Books: The Life of Abraham Lincoln

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Let us now glance at his record. We have already seen (in chapter V.)
how he revolted from the first view of the horrors of the institution,
and the youthful vow which he there recorded will not readily be
forgotten. That was in 1831 when he was twenty-two years of age.

Six years later, or in 1837, when he was a youthful member of the
Illinois legislature, he persuaded Stone to join him in a protest
against slavery. There was positively nothing to be gained by this
protest, either personally or in behalf of the slave. The only possible
reason for it was that he believed that slavery was wrong and could not
rest until he had openly expressed that belief. "A timely utterance
gave that thought relief, And I again am strong."

When he was in congress, in 1846, the famous Wilmot Proviso came up.
This was to provide "that, as an express and fundamental condition to
the acquisition of any territory from the republic of Mexico by the
United States ... neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever
exist in any part of the said territory." By reason of amendments, this
subject came before the house very many times, and Lincoln said
afterwards that he had voted for the proviso in one form or another
forty-two times.

On the 16th day of January, 1849, he introduced into congress a bill
for the emancipation of slavery in the District of Columbia. This was a
wise and reasonable bill. It gave justice to all, and at the same time
gathered all the fruits of emancipation in the best possible way. The
bill did not pass, there was no hope at the time that it would pass.
But it compelled a reasonable discussion of the subject and had a
certain amount of educational influence.

It is interesting that, thirteen years later, April 10, 1862, he had
the privilege of fixing his presidential signature to a bill similar to
his own. Congress had moved up to his position. When he signed the
bill, he said: "Little did I dream, in 1849, when I proposed to abolish
slavery in this capital, and could scarcely get a hearing for the
proposition, that it would be so soon accomplished."

After the expiration of his term in congress he left political life, as
he supposed, forever. He went into the practise of the law in earnest,
and was so engaged at the time of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise
which called him back to the arena of politics.

In the early part of the war there were certain attempts at
emancipation which Lincoln held in check for the reason that the time
for them had not arrived. "There's a tide in the affairs of men." It is
of prime importance that this tide be taken at the flood. So far as
emancipation was concerned, this came in slower than the eagerness of
Generals Fremont and Hunter. But it was coming, and in the meantime
Lincoln was doing what he could to help matters on. The difficulty was
that if the Union was destroyed it would be the death-blow to the cause
of emancipation. At the same time not a few loyal men were
slaveholders. To alienate these by premature action would be
disastrous. The only wise plan of action was to wait patiently until a
sufficient number of these could be depended on in the emergency of
emancipation. This was what Lincoln was doing.

The first part of the year 1862 was very trying. The North had expected
to march rapidly and triumphantly into Richmond. This had not been
accomplished, but on the contrary disaster had followed disaster in
battle, and after many months the two armies were encamped facing each
other and almost in sight of Washington, while the soldiers from the
North were rapidly sickening and dying in the Southern camps. Small
wonder if there was an impatient clamor.

A serious result of this delay was the danger arising from European
sources. The monarchies of Europe had no sympathy with American
freedom. They became impatient with the reports of "no progress" in the
war, and at this time some of them were watching for a pretext to
recognize the Southern Confederacy. This came vividly to the knowledge
of Carl Schurz, minister to Spain. By permission of the President he
returned to this country--this was late in January, 1862--to lay the
matter personally before him. With the help of Schurz, Lincoln
proceeded to develop the sentiment for emancipation. By his request
Schurz went to New York to address a meeting of the Emancipation
Society on March 6th. It need not be said that the speaker delivered a
most able and eloquent plea upon "Emancipation as a Peace Measure."
Lincoln also made a marked contribution to the meeting. He telegraphed
to Schurz the text of his message to congress recommending emancipation
in the District of Columbia,--which resulted in the law already
mentioned,--and this message of Lincoln was read to the meeting. The
effect of it, following the speech of Schurz, was overwhelming. It was
quite enough to satisfy the most sanguine expectations. This was not a
coincidence, it was a plan. Lincoln's hand in _the whole matter_
was not seen nor suspected for many years after. It gave a marked
impetus to the sentiment of emancipation.

To the loyal slaveholders of the border states he made a proposal of
compensated emancipation. To his great disappointment they rejected
this. It was very foolish on their part, and he cautioned them that
they might find worse trouble.

All this time, while holding back the eager spirits of the
abolitionists, he was preparing for his final stroke. But it was of
capital importance that this should not be premature. McClellan's
failure to take Richmond and his persistent delay, hastened the result.
The community at large became impatient beyond all bounds. There came
about a feeling that something radical must be done, and that quickly.
But it was still necessary that he should be patient. As the bravest
fireman is the last to leave the burning structure, so the wise
statesman must hold himself in check until the success of so important
a measure is assured beyond a doubt.

An event which occurred later may be narrated here because it
illustrates the feeling which Lincoln always had in regard to slavery.
The item was written out by the President himself and given to the
newspapers for publication under the heading,

"THE PRESIDENT'S LAST, SHORTEST, AND BEST SPEECH."

"On Thursday of last week, two ladies from Tennessee came before the
President, asking the release of their husbands, held as prisoners of
war at Johnson's Island. They were put off until Friday, when they came
again, and were again put off until Saturday. At each of the interviews
one of the ladies urged that her husband was a religious man. On
Saturday, when the President ordered the release of the prisoners, he
said to this lady: You say your husband is a religious man; tell him
when you meet him that I say I am not much of a judge of religion, but
that, in my opinion, the religion that sets men to rebel and fight
against their government because, as they think, that government does
not sufficiently help _some_ men to eat their bread in the sweat
of _other_ men's faces, is not the sort of religion upon which
people can get to heaven."

As the dreadful summer of 1862 advanced, Lincoln noted surely that the
time was at hand when emancipation would be the master stroke. In
discussing the possibilities of this measure he seemed to take the
opposite side. This was a fixed habit with him. He drew out the
thoughts of other people. He was enabled to see the subject from all
sides. Even after his mind was made up to do a certain thing, he would
still argue against it. But in any other sense than this he took
counsel of no one upon the emancipation measure. The work was his work.
He presented his tentative proclamation to the cabinet on the 22d of
July, 1862. The rest of the story is best told in Lincoln's own words:
--

"It had got to be midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to
worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan
of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last
card, and must change our tactics or lose the game. I now determined
upon the adoption of the emancipation policy; and without consultation
with, or knowledge of, the cabinet, I prepared the original draft of
the proclamation, and after much anxious thought called a cabinet
meeting upon the subject.... I said to the cabinet that I had resolved
upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice,
but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them,
suggestions as to which would be in order after they had heard it
read."

The members of the cabinet offered various suggestions, but none which
Lincoln had not fully anticipated. Seward approved the measure but
thought the time not opportune. There had been so many reverses in the
war, that he feared the effect. "It may be viewed," he said, "as the
last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the government
stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching
forth her hands to the government." He then suggested that the
proclamation be not issued until it could be given to the country
supported by military successes. This seemed to Lincoln a wise
suggestion, and he acted on it. The document was laid away for the
time.

It was not until September 17th that the looked-for success came. The
Confederate army had crossed the Potomac with the intention of invading
the North. They were met and completely defeated in the battle of
Antietam. Lincoln said of it: "When Lee came over the river, I made a
resolution that if McClellan drove him back I would send the
proclamation after him. The battle of Antietam was fought Wednesday,
and until Saturday I could not find out whether we had gained a victory
or lost a battle. It was then too late to issue the proclamation that
day; and the fact is I fixed it up a little Sunday, and Monday I let
them have it."

This was the preliminary proclamation and was issued September 22d. The
supplementary document, the real proclamation of emancipation, was
issued January 1, 1863. As the latter covers substantially the ground
of the former, it is not necessary to repeat both and only the second
one is given.

EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.

Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by
the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the
following, to wit:--

That on the first day of January in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any
state, or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be
in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward
and forever free, and the Executive Government of the United States,
including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to
repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for
their actual freedom.

That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid by
proclamation, designate the states and part of states, if any, in which
the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the
United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof,
shall on that day be in good faith represented in the congress of the
United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority
of the qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall,
in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive
evidence that such state and the people thereof are not then in
rebellion against the United States:--

_Now, therefore,_ I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power in me vested as commander-in-chief of
the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed
rebellion against the authority of, and government of, the United
States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said
rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my
purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one
hundred days from the day first above mentioned, order, and designate,
as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof
respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States [here
follows the list].

And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order
and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated
states and parts of states, are and henceforward shall be free; and
that the executive government of the United States, including the
military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the
freedom of said persons.

And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain
from all violence, unless in necessary self-defense, and I recommend to
them, that in all cases, when allowed, they labor faithfully for
reasonable wages.

And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable
condition will be received into the armed service of the United States
to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man
vessels of all sorts in said service.

And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice,
warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the
considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of almighty God.

_In Testimony whereof,_ I have hereunto set my name and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the
Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

So he fulfilled his youthful vow. He had hit that thing, and he had hit
it hard! From that blow the cursed institution of slavery will not
recover in a thousand years.

CHAPTER XXXII.

DISCOURAGEMENTS.

The middle period of the war was gloomy and discouraging. Though the
Confederates made no substantial progress they certainly held their
own. Time is an important factor in all history, and the fact that the
Confederates at least gained time counted heavily against the Union.
There were no decisive victories gained by the Federal troops.
Antietam, to be sure, was won, but the fruits of the victory were lost.
For many months the two armies continued facing each other, and for the
most part they were much nearer Washington than Richmond.

Meantime the summer, fall, winter were passing by and there was no
tangible evidence that the government would ever be able to maintain
its authority. All this time the Army of the Potomac was magnificent in
numbers, equipment, intelligence. In every respect but one they were
decidedly superior to the enemy. The one thing they needed was
leadership. The South had generals of the first grade. The generalship
of the North had not yet fully developed.

Lincoln held on to McClellan as long as it was possible to do so. He
never resented the personal discourtesies. He never wearied of the
fruitless task of urging him on. He never refused to let him have his
own way provided he could show a reason for it. But his persistent
inactivity wore out the patience of the country and finally of the army
itself. With the exception of northern democrats with southern
sympathies, who from the first were sure of only one thing, namely,
that the war was a failure, the clamor for the removal of McClellan was
well-nigh unanimous. To this clamor Lincoln yielded only when it became
manifestly foolish longer to resist it.

A succeeding question was no less important: Who shall take his place?
There was in the East no general whose record would entitle him to this
position of honor and responsibility. In all the country there was at
that time no one whose successes were so conspicuous as to point him
out as the coming man. But there were generals who had done good
service, and just at that time. Burnside was at the height of his
success. He was accordingly appointed. His record was good. He was an
unusually handsome man, of soldierly bearing, and possessed many
valuable qualities. He was warmly welcomed by the country at large and
by his own army, who thanked God and took courage.

His first battle as commander of the Army of the Potomac was fought at
Fredericksburg on the 15th of December and resulted in his being
repulsed with terrible slaughter. It is possible, in this as in every
other battle, that had certain things been a little different,--had it
been possible to fight the battle three weeks earlier,--he would have
won a glorious victory. But these thoughts do not bring to life the men
who were slain in battle, nor do they quiet the clamor of the country.
Burnside showed a certain persistence when, in disregard of the
unanimous judgment of his generals, he tried to force a march through
the heavy roads of Virginia, as sticky as glue, and give battle again.
But he got stuck in the mud and the plan was given up, the only
casualty, being the death of a large number of mules that were killed
trying to draw wagons through the bottomless mud. After this one
battle, it was plain that Burnside was not the coming general.

The next experiment was with Hooker, a valiant and able man, whose
warlike qualities are suggested by his well-earned soubriquet of
"fighting Joe Hooker." He had his limitations, as will presently
appear. But upon appointing him to the command Lincoln wrote him a
personal letter. This letter is here reproduced because it is a perfect
illustration of the kindly patience of the man who had need of so much
patience:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D.C., January 26, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL HOOKER,

GENERAL: I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of
course I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient
reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some
things in regard to which I am not satisfied with you. I believe you to
be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe
that you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are
right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable, if not
indispensable, quality. You are ambitious, which, within reason, does
good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's
command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and
thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to
the country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I
have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying
that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it
was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the
command. Only those generals who gain success can be dictators. What I
now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.
The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is
neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders.
I much fear that the spirit you have aimed to infuse into the army, of
criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will
now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down.
Neither you, nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good
out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of
rashness. Beware of rashness, but, with energy and sleepless vigilance,
go forward and give us victories.

Yours, very truly,
A. LINCOLN."

The first effect of this letter was to subdue the fractious spirit of
the fighter. He said, "That is just such a letter as a father might
write to a son. It is a beautiful letter, and although I think he was
harder on me than I deserved, I will say that I love the man who wrote
it."

But later his conceit took possession of him. According to Noah Brooks
he said to some friends: "I suppose you have seen this letter or a copy
of it?" They had. "After I have been to Richmond I shall have the
letter published in the newspapers. It will be amusing." When this was
told Lincoln he took the good-natured view of it and only said, "Poor
Hooker! I am afraid he is incorrigible."

It was in January, 1863, that Hooker took command of the army. Three
months later he had it in shape for the campaign, and Lincoln went down
to see the review. It was indeed a magnificent army, an inspiring
sight. But it was noticed by many that Lincoln's face had not the
joyous radiancy of hope which it had formerly worn; it was positively
haggard. It was plain that he did not share his general's easy
confidence. He could not forget that he had more than once seen an army
magnificent before battle, and shattered after battle. He spent a week
there, talking with the generals, shaking hands with "the boys." Many a
private soldier of that day carries to this day as a sacred memory the
earnest sound of the President's voice, "God bless you!"

Then came Chancellorsville with its sickening consequences. When the
news came to Washington, the President, with streaming eyes, could only
exclaim: "My God, my God! what will the country say?"

The next we hear of Hooker, he had not entered Richmond nor had he
found the amusement of publishing the President's fatherly letter. He
was chasing Lee in a northerly direction,--towards Philadelphia or New
York. He became angry with Halleck who refused him something and
summarily resigned. It was not, for the country, an opportune time for
changing generals, but perhaps it was as well. It certainly shows that
while Lincoln took him as the best material at hand, while he
counseled, encouraged, and bore with him, yet his diagnosis of Hooker's
foibles was correct, and his fears, not his hopes, were realized.

He was succeeded by George C. Meade, "four-eyed George," as he was
playfully called by his loyal soldiers, in allusion to his eyeglasses.
It was only a few days later that the great battle of Gettysburg was
fought under Meade, and a brilliant victory was achieved. But here, as
at Antietam, the triumph was bitterly marred by the disappointment that
followed. The victorious army let the defeated army get away. The
excuses were about the same as at Antietam,--the troops were tired. Of
course they were tired. But it may be assumed that the defeated army
was also tired. It surely makes one army quite as tired to suffer
defeat as it makes the other to achieve victory. It was again a golden
opportunity to destroy Lee's army and end the war.

Perhaps Meade had achieved enough for one man in winning Gettysburg. It
would not be strange if the three days' battle had left him with nerves
unstrung. The fact remains that he did not pursue and annihilate the
defeated army. They were permitted to recross the Potomac without
molestation, to reenter what may be called their own territory, to
reorganize, rest, reequip, and in due time to reappear as formidable as
ever. It is plain that the hero of Gettysburg was not the man destined
to crush the rebellion.

Here were three men, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade, all good men and
gallant soldiers. But not one of them was able successfully to command
so large an army, or to do the thing most needed,--capture Richmond.
The future hero had not yet won the attention of the country.

In the meantime affairs were very dark for the administration, and up
to the summer of 1863 had been growing darker and darker. Some splendid
military success had been accomplished in the West, but the West is at
best a vague term even to this day, and it has always seemed so remote
from the capital, especially as compared to the limited theater of war
in Virginia where the Confederate army was almost within sight of the
capital, that these western victories did not have as much influence as
they should have had.

And there were signal reverses in the West, too. Both Louisville and
Cincinnati were seriously threatened, and the battle of Chickamauga was
another field of slaughter, even though it was shortly redeemed by
Chattanooga. But the attention of the country was necessarily focussed
chiefly on the limited territory that lay between Washington and
Richmond. In that region nothing permanent or decisive had been
accomplished in the period of more than two years, and it is small
wonder that the President became haggard in appearance.

He did what he could. He had thus far held the divided North, and
prevented a European alliance with the Confederates. He now used, one
by one, the most extreme measures. He suspended the writ of _habeas
corpus_, declared or authorized martial law, authorized the
confiscation of the property of those who were providing aid and
comfort for the enemy, called for troops by conscription when
volunteers ceased, and enlisted negro troops. Any person who studies
the character of Abraham Lincoln will realize that these measures, or
most of them, came from him with great reluctance. He was not a man who
would readily or lightly take up such means. They meant that the
country was pressed, hard pressed. They were extreme measures, not
congenial to his accustomed lines of thought. They were as necessities.

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