Books: The Querist
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George Berkley >> The Querist
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11. Qu. Whether the wealth of the richest nations in Christendom
doth not consist in paper vastly more than in gold and silver?
12. Qu. Whether Lord Clarendon doth not aver of his own knowledge,
that the Prince of Orange, with the best credit, and the assistance
of the richest men in Amsterdam, was above ten days endeavouring to
raise L20,000 in specie, without being able to raise half the sum in
all that time? (See Clarendon's History, BK. XII)
13. Qu. Whether the whole city of Amsterdam would not have been
troubled to have brought together twenty thousand pounds in one
room?
14. Qu. Whether it be not absolutely necessary that there must be a
bank and must be a trust? And, if so, whether it be not the most
safe and prudent course to have a national bank and trust the
legislature?
15. Qu. Whether objections against trust in general avail, when it
is allowed there must be a trust, and the only question is where to
place this trust, whether in the legislature or in private hands?
16. Qu. Whether it can be expected that private persons should have
more regard to the public than the public itself?
17. Qu. Whether, if there be hazards from mismanagement, those may
not be provided against in the framing of a pubic bank; but whether
any provision can be made against the mismanagement of private banks
that are under no check, control, or inspection?
18. Qu. Whatever may be said for the sake of objecting, yet, whether
it be not false in fact, that men would prefer a private security to
a public security?
19. Qu. Whether a national bank ought to be considered as a new
experiment; and whether it be not a motive to try this scheme that
it hath been already tried with success in other countries?
20. Qu. If power followeth money, whether this can be anywhere more
properly and securely placed, than in the same hands wherein the
supreme power is already placed?
21. Qu. Whether there be more danger of abuse in a private than in a
public management?
22. Qu. Whether the proper usual remedy for abuses of private banks
be not to bring them before Parliament, and subject them to the
inspection of a committee; and whether it be not more prudent to
prevent than to redress an evil?
23. Qu. Supposing there had been hitherto no such thing as a bank,
and the question were now first proposed, whether it would be safer
to circulate unlimited bills in a private credit, or bills to a
limited value on the public credit of the community, what would men
think?
24. Qu. Whether experience and example be not the plainest proof;
and whether any instance can be assigned where a national bank hath
not been attended with great advantage to the public?
25. Qu. Whether the evils apprehended from a national bank are not
much more to be apprehended from private banks; but whether men by
custom are not familiarized and reconciled to common dangers, which
are therefore thought less than they really are?
26. Qu. Whether it would not be very hard to suppose all sense,
honesty, and public spirit were in the keeping of only a few private
men, and the public was not fit to be trusted?
27. Qu. Whether it be not ridiculous to suppose a legislature should
be afraid to trust itself?
28. Qu. But, whether a private interest be not generally supported
and pursued with more zeal than a public?
29. Qu. Whether the maxim, 'What is everybody's business is
nobody's,' prevails in any country under the sun more than in
Ireland?
30. Qu. Whether, nevertheless, the community of danger, which lulls
private men asleep, ought not to awaken the public?
31. Qu. Whether there be not less security where there are more
temptations and fewer checks?
32. Qu. If a man is to risk his fortune, whether it be more prudent
to risk it on the credit of private men, or in that of the great
assembly of the nation?
33. Qu. Where is it most reasonable to expect wise and punctual
dealing, whether in a secret impenetrable recess, where credit
depends on secrecy, or in a public management regulated and
inspected by Parliament?
34. Qu. Whether a supine security be not catching, and whether
numbers running the same risk, as they lessen the caution, may not
increase the danger?
35. Qu. What real objection lies against a national bank erected by
the legislature, and in the management of public deputies, appointed
and inspected by the legislature?
36. Qu. What have we to fear from such a bank, which may not be as
well feared without it?
37. Qu. How, why, by what means, or for what end, should it become
an instrument of oppression?
38. Qu. Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we
are already? Whether it be not in the power of any particular person
at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign parts? or
whether there can be any security in an estate of land when the
demands upon it are unknown?
39. Qu. Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a
concurrence of the government, be not very practicable?
40. Qu. But, whether though a scheme be never so evidently
practicable and useful to the pubic, yet, if conceived to interfere
with a private interest, it be not forthwith in danger of appearing
doubtful, difficult, and impracticable?
41. Qu. Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient
power to hurt, if they may be supposed capable of it, and whether a
bank would give them any new power?
42. Qu. What should tempt the pubic to defraud itself?
43. Qu. Whether, if the legislature destroyed the public, it would
not be felo de se; and whether it be reasonable to suppose it bent
on its own destruction?
44. Qu. Whether the objection to a pubic national bank, from want of
secrecy, be not in truth an argument for it?
45. Qu. Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing
that renders them so hazardous? and whether, without that, there
could have been of late so many sufferers?
46. Qu. Whether when all objections are answered it be still
incumbent to answer surmises?
47. Qu. Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be
against any proposal they could not turn into a job?
48. Qu. Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private
banker, and regularly visited his books, would not money lodged in
his bank be therefore reckoned more secure?
49. Qu. In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be
trusted, what security can there be for trusting any one else?
50. Qu. If it be not ridiculous to question whether the pubic can
find cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers
are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited value?
51. Qu. Whether the united stock of a nation be not the best
security? And whether anything but the ruin of the State can produce
a national bankruptcy?
52. Qu. Whether the total sum of the public treasure, power, and
wisdom, all co-operating, be not most likely to establish a bank of
credit, sufficient to answer the ends, relieve the wants, and
satisfy the scruples of all people?
53. Qu. Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend
private banks can be admitted as objections against a public one?
54. Qu. Whether that which is an objection to everything be an
objection to anything; and whether the possibility of an abuse be
not of that kind?
55. Qu. Whether, in fact, all things are not more or less abused,
and yet notwithstanding such abuse, whether many things are not upon
the whole expedient and useful?
56. Qu. Whether those things that are subject to the most general
inspection are not the least subject to abuse?
57. Qu. Whether, for private ends, it may not be sometimes expedient
to object novelty to things that have been often tried, difficulty
to the plainest things, and hazard to the safest?
58. Qu. Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question
was between money and credit, and not (as in fact it is) which ought
to be preferred, private credit or public credit?
59. Qu. Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt, or
to be feared, on one side?
60. Qu. Whether, therefore, those that would make an impartial
judgment ought not to be on their guard, keeping both prospects
always in view, balancing the inconveniencies on each side and
considering neither absolutely?
61. Qu. Whether wilful mistakes, examples without a likeness, and
general addresses to the passions are not often more successful than
arguments?
62. Qu. Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as
to explain obscure ones?
63. Qu. Whether private men are not often an over-match for the
public; want of weight being made up for by activity?
64. Qu. If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or
representatives, whether we are not already undone, and so have
nothing further to fear?
65. Qu. Suppose a power in the government to hurt the pubic by means
of a national bank, yet what should give them the will to do this?
Or supposing a will to do mischief, yet how could a national bank,
modelled and administered by Parliament, put it in their power?
66. Qu. Whether even a wicked will entrusted with power can be
supposed to abuse it for no end?
67. Qu. Whether it be not much more probable that those who maketh
such objections do not believe them?
68. Qu. Whether it be not vain to object that our fellow-subjects of
Great Britain would malign or obstruct our industry when it is
exerted in a way which cannot interfere with their own?
66. Qu. Whether it is to be supposed they should take delight in the
dirt and nakedness and famine of our people, or envy them shoes for
their feet and beef for their belies?
70. Qu. What possible handle or inclination could our having a
national bank give other people to distress us?
71. Qu. Whether it be not ridiculous to conceive that a project for
cloathing and feeding our natives should give any umbrage to
England?
72. Qu. Whether such unworthy surmises are not the pure effect of
spleen?
73. Qu. Whether London is not to be considered as the metropolis of
Ireland? And whether our wealth (such as it is) doth not circulate
through London and throughout all England, as freely as that of any
part of his Majesty's dominions?
74. Qu. Whether therefore it be not evidently the interest of the
people of England to encourage rather than to oppose a national bank
in this kingdom, as well as every other means for advancing our
wealth which shall not impair their own?
75. Qu. Whether it is not our interest to be useful to them rather
than rival them; and whether in that case we may not be sure of
their good offices?
76. Qu. Whether we can propose to thrive so long as we entertain a
wrongheaded distrust of England?
77. Qu. Whether, as a national bank would increase our industry, and
that our wealth, England may not be a proportionable gainer; and
whether we should not consider the gains of our mother-country as
some accession to our own?
78. Qu. Whether the Protestant colony in this kingdom can ever
forget what they owe to England?
79. Qu. Whether there ever was in any part of the world a country in
such wretched circumstances, and which, at the same time, could be
so easily remedied, and nevertheless the remedy not applied?
80. Qu. What must become of a people that can neither see the
plainest things nor do the easiest?
81. Qu. Be the money lodged in the bank what it will, yet whether an
Act to make good deficiencies would not remove all scruples?
82. Qu. If it be objected that a national bank must lower interest,
and therefore hurt the monied man, whether the same objection would
not hold as strong against multiplying our gold and silver?
83. Qu. But whether a bank that utters bills, with the sole view of
promoting the public weal, may not so proportion their quantity as
to avoid several inconveniencies which might attend private banks?
84. Qu. Whether there be any difficulty in comprehending that the
whole wealth of the nation is in truth the stock of a national bank?
And whether any more than the right comprehension of this be
necessary to make all men easy with regard to its credit?
85. Qu. Whether any Thing be more reasonable than that the pubic,
which makes the whole profit of the bank, should engage to make good
its credit?
86. Qu. Whether the prejudices about gold and silver are not strong,
but whether they are not still prejudices?
87. Qu. Whether paper doth not by its stamp and signature acquire a
local value, and become as precious and as scarce as gold? And
whether it be not much fitter to circulate large sums, and therefore
preferable to gold?
88. Qu. Whether, in order to make men see and feel, it be not often
necessary to inculcate the same thing, and place it in different
lights?
89. Qu. Whether it doth not much import to have a right conception
of money? And whether its true and just idea be not that of a
ticket, entitling to power, and fitted to record and transfer such
power?
90. Qu. Whether the managers and officers of a national bank ought
to be considered otherwise than as the cashiers and clerks of
private banks? Whether they are not in effect as little trusted,
have as little power, are as much limited by rules, and as liable to
inspection?
91. Qu. Whether the mistaking this point may not create some
prejudice against a national bank, as if it depended on the credit,
or wisdom, or honesty, of private men, rather than on the pubic,
which is really the sole proprietor and director thereof, and as
such obliged to support it?
92. Qu. Though the bank of Amsterdam doth very rarely, if at all,
pay out money, yet whether every man possess'd of specie be not
ready to convert it into paper, and act as cashier to the bank? And
whether, from the same motive, every monied man throughout this
kingdom would not be cashier to our national bank?
93. Qu. Whether a national bank would not be the great means and
motive for employing our poor in manufactures?
94. Qu. Whether money, though lent out only to the rich, would not
soon circulate among the poor? And whether any man borrows but with
an intent to circulate?
95. Qu. Whether both government and people would not in the event be
gainers by a national bank? And whether anything but wrong
conceptions of its nature can make those that wish well to either
averse from it?
96. Qu. Whether it may not be right to think, and to have it
thought, that England and Ireland, prince and people, have one and
the same interest?
97. Qu. Whether, if we had more means to set on foot such
manufactures and such commerce as consists with the interest of
England, there would not of course be less sheep-walk, and less wool
exported to foreign countries? And whether a national bank would not
supply such means?
98. Qu. Whether we may not obtain that as friends which it is in
vain to hope for as rivals?
99. Qu. Whether in every instance by which we prejudice England, we
do not in a greater degree prejudice ourselves? See Part II. qu. 153
and 154.
100. Qu. Whether in the rude original of society the first step was
not the exchanging of commodities; the next a substituting of metals
by weight as the common medium of circulation; after this the making
use of coin; lastly, a further refinement by the use of paper with
proper marks and signatures? And whether this, as it is the last, so
it be not the greatest improvement?
101. Qu. Whether we are not in fact the only people who may be said
to starve in the midst of plenty?
102. Qu. Whether business in general doth not languish among us?
Whether our land is not untilled? Whether its inhabitants are not
upon the wing?
103. Qu. Whether there can be a worse sign than that people should
quit their country for a livelihood? Though men often leave their
country for health, or pleasure, or riches, yet to leave it merely
for a livelihood, whether this be not exceeding bad, and sheweth
some peculiar mismanagement?
104. Qu. Whether our circumstances do not call aloud for some
present remedy? And whether that remedy be not in our power?
105. Qu. Whether, in order to redress our evils, artificial helps
are not most wanted in a land where industry is most against the
natural grain of the people?
106. Qu. Whether, of all the helps to industry that ever were
invented, there be any more secure, more easy, and more effectual
than a national bank?
107. Qu. Whether medicines do not recommend themselves by
experience, even though their reasons be obscure? But whether reason
and fact are not equally clear in favour of this political medicine?
108. Qu. Whether, although the prepossessions about gold and silver
have taken deep root, yet the example of our Colonies in America
doth not make it as plain as day-light that they are not so
necessary to the wealth of a nation as the vulgar of all ranks
imagine?
109. Qu. Whether it be not evident that we may maintain a much
greater inward and outward commerce, and be five times richer than
we are, nay, and our bills abroad be of far greater credit, though
we had not one ounce of gold or silver in the whole island?
110. Qu. Whether wrongheaded maxims, customs, and fashions are not
sufficient to destroy any people which hath so few resources as the
inhabitants of Ireland.
111. Qu. Whether it would not be a horrible thing to see our matrons
make dress and play their chief concern?
112. Qu. Whether our ladies might not as well endow monasteries as
wear Flanders lace? And whether it be not true that Popish nuns are
maintained by Protestant contributions?
113. Qu. Whether England, which hath a free trade, whatever she
remits for foreign luxury with one hand, doth not with the other
receive much more from abroad? Whether, nevertheless, this nation
would not be a gainer, if our women would content themselves with
the same moderation in point of expense as the English ladies?
114. Qu. But whether it be not a notorious truth that our Irish
ladies are on a foot, as to dress, with those of five times their
fortune in England?
115. Qu. Whether it be not even certain that the matrons of this
forlorn country send out a greater proportion of its wealth, for
fine apparel, than any other females on the whole surface of this
terraqueous globe?
116. Qu. Whether the expense, great as it is, be the greatest evil;
but whether this folly may not produce many other follies, an entire
derangement of domestic life, absurd manners, neglect of duties, bad
mothers, a general corruption in both sexes?
117. Qu. Whether therefore a tax on all gold and silver in apparel,
on all foreign laces and silks, may not raise a fund for the bank,
and at the same time have other salutary effects on the public?
118. Qu. But, if gentlemen had rather tax themselves in another way,
whether an additional tax of ten shillings the hogshead on wines may
not supply a sufficient fund for the national bank, all defects to
be made good by Parliament?
119. Qu. Whether upon the whole it may not be right to appoint a
national bank?
120. Qu. Whether the stock and security of such bank would not be,
in truth, the national stock, or the total sum of the wealth of this
kingdom?
121. Qu. Whether, nevertheless, there should not be a particular
fund for present use in answering bills and circulating credit?
122. Qu. Whether for this end any fund may not suffice, provided an
Act be passed for making good deficiencies?
123. Qu. Whether the sole proprietor of such bank should not be the
public, and the sole director the legislature?
124. Qu. Whether the managers, officers, and cashiers should not be
servants of the pubic, acting by orders and limited by rules of the
legislature?
125. Qu. Whether there should not be a standing number of
inspectors, one-third men in great office, the rest members of both
houses, half whereof to go out, and half to come in every session?
126. Qu. Whether those inspectors should not, all in a body, visit
twice a year, and three as often as they pleased?
127. Qu. Whether the general bank should not be in Dubin, and
subordinate banks or compters one in each province of Munster,
Ulster, and Connaught?
128. Qu. Whether there should not be such provisions of stamps,
signatures, checks, strong boxes, and all other measures for
securing the bank notes and cash, as are usual in other banks?
129. Qu. Whether these ten or a dozen last queries may not easily be
converted into heads of a bill?
130. Qu. Whether any one concerns himself about the security or
funds of the banks of Venice or Amsterdam? And whether in a little
time the case would not be the same as to our bank?
131. Qu. Whether the first beginning of expedients do not always
meet with prejudices? And whether even the prejudices of a people
ought not to be respected?
132. Qu. Whether a national bank be not the true philosopher's stone
in a State?
133. Qu. Whether it be not the most obvious remedy for all the
inconveniencies we labour under with regard to our coin?
134. Qu. Whether it be not agreed on all hands that our coin is on
very bad foot, and calls for some present remedy?
135. Qu. Whether the want of silver hath not introduced a sort of
traffic for change, which is purchased at no inconsiderable discount
to the great obstruction of our domestic commerce?
136. Qu. Whether, though it be evident silver is wanted, it be yet
so evident which is the best way of providing for this want? Whether
by lowering the gold, or raising the silver, or partly one, partly
the other?
137. Qu. Whether a partial raising of one species be not, in truth,
wanting a premium to our bankers for importing such species? And
what that species is which deserves most to be encouraged?
138. Qu. Whether it be not just, that all gold should be alike rated
according to its weight and fineness?
139. Qu. Whether this may be best done, by lowering some certain
species of gold, or by raising others, or by joining both methods
together?
140. Qu. Whether all regulations of coin should not be made with a
view to encourage industry, and a circulation of commerce,
throughout the kingdom?
141. Qu. Whether the North and the South have not, in truth, one and
the same interest in this matter?
142. Qu. Whether to oil the wheels of commerce be not a common
benefit? And whether this be not done by avoiding fractions and
multiplying small silver?
143. Qu. But, whether a pubic benefit ought to be obtained by unjust
methods, and therefore, whether any reduction of coin should be
thought of which may hurt the properties of private men?
144. Qu. Whether those parts of the kingdom where commerce doth most
abound would not be the greatest gainers by having our coin placed
on a right foot?
145. Qu. Whether, in case a reduction of coin be thought expedient,
the uttering of bank bills at the same time may not prevent the
inconveniencies of such a reduction?
146. Qu. But, whether any pubic expediency could countervail a real
pressure on those who are least able to bear it, tenants and
debtors?
147. Qu. Whether, nevertheless, the political body, as well as the
natural, must not sometimes be worse in order to be better?
148. Qu. Whether, all things considered, a general raising the value
of gold and silver be not so far from bringing greater quantities
thereof into the kingdom that it would produce a direct contrary
effect, inasmuch as less, in that case, would serve, and therefore
less be wanted? And whether men do not import a commodity in
proportion to the demand or want of it?
149. Qu. Whether the lowering of our gold would not create a fever
in the State? And whether a fever be not sometimes a cure, but
whether it be not the last cure a man would choose?
150. Qu. What if our other gold were raised to a par with Portugal
gold, and the value of silver in general raised with regard to that
of gold?
151. Qu. Whether the pubic ends may or may not be better answered by
such augmentation, than by a reduction of our coin?
152. Qu. Provided silver is multiplied, be it by raising or
diminishing the value of our coin, whether the great end is not
answered?
153. Qu. Whether raising the value of a particular species will not
tend to multiply such species, and to lessen others in proportion
thereunto? And whether a much less quantity of cash in silver would
not, in reality, enrich the nation more than a much greater in gold?
154. Qu. Whether, if a reduction be thought necessary, the obvious
means to prevent all hardships and injustice be not a national bank?
155. Qu. Upon supposition that the cash of this kingdom was five
hundred thousand pounds, and by lowering the various species each
one-fifth of its value the whole sum was reduced to four hundred
thousand pounds, whether the difficulty of getting money, and
consequently of paying rents, would not be increased in the
proportion of five to four?
156. Qu. Whether such difficulty would not be a great and unmerited
distress on all the tenants in the nation? But if at the same time
with the aforesaid reduction there were uttered one hundred thousand
pounds additional to the former current stock, whether such
difficulty or inconvenience would then be felt?
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