Books: The Life of Abraham Lincoln

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In defense he was a terrible fighter. That is to say, when he fought at
all--for he fought only in defense--he fought well. A distinguished
Confederate soldier said, "There was no Union general whom we so much
dreaded as McClellan. He had, as we thought, no equal." And they
declared they could always tell when McClellan was in command by the
way the men fought.

An illustrious comment on this is the splendid fighting at Antietam.
That was one of the greatest battles and one of the most magnificent
victories of the war. It showed McClellan at his best.

We know what the Army of the Potomac was previous to the accession of
McClellan. Let us see what it was after his removal. "McClellan was
retired," says the Honorable Hugh McCulloch, "and what happened to the
Army of the Potomac? Terrible slaughter under Burnside at
Fredericksburg; crushing defeat at Chancellorsville under Hooker." All
this shows that McClellan narrowly missed the fame of being one of the
greatest generals in history. But let us glance at another page in the
ledger.

His first act, when in command at Cincinnati, was to enter into an
agreement with General Buckner that the state of Kentucky should be
treated as neutral territory. That agreement put that state into the
position of a foreign country, like England or China, when the very
purpose of the war was to insist that the United States was one nation.
This act was a usurpation of authority, and further, it was
diametrically wrong even had he possessed the authority.

His next notable act, one which has already been mentioned, was to
issue a proclamation in defense of slavery, promising to assist [the
rebels] to put down any attempt at insurrection by the slaves. This was
wrong. His duty was to conquer the enemy. It was no more his duty to
defend slavery than it was Fremont's to emancipate the slaves.

The next development of McClellan was the hallucination, from which he
never freed himself, that the enemy's numbers were from five to ten
times as great as they really were. "I am here," he wrote August 16,
1861, "in a terrible place; the enemy have from three to four times my
force. The President, the old general, cannot or will not see the true
state of affairs." At that time the "true state of affairs" was that
the enemy had from one-third to one-half his force. That is a fair
specimen of the exaggeration of his fears. That is, McClellan's
estimate was from six to twelve times too much.

At Yorktown he faced the Confederate Magruder, who commanded 11,000 all
told. Of this number, 6,000 were spread along a line of thirteen miles
of defense across the peninsula, leaving 5,000 for battle. McClellan's
imagination, or fears, magnified this into an enormous army. With his
58,000 effective troops he industriously prepared for defense, and when
the engineering work was accomplished thought he had done a great act
in defending his army. All the while he was calling lustily for
reinforcements from Washington. When Magruder was ready he retired with
his little army and McClellan's opportunity was gone.

At Antietam he won a brilliant victory, but he failed to follow it up.
There was a chance to annihilate the Confederate army and end the war.
To do that was nearly as important as it had been to win the victory.
To be sure his troops were worn, but as compared with the shattered
condition of the enemy, his army was ready for dress parade. So the
enemy was allowed to cross the Potomac at leisure, reform, reorganize,
and the war was needlessly prolonged. It was this neglect which, more
than any other one thing, undermined the general confidence in
McClellan.

Later, at second Bull Run he left Pope to suffer. It was clearly his
duty to reinforce Pope, but he only said that Pope had got himself into
the fix and he must get out as he could. He seemed to forget that there
never was a time when he was not calling for reinforcements himself.
This wanton neglect was unsoldierly, inhuman. He also forgot that this
method of punishing Pope inflicted severe punishment on the nation.

His chronic call for reinforcements, were it not so serious, would make
the motive of a comic opera. When he was in Washington, he wanted all
the troops called in for the defense of the city. When he was in
Virginia, he thought the troops which were left for the defense of the
city ought to be sent to reinforce him,--the city was safe enough! He
telegraphed to Governor Denison of Ohio to pay no attention to
Rosecrans' request for troops. He thought that 20,000, with what could
be raised in Kentucky and Tennessee, was enough for the Mississippi
Valley, while he needed 273,000. When he was insisting that Washington
should be stripped in order to furnish him with 50,000 additional men,
the President asked what had become of his more than 160,000; and in
his detailed reply he gave the item of 38,500 absent on leave. Here was
nearly the number of 50,000 which he asked for, if he would only call
them in.

Incidentally to all this were persistent discourtesies to the
President. He would sit silent in the cabinet meetings pretending to
have secrets of great importance. Instead of calling on the President
to report, he made it necessary for the President to call on him. At
other times he would keep the President waiting while he affected to be
busy with subordinates. Once indeed he left the President waiting while
he went to bed. All this Lincoln bore with his accustomed patience. He
playfully said, when remonstrated with, that he would gladly hold
McClellan's horse if he would only win the battles. This he failed to
do. And when he was finally relieved, he had worn out the patience not
only of the President, but of his army, and of the entire country. One
writer of the day said with much bitterness, but with substantial
truth, that "McClellan, with greater means at his command than
Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, or Wellington, has lost more men and means
in his disasters than they in their victories."

What were the defects of this remarkable man? In the first place, he
believed in slavery. At this late day it is difficult to realize the
devotion which some men had for slavery as a "divine institution,"
before which they could kneel down and pray, as if it was the very ark
of God. McClellan was one such. And it is not improbable that he early
had more than a suspicion that slavery was the real cause of all the
trouble. This would in part account for his hesitation.

Then there was a bitter personal hatred between him and Stanton. This
led him to resent all suggestions and orders emanating from the War
Department. It also made him suspicious of Stanton's associates,
including the President.

Then he seemed to lack the nerve for a pitched battle. He could do
everything up to the point of action, but he could not act. This lack
of nerve is a more common fact in men in all walks of life than is
usually recognized. He was unconquerable in defense, he did not know
the word _aggressive_. Had he possessed some of the nerve of Sheridan,
Hooker, Sherman, or any one of a hundred others, he would have been one
of the four great generals of history. But he could not be persuaded or
forced to attack. His men might die of fever, but not in battle. So far
as he was concerned, the Army of the Potomac might have been
reorganizing, changing its base, and perfecting its defenses against
the enemy, to this day.

A fatal defect was the endeavor to combine the military and the
political. Few men have succeeded in this. There were Alexander,
Caesar, Napoleon,--but all came to an untimely end; the first met an
early death in a foreign land, the second was assassinated, the third
died a prisoner in exile. McClellan and Fremont, with all their
splendid talents, made the fatal mistake. They forgot that for the time
they were only military men. Grant was not a politician until after his
military duties were ended.

The conclusion of the relations between Lincoln and McClellan was not
generally known until recently made public by Lincoln's intimate friend
Lamon. McClellan was nominated in 1864 for President by the democrats.
As election day approached it became increasingly clear that McClellan
had no chance whatever of being elected. But Lincoln wanted something
more than, and different from, a reelection. His desires were for the
welfare of the distracted country. He wanted peace, reconstruction,
prosperity. A few days before election he sent a remarkable proposition
through a common friend, Francis P. Blair, to McClellan. Mr. Blair was
in hearty sympathy with the plan.

This proposition set forth the hopelessness of McClellan's chances for
the presidency, which he knew perfectly well. It was then suggested
that McClellan withdraw from the contest and let the President be
chosen by a united North, which would bring the war to a speedy close
and stop the slaughter of men on both sides. The compensations for this
concession were to be: McClellan was to be promoted immediately to be
General of the Army, his father-in-law Marcy was to be appointed major-
general, and a suitable recognition of the democratic party would be
made in other appointments.

At first blush McClellan was in favor of the arrangement. It is
probable that if left to himself he would have acceded. The imagination
can hardly grasp the fame that would have come to "little Mac," and the
blessings that would have come to the reunited country, had this wise
plan of Lincoln been accepted. But McClellan consulted with friends who
advised against it. The matter was dropped,--and that was the end of
the history of McClellan. He had thrown away his last chance of success
and fame. All that followed may be written in one brief sentence: On
election day he resigned from the army and was overwhelmingly defeated
at the polls.

CHAPTER XXX.

LINCOLN AND GREELEY.

Much of the mischief of the world is the work of people who mean well.
Not the least of the annoyances thrust on Lincoln came from people who
ought to have known better. The fact that such mischief-makers are
complacent, as if they were doing what was brilliant, and useful, adds
to the vexation.

One of the most prominent citizens of the United States at the time of
the civil war was Horace Greeley. He was a man of ardent convictions,
of unimpeachable honesty, and an editorial writer of the first rank. He
did a vast amount of good. He also did a vast amount of mischief which
may be considered to offset a part of the good he accomplished.

His intellectual ability made it impossible for him to be anywhere a
nonentity. He was always prominent. His paper, the New York _Tribune_,
was in many respects the ablest newspaper of the day. Large numbers of
intelligent republicans took the utterances of the _Tribune_ as gospel
truth.

It is not safe for any man to have an excess of influence. It is not
surprising that the wide influence which Greeley acquired made him
egotistic. He apparently came to believe that he had a mortgage on the
republican party, and through that upon the country. His editorial
became dictatorial. He looked upon Lincoln as a protege of his own who
required direction. This he was willing to give,--mildly but firmly.
All this was true of many other good men and good republicans. But it
was emphatically true of Greeley.

If there is anything worse than a military man who plumes himself upon
his statesmanship, it is the civilian who affects to understand
military matters better than the generals, the war department, and the
commander-in-chief. This was Greeley. He placed his military policy in
the form of a war-cry,--"On to Richmond!"--at the head of his editorial
page, and with a pen of marvelous power rung the changes on it.

This is but one sample of the man's proneness to interfere in other
matters. With all the infallibility of an editor he was ever ready to
tell what the President ought to do as a sensible and patriotic man.
_He_ would have saved the country by electing Douglas, by permitting
peaceable secession, by persuading the French ambassador to intervene,
by conference and argument with the Confederate emissaries, and by
assuming personal control of the administration. At a later date he
went so far as to propose to force Lincoln's resignation. He did not
seem to realize that Lincoln could be most effective if allowed to do
his work in his own way. He did not grasp the truth that he could be of
the highest value to the administration only as he helped and
encouraged, and that his obstructions operated only to diminish the
efficiency of the government. If Greeley had put the same degree of
force into encouraging the administration that he put into hindering
its work, he would have merited the gratitude of his generation.

He was singularly lacking in the willingness to do this, or in the
ability to recognize its importance. Like hundreds of others he
persisted in expounding the duties of the executive, but his
patronizing advice was more harmful in proportion to the incisiveness
of his literary ability. This impertinence of Greeley's criticism
reached its climax in an open letter to Lincoln. This letter is, in
part, quoted here. It shows something of the unspeakable annoyances
that were thrust upon the already overburdened President, from those
who ought to have delighted in holding up his hands, those of whom
better things might have been expected. The reply shows the patience
with which Lincoln received these criticisms. It further shows the
skill with which he could meet the famous editor on his own ground; for
he also could wield a trenchant pen.

Greeley's letter is very long and it is not necessary to give it in
full. But the headings, which are given below, are quite sufficient to
show that the brilliant editor dipped his pen in gall in order that he
might add bitterness to the man whose life was already filled to the
brim with the bitter sorrows, trials, and disappointments of a
distracted nation. The letter is published on the editorial page of the
New York _Tribune_ of August 20, 1862.

"THE PRAYER OF TWENTY MILLIONS:

"To ABRAHAM LINCOLN, _President of the United States_:

"DEAR SIR: I do not intrude to tell you--for you must know already--
that a great proportion of those who triumphed in your election, and
of all who desire the unqualified suppression of the Rebellion now
desolating our country, are sorely disappointed and deeply pained by
the policy you seem to be pursuing with regard to the slaves of the
Rebels. I write only to set succinctly and unmistakably before you
what we require, what we think we have a right to expect, and of what
we complain.

"I. We require of you, as the first servant of the Republic, charged
especially and preeminently with this duty, that you EXECUTE THE
LAWS...."

"II. We think you are strangely and disastrously remiss in the
discharge of your official and imperative duty with regard to the
emancipating provisions of the new Confiscation Act...."

"III. We think you are unduly influenced by the counsels, the
representations, the menaces, of certain fossil politicians hailing
from the Border States...."

"IV. We think the timid counsels of such a crisis calculated to prove
perilous and probably disastrous...."

"V. We complain that the Union cause has suffered and is now suffering
immensely, from mistaken deference to Rebel Slavery. Had you, Sir, in
your Inaugural Address, unmistakably given notice that, in case the
Rebellion already commenced were persisted in, and your efforts to
preserve the Union and enforce the laws should be resisted by armed
force, you _would recognize no loyal person as rightfully held in
Slavery by a traitor_, we believe that the Rebellion would have
received a staggering, if not fatal blow...."

"VI. We complain that the Confiscation Act which you approved is
habitually disregarded by your Generals, and that no word of rebuke for
them from you has yet reached the public ear...."

"VII. Let me call your attention to the recent tragedy in New Orleans,
whereof the facts are obtained entirely through Pro-Slavery
channels...."

"VIII. On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one
disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union Cause who
does not feel that all attempts to put down the Rebellion and at the
same time uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile--that
the Rebellion, if crushed out to-morrow, would be renewed within a year
if Slavery were left in full vigor--that the army of officers who
remain to this day devoted to Slavery can at best be but half way loyal
to the Union--and that every hour of deference to Slavery is an hour of
added and deepened peril to the Union...."

"IX. I close as I began with the statement that what an immense
majority of the Loyal Millions of your countrymen require of you is a
frank, declared, unqualified, ungrudging execution of the laws of the
land, more especially of the Confiscation Act.... As one of the
millions who would gladly have avoided this struggle at any sacrifice
but that of Principle and Honor, but who now feel that the triumph of
the Union is indispensable not only to the existence of our country,
but to the well-being of mankind, I entreat you to render a hearty and
unequivocal obedience to the law of the land."

"Yours,"

"HORACE GREELEY."

"NEW YORK, August 19, 1862."

Those who are familiar with the eccentricities of this able editor will
not be slow to believe that, had Lincoln, previous to the writing of
that letter, done the very things he called for, Greeley would not
improbably, have been among the first to attack him with his caustic
criticism. Lincoln was not ignorant of this. But he seized this
opportunity to address a far wider constituency than that represented
in the subscription list of the _Tribune_. His reply was published
in the Washington _Star_. He puts the matter so temperately and
plainly that the most obtuse could not fail to see the reasonableness
of it. As to Greeley, we do not hear from him again, and may assume
that he was silenced if not convinced. The reply was as follows:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 22, 1862.

"HON. HORACE GREBLEY,

"DEAR SIR: I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself
through the New York _Tribune_. If there be in it any statements,
or assumptions of fact, which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now
and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may
believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against
them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone,
I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always
supposed to be right. As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you
say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the
Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The
sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union
will be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the
Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree
with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they
could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My
paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not
either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without
freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save it by freeing all the
slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and
leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and
the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union:
and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to
save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am
doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe
doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when
shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall
appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my
view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft expressed
personal wish that all men everywhere could be free."

"Yours,

A. LINCOLN."

Not the least interesting fact connected with this subject is that at
this very time Lincoln had the Emancipation Proclamation in mind. But
not even the exasperating teasing that is fairly represented by
Greeley's letter caused him to put forth that proclamation prematurely.
It is no slight mark of greatness that he was able under so great
pressure to bide his time.

This was not the last of Greeley's efforts to control the President or
run the machine. In 1864 he was earnestly opposed to his renomination
but finally submitted to the inevitable.

In July of that year, 1864, two prominent Confederates, Clay of
Alabama, and Thompson of Mississippi, managed to use Greeley for their
purposes. They communicated with him from Canada, professing to have
authority to arrange for terms of peace, and they asked for a safe-
conduct to Washington. Greeley fell into the trap but Lincoln did not.
There is little doubt that their real scheme was to foment discontent
and secure division throughout the North on the eve of the presidential
election. Lincoln wrote to Greeley as follows:

"If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have authority
from Jefferson Davis, in writing, embracing the restoration of the
Union and the abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to
him that he may come to me with you."

Under date of July 18, he wrote the following:

"_To whom it may concern:_"

"Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity
of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by
and with an authority that can control the armies now at war with the
United States, will be received and considered by the Executive
government of the United States, and will be met on liberal terms on
substantial and collateral points; and the bearer or bearers thereof
shall have safe-conduct both ways."

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

Greeley met these "commissioners" at Niagara, but it turned out that
they had no authority whatever from the Confederate government. The
whole affair was therefore a mere fiasco. But Greeley, who had been
completely duped, was full of wrath, and persistently misrepresented,
not to say maligned, the President. According to Noah Brooks, the
President said of the affair:

"Well, it's hardly fair to say that this won't amount to anything. It
will shut up Greeley, and satisfy the people who are clamoring for
peace. That's something, anyhow." The President was too hopeful. It did
not accomplish quite that, for Greeley was very persistent; but it did
prevent a serious division of the North.

CHAPTER XXXI.

EMANCIPATION.

The institution of slavery was always and only hateful to the earnest
and honest nature of Lincoln. He detested it with all the energy of his
soul. He would, as he said, gladly have swept it from the face of the
earth. Not even the extreme abolitionists, Garrison, Wendell Phillips,
Whittier, abominated slavery with more intensity than Lincoln. But he
did not show his hostility in the same way. He had a wider scope of
vision than they. He had, and they had not, an appreciative historical
knowledge of slavery in this country. He knew that it was tolerated by
the Constitution and laws enacted within the provisions of the
Constitution, though he believed that the later expansion of slavery
was contrary to the spirit and intent of the men who framed the
Constitution. And he believed that slaveholders had legal rights which
should be respected by all orderly citizens. His sympathy with the
slave did not cripple his consideration for the slave-owner who had
inherited his property in that form, and under a constitution and laws
which he did not originate and for which he was not responsible.

He would destroy slavery root and branch, but he would do it in a
manner conformable to the Constitution, not in violation of it. He
would exterminate it, but he would not so do it as to impoverish law-
abiding citizens whose property was in slaves. He would eliminate
slavery, but not in a way to destroy the country, for that would entail
more mischief than benefit. To use a figure, he would throw Jonah
overboard, but he would not upset the ship in the act.

Large numbers of people have a limited scope of knowledge. Such
overlooked the real benefits of our civilization, and did not realize
that wrecking the constitution would simply destroy the good that had
thus far been achieved, and uproot the seeds of promise of usefulness
for the centuries to come. They wanted slavery destroyed at once,
violently, regardless of the disastrous consequences. On the other
hand, Lincoln wanted it destroyed, but by a sure and rational process.
He wished--and from this he never swerved--to do also two things:
first, to compensate the owners of the slaves, and second to provide
for the future of the slaves themselves. Of course, the extreme
radicals could not realize that he was more intensely opposed to
slavery than themselves.

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