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33. OF REAL THINGS AND IDEAS OR CHIMERAS.--The ideas imprinted on the
Senses by the Author of nature are called REAL THINGS; and those
excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant,
are more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which they
copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid
and distinct, are nevertheless IDEAS, that is, they exist in the
mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing.
The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to
be more (1)STRONG, (2)ORDERLY, and (3)COHERENT than the creatures of the
mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are
also (4)LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SPIRIT [Note: Vide sect. xxix.--Note.],
or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by
the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS,
and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than
in a mind perceiving it.

34. FIRST GENERAL OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Before we proceed any farther
it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which
may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid
down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick
apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not
equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be
understood by every one.

FIRST, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles ALL
THAT IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL IN NATURE IS BANISHED OUT OF THE WORLD, and
instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that
exist, exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What
therefore becomes of the sun, moon and stars? What must we think of
houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies?
Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all
which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I ANSWER, that
by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in
nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand
remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a RERUM
NATURA, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its
full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have
shown what is meant by REAL THINGS in opposition to CHIMERAS or ideas of
our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in
that sense they are alike IDEAS.

35. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER, AS UNDERSTOOD BY PHILOSOPHERS,
DENIED.[Vide sect. lxxxiv.]--I do not argue against the existence of
any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion.
That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist,
really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose
existence we deny IS THAT WHICH PHILOSOPHERS CALL MATTER or corporeal
substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest
of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed
will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and
the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for
trifling and disputation.

36. READILY EXPLAINED.--If any man thinks this detracts from the existence
or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what has been
premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an
abstract of what has been said:--There are spiritual substances,
minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at
pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of
others they perceive by sense--which, being impressed upon them
according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the
effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. These
latter are said to have more REALITY in them than the former:--by
which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly, and distinct,
and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And
in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I
imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of
REALITY it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general
each part of the mundane system, is as much a REAL BEING by our
principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term
REALITY different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own
thoughts and see.

37. THE PHILOSOPHIC, NOT THE VULGAR SUBSTANCE, TAKEN AWAY.--I will
be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take
away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word
SUBSTANCE be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible
qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we
cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic
sense--for the SUPPORT of accidents or QUALITIES WITHOUT THE MIND--then
indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take
away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

38. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink
ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so--the word
IDEA not being used in common discourse to signify the several
combinations of sensible qualities which are called THINGS; and it is
certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of
language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the
truth of the proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we
are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by
our senses. The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure,
or suchlike qualities, which combined together constitute the several
sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shown to exist only in the mind
that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them IDEAS;
which word if it was as ordinarily used as THING, would sound no harsher
nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety,
but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we
eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense, which
cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is
more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things
rather than ideas.

39. THE TERM IDEA PREFERABLE TO THING.--If it be demanded why I make
use of the word IDEA, and do not rather in compliance with custom
call them THINGS. I answer, I do it for two reasons:--first, because
the term THING in contra-distinction to IDEA, is generally supposed
to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because
THING has a more comprehensive signification than IDEA, including
SPIRIT or thinking things as well as IDEAS. Since therefore the
objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless
and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word IDEA, which implies
those properties.

40. THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES NOT DISCREDITED.--But, say what we can,
some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his
senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever,
to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence
of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same.
That what I see, hear, and feel DOTH EXIST, THAT IS to say, IS PERCEIVED
BY ME, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how
the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of
anything which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man
turn SCEPTIC and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all
the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more
opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down [Note.], as shall be
hereafter clearly shown.

[Note: They extirpate the very root of scepticism, "the fallacy
of the senses."--Ed.]

41. SECOND OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Secondly, it will be OBJECTED
that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance,
and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt,
and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of
fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be
convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition
to our tenets. To all which the ANSWER is evident from what has
been already said; and I shall only add in this place, that if real
fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain
that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and yet
nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in an
unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea.

42. THIRD OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Thirdly, it will be objected that
we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which
consequently do not exist in the mind; it being absurd that those
things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be
as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it
may be considered that in a DREAM we do oft perceive things as
existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things
are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to
consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a
distance by sight. For, that we should in truth see EXTERNAL space, and
bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to
carry with it some opposition to what has been said of their existing
nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was
that gave birth to my "Essay towards a New Theory of Vision," which was
published not long since, wherein it is shown (1) that DISTANCE or outness
is NEITHER IMMEDIATELY of itself PERCEIVED by sight, nor yet apprehended
or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that has a necessary
connexion with it; but (2) that it is ONLY SUGGESTED to our thoughts by
certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own
nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or
things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion taught us BY EXPERIENCE,
they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that
WORDS of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for;
insomuch that a man BORN blind and afterwards made to see, would not, at
first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any
distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise.

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and
heterogeneous. THE FORMER ARE MARKS AND PROGNOSTICS OF THE LATTER. That
the proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the
images of external things, was shown even in that treatise. Though
throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible
objects--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for
establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my
purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse concerning VISION. So
that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we apprehend by them
distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to
us things ACTUALLY existing at a distance, but only admonish us what
ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances
of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say,
evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise,
and in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that
visible ideas are the Language whereby the governing Spirit on whom we
depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in
case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller
information in this point I refer to the Essay itself.

45. FOURTH OBJECTION, FROM PERPETUAL ANNIHILATION AND CREATION.--ANSWER.--
Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it
follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects
of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in
the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is
somebody by to perceive them. Upon SHUTTING MY EYES all the furniture in
the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again
created. In ANSWER to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said
in sect. 3, 4, &c., and desire he will consider whether he means anything
by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For
my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover
that anything else is meant by those words; and I once more entreat the
reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on
by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their
archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause;
but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand
up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an
absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no
meaning in them.

46. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--It will not be amiss to observe how far
the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable
with those pretended absurdities. (1) It is thought strangely absurd
that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me
should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers
commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and
colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight,
are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived?
(2)Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should
be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the
schools. For the SCHOOLMEN, though they acknowledge the existence of
Matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are
nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine
conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.

47. (3) Further, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow
the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably
follow, FROM THE PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE NOW GENERALLY ADMITTED, that the
PARTICULAR bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they
are not perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following
sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible
somewhat, WHICH HAS NONE OF THOSE PARTICULAR QUALITIES WHEREBY THE
BODIES FALLING UNDER OUR SENSES ARE DISTINGUISHED ONE FROM ANOTHER.
(2) But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite
divisibility of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most
approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles
demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an
infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which are not
perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems
to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to
sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains
an infinite number of parts, BUT BECAUSE THE SENSE IS NOT ACUTE ENOUGH TO
DISCERN THEM. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more
acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the
object appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its
extremities which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in
very different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense.
And at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense
becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which
there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. EACH BODY
THEREFORE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, IS INFINITELY EXTENDED, AND CONSEQUENTLY
VOID OF ALL SHAPE OR FIGURE. From which it follows that, though we should
grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as
certain, the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced
to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense,
nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each
particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, AND IT IS
THE MIND THAT FRAMES ALL THAT VARIETY OF BODIES WHICH COMPOSE THE VISIBLE
WORLD, ANY ONE WHEREOF DOES NOT EXIST LONGER THAN IT IS PERCEIVED.

48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be
found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in
truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we
hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which
cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no
existence except only while they are perceived by US, since THERE MAY BE
SOME OTHER SPIRIT THAT PERCEIVES THEM THOUGH WE DO NOT. Wherever bodies
are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood
to mean this or that particular mind, but ALL MINDS WHATSOEVER. It does
not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are
annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the
intervals between our perception of them.

49. FIFTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Fifthly, it may perhaps be OBJECTED
that if extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows
that the mind is extended and figured; since extension is a mode or
attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the
subject in which it exists. I ANSWER, (1) Those qualities are in the
mind ONLY AS THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY IT--that is, not by way of MODE
or ATTRIBUTE, but only by way of IDEA; and it no more follows the
soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it alone,
than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are ON
ALL HANDS acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. (2) As to what
philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and
unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard,
extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a
subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure
which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot
comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things
which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard,
extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject
distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning
of the word DIE.

50. SIXTH OBJECTION, FROM NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.--ANSWER.--Sixthly,
you will say there have been a great many things explained by
matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole
corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which
have been applied with so much success to account for the PHENOMENA. In
short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern
philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition
that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I ANSWER
that there is not any one PHENOMENON explained on that supposition which
may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear
by an INDUCTION OF PARTICULARS. To explain the PHENOMENA, is all one as
to show why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and
such ideas. But (1) how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any
idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is
therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in natural philosophy.
Besides, (2) they who attempt to account for things do it not by CORPOREAL
SUBSTANCE, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth
no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything,
as has been already shown. See sect. 25.

51. SEVENTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--Seventhly, it will upon this be
demanded whether it does not seem ABSURD TO TAKE AWAY NATURAL CAUSES,
AND ASCRIBE EVERYTHING TO THE IMMEDIATE OPERATION OF SPIRITS? We
must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water
cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be
deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I ANSWER,
he would so; in such things we ought to THINK WITH THE LEARNED,
AND SPEAK WITH THE VULGAR. They who to demonstration are convinced
of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun
rises," "the sun sets," or "comes to the meridian"; and if they
affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear
very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what is here said will make it
manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of
alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets.

52. IN THE ORDINARY AFFAIRS OF LIFE, ANY PHRASES MAY BE RETAINED, so long
as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a
manner as is necessary for our WELL-BEING, how false soever they may be
if taken in a strict and SPECULATIVE SENSE. Nay, this is unavoidable,
since, propriety being regulated by CUSTOM, language is suited to the
RECEIVED opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is
impossible, even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to
alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a
handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a
fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor
and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate
modes of speech which use has made inevitable.

53. As to the OPINION THAT THERE ARE NO CORPOREAL CAUSES, this has been
heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by
others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to
exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all
things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was
none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by
consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to
exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But
then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created
beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one
effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose,
since God might have done everything as well without them: this I say,
though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and
extravagant supposition.

54. EIGHTH OBJECTION.--TWOFOLD ANSWER.--In the eighth place, the
universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some
an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of
external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken?
And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant
an error? I answer, FIRST, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will
not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the
existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to
believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is
impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I
refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense,
indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they ACT
as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every
moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking
being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by
those words, and form thereof a settled SPECULATIVE opinion, is what I am
not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose
upon themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they
have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.

55. But SECONDLY, though we should grant a notion to be never so
universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its
truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false
opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the
unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a
time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as
monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered
what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find
that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable
footing in the world.

56. NINTH OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But it is demanded that we assign
A CAUSE OF THIS PREJUDICE, and account for its obtaining in the
world. To this I ANSWER, that men knowing they perceived several
ideas, WHEREOF THEY THEMSELVES WERE NOT THE AUTHORS--as not being
excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills--this
made them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an
EXISTENCE INDEPENDENT OF AND WITHOUT THE MIND, without ever dreaming
that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers
having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do
not exist without the mind, THEY IN SOME DEGREE CORRECTED the
mistake of the vulgar; but at the same time run into another which
seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really
existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being
perceived, OF WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE ONLY IMAGES or resemblances, imprinted
by those objects on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes
its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being
conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which
they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must
have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.

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