepticism of his day. The Queen died in 1737, and, in accordance
with the strong desire expressed in her last days, in 1738 Butler
was made a Bishop. But his Bishopric was Bristol, worth only 300 or
400 pounds a year. The King added the Deanery of St. Paul's, when
that became vacant in 1740, and in 1750, towards the close of his
life, Joseph Butler was translated to the Bishopric of Durham. He
died in 1752.
No man could be less self-seeking. He owed his rise in the Church
wholly to the intellectual power and substantial worth of character
that inspired strong friendship. Seeing how little he sought
worldly advancement for himself, while others were pressing and
scrambling, Butler's friends used their opportunities of winning for
him the advancement he deserved. He was happiest in doing his work,
of which a chief part was in his study, where he employed his
philosophic mind in strengthening the foundations of religious
faith. Faith in God was attacked by men who claimed especially to
be philosophers, and they were best met by the man who had, beyond
all other divines of his day--some might not be afraid to add, of
any day--the philosophic mind.
H.M.
HUMAN NATURE, AND OTHER SERMONS.
SERMON I.
UPON HUMAN NATURE.
ROMANS xii. 4, 5.
For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not
the same office: so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and
every one members one of another.
The Epistles in the New Testament have all of them a particular
reference to the condition and usages of the Christian world at the
time they were written. Therefore as they cannot be thoroughly
understood unless that condition and those usages are known and
attended to, so, further, though they be known, yet if they be
discontinued or changed, exhortations, precepts, and illustrations
of things, which refer to such circumstances now ceased or altered,
cannot at this time be urged in that manner and with that force
which they were to the primitive Christians. Thus the text now
before us, in its first intent and design, relates to the decent
management of those extraordinary gifts which were then in the
Church, {1} but which are now totally ceased. And even as to the
allusion that "we are one body in Christ," though what the apostle
here intends is equally true of Christians in all circumstances, and
the consideration of it is plainly still an additional motive, over
and above moral considerations, to the discharge of the several
duties and offices of a Christian, yet it is manifest this allusion
must have appeared with much greater force to those who, by the many
difficulties they went through for the sake of their religion, were
led to keep always in view the relation they stood in to their
Saviour, who had undergone the same: to those, who, from the
idolatries of all around them, and their ill-treatment, were taught
to consider themselves as not of the world in which they lived, but
as a distinct society of themselves; with laws and ends, and
principles of life and action, quite contrary to those which the
world professed themselves at that time influenced by. Hence the
relation of a Christian was by them considered as nearer than that
of affinity and blood; and they almost literally esteemed themselves
as members one of another.
It cannot, indeed, possibly be denied, that our being God's
creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and
the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are prior
obligations to piety and virtue than the consideration that God sent
his Son into the world to save it, and the motives which arise from
the peculiar relation of Christians as members one of another under
Christ our head. However, though all this be allowed, as it
expressly is by the inspired writers, yet it is manifest that
Christians at the time of the Revelation, and immediately after,
could not but insist mostly upon considerations of this latter kind.
These observations show the original particular reference to the
text, and the peculiar force with which the thing intended by the
allusion in it must have been felt by the primitive Christian world.
They likewise afford a reason for treating it at this time in a more
general way.
The relation which the several parts or members of the natural body
have to each other and to the whole body is here compared to the
relation which each particular person in society has to other
particular persons and to the whole society; and the latter is
intended to be illustrated by the former. And if there be a
likeness between these two relations, the consequence is obvious:
that the latter shows us we were intended to do good to others, as
the former shows us that the several members of the natural body
were intended to be instruments of good to each other and to the
whole body. But as there is scarce any ground for a comparison
between society and the mere material body, this without the mind
being a dead unactive thing, much less can the comparison be carried
to any length. And since the apostle speaks of the several members
as having distinct offices, which implies the mind, it cannot be
thought an allowable liberty, instead of the BODY and ITS MEMBERS,
to substitute the WHOLE NATURE of MAN, and ALL THE VARIETY OF
INTERNAL PRINCIPLES WHICH BELONG TO IT. And then the comparison
will be between the nature of man as respecting self, and tending to
private good, his own preservation and happiness; and the nature of
man as having respect to society, and tending to promote public
good, the happiness of that society. These ends do indeed perfectly
coincide; and to aim at public and private good are so far from
being inconsistent that they mutually promote each other: yet in
the following discourse they must be considered as entirely
distinct; otherwise the nature of man as tending to one, or as
tending to the other, cannot be compared. There can no comparison
be made, without considering the things compared as distinct and
different.
From this review and comparison of the nature of man as respecting
self and as respecting society, it will plainly appear that there
are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that
we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as
that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and
private good: and that the same objections lie against one of these
assertions as against the other. For,
First, there is a natural principle of BENEVOLENCE {2} in man, which
is in some degree to SOCIETY what SELF-LOVE is to the INDIVIDUAL.
And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there
be any such thing as compassion--for compassion is momentary love--
if there be any such thing as the paternal or filial affections; if
there be any affection in human nature, the object and end of which
is the good of another, this is itself benevolence, or the love of
another. Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or
ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out
what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher
degree and more extensive. I must, however, remind you that though
benevolence and self-love are different, though the former tends
most directly to public good, and the latter to private, yet they
are so perfectly coincident that the greatest satisfactions to
ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and
that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards
society. It may be added that their mutual coinciding, so that we
can scarce promote one without the other, is equally a proof that we
were made for both.
Secondly, this will further appear, from observing that the SEVERAL
PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS, which are distinct {3} both from
benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to
PUBLIC GOOD as really as to PRIVATE. It might be thought too minute
and particular, and would carry us too great a length, to
distinguish between and compare together the several passions or
appetites distinct from benevolence, whose primary use and intention
is the security and good of society, and the passions distinct from
self-love, whose primary intention and design is the security and
good of the individual. {4} It is enough to the present argument
that desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem of them, love
of society as distinct from affection to the good of it, indignation
against successful vice--that these are public affections or
passions, have an immediate respect to others, naturally lead us to
regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of service to our
fellow-creatures. If any or all of these may be considered likewise
as private affections, as tending to private good, this does not
hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy the good
influence of them upon society, and their tendency to public good.
It may be added that as persons without any conviction from reason
of the desirableness of life would yet of course preserve it merely
from the appetite of hunger, so, by acting merely from regard
(suppose) to reputation, without any consideration of the good of
others, men often contribute to public good. In both these
instances they are plainly instruments in the hands of another, in
the hands of Providence, to carry on ends--the preservation of the
individual and good of society--which they themselves have not in
their view or intention. The sum is, men have various appetites,
passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self-
love and from benevolence: all of these have a tendency to promote
both public and private good, and may be considered as respecting
others and ourselves equally and in common; but some of them seem
most immediately to respect others, or tend to public good; others
of them most immediately to respect self, or tend to private good:
as the former are not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love:
neither sort are instances of our love either to ourselves or
others, but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the
individual and the species, and proofs that He intended we should be
instruments of good to each other, as well as that we should be so
to ourselves.
Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men, by which they
distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We
are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon
our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within
itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections as
respecting such objects, and in such degrees; and of the several
actions consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one,
disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither
of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by
which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is
conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though
sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this faculty
tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and leads
them to do good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus
a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him
to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them--the
natural affection leads to this: but the reflection that it is his
proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and
commendable so to do--this, added to the affection, becomes a much
more settled principle, and carries him on through more labour and
difficulties for the sake of his children than he would undergo from
that affection alone, if he thought it, and the cause of action it
led to, either indifferent or criminal. This indeed is impossible,
to do that which is good and not to approve of it; for which reason
they are frequently not considered as distinct, though they really
are: for men often approve of the action of others which they will
not imitate, and likewise do that which they approve not. It cannot
possibly be denied that there is this principle of reflection or
conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an innocent
person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in the
fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person who had given
no just cause of offence. To aggravate the injury, add the
circumstances of former friendship and obligation from the injured
person; let the man who is supposed to have done these two different
actions coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without regard to their
consequences to himself: to assert that any common man would be
affected in the same way towards these different actions, that he
would make no distinction between them, but approve or disapprove
them equally, is too glaring a falsity to need being confuted.
There is therefore this principle of reflection or conscience in
mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has to private
good with the respect it has to public; since it plainly tends as
much to the latter as to the former, and is commonly thought to tend
chiefly to the latter. This faculty is now mentioned merely as
another part in the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in some
degree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally and of
course have some influence. The particular place assigned to it by
nature, what authority it has, and how great influence it ought to
have, shall be hereafter considered.
From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our public and
private affections, of the courses of life they lead to, and of the
principle of reflection or conscience as respecting each of them, it
is as manifest that WE WERE MADE FOR SOCIETY, AND TO PROMOTE THE
HAPPINESS OF IT, AS THAT WE WERE INTENDED to TAKE CARE OF OUR OWN
LIFE AND HEALTH AND PRIVATE GOOD.
And from this whole review must be given a different draught of
human nature from what we are often presented with. Mankind are by
nature so closely united, there is such a correspondence between the
inward sensations of one man and those of another, that disgrace is
as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and
love as much desired as any external goods; and in many particular
cases persons are carried on to do good to others, as the end their
affection tends to and rests in; and manifest that they find real
satisfaction and enjoyment in this course of behaviour. There is
such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man that
having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in the same
climate, barely having been born in the same artificial district or
division, becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances and
familiarities many years after; for anything may serve the purpose.
Thus relations merely nominal are sought and invented, not by
governors, but by the lowest of the people, which are found
sufficient to hold mankind together in little fraternities and
copartnerships: weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough
for ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as the real principles
of that union: but they are in truth merely the occasions, as
anything may be of anything, upon which our nature carries us on
according to its own previous bent and bias; which occasions
therefore would be nothing at all were there not this prior
disposition and bias of nature. Men are so much one body that in a
peculiar manner they feel for each other shame, sudden danger,
resentment, honour, prosperity, distress; one or another, or all of
these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the
occasion of natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence;
each of these being distinct cements of society. And therefore to
have no restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour, is
the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and
independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to
our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this is
the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no
natural respect to any other, or to the whole body.
But, allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions
and principles within which lead him to do evil to others, as well
as to do good? Whence come the many miseries else which men are the
authors and instruments of to each other?" These questions, so far
as they relate to the foregoing discourse, may be answered by
asking, Has not man also dispositions and principles within which
lead him to do evil to himself, as well as good? Whence come the
many miseries else--sickness, pain, and death--which men are
instruments and authors of to themselves?
It may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than
the other, but the answer to both is really the same: that mankind
have ungoverned passions which they will gratify at any rate, as
well to the injury of others as in contradiction to known private
interest: but that as there is no such thing as self-hatred, so
neither is there any such thing as ill-will in one man towards
another, emulation and resentment being away; whereas there is
plainly benevolence or good-will: there is no such thing as love of
injustice, oppression, treachery, ingratitude, but only eager
desires after such and such external goods; which, according to a
very ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to obtain
by innocent means, if they were as easy and as effectual to their
end: that even emulation and resentment, by any one who will
consider what these passions really are in nature, {5} will be found
nothing to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles
and passions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from self-
love and benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right
behaviour with regard to others as well as himself, and only
secondarily and accidentally to what is evil. Thus, though men, to
avoid the shame of one villainy, are sometimes guilty of a greater,
yet it is easy to see that the original tendency of shame is to
prevent the doing of shameful actions; and its leading men to
conceal such actions when done is only in consequence of their being
done; i.e., of the passion's not having answered its first end.
If it be said that there are persons in the world who are in great
measure without the natural affections towards their fellow-
creatures, there are likewise instances of persons without the
common natural affections to themselves. But the nature of man is
not to be judged of by either of these, but by what appears in the
common world, in the bulk of mankind.
I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm the
truth of this account of human nature, and make out the justness of
the foregoing comparison, it should be added that from what appears,
men in fact as much and as often contradict that PART of their
nature which respects SELF, and which leads them to their OWN
PRIVATE good and happiness, as they contradict that PART of it which
respects SOCIETY, and tends to PUBLIC good: that there are as few
persons who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment which
they might attain in the present world, as who do the greatest good
to others which they might do; nay, that there are as few who can be
said really and in earnest to aim at one as at the other. Take a
survey of mankind: the world in general, the good and bad, almost
without exception, equally are agreed that were religion out of the
case, the happiness of the present life would consist in a manner
wholly in riches, honours, sensual gratifications; insomuch that one
scarce hears a reflection made upon prudence, life, conduct, but
upon this supposition. Yet, on the contrary, that persons in the
greatest affluence of fortune are no happier than such as have only
a competency; that the cares and disappointments of ambition for the
most part far exceed the satisfactions of it; as also the miserable
intervals of intemperance and excess, and the many untimely deaths
occasioned by a dissolute course of life: these things are all
seen, acknowledged, by every one acknowledged; but are thought no
objections against, though they expressly contradict, this universal
principle--that the happiness of the present life consists in one or
other of them. Whence is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is
not the middle way obvious? Can anything be more manifest than that
the happiness of life consists in these possessed and enjoyed only
to a certain degree; that to pursue them beyond this degree is
always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a man's
self, and often with extreme misery and unhappiness? Whence, then,
I say, is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is it really the
result of consideration in mankind, how they may become most easy to
themselves, most free from care, and enjoy the chief happiness
attainable in this world? Or is it not manifestly owing either to
this, that they have not cool and reasonable concern enough for
themselves to consider wherein their chief happiness in the present
life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not
act conformably to what is the result of that consideration--i.e.,
reasonable concern for themselves, or cool self-love, is prevailed
over by passions and appetite? So that from what appears there is
no ground to assert that those principles in the nature of man,
which most directly lead to promote the good of our fellow-
creatures, are more generally or in a greater degree violated than
those which most directly lead us to promote our own private good
and happiness.
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