Books: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

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[Note: Vide sect. iii. and xxv.]

8. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not
exist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof they
are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an
unthinking substance. I ANSWER, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a
colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we
look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible
for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask
whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas
are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If
they are, THEN THEY ARE IDEAS and we have gained our point; but if you say
they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour
is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which
is intangible; and so of the rest.

9. THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTION OF MATTER INVOLVES A CONTRADICTION.--Some
there are who make a DISTINCTION betwixt PRIMARY and SECONDARY
qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest,
solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all
other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The
ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of
anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have
our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things
which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call
MATTER. By MATTER, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless
substance, in which extension, figure, and motion DO ACTUALLY SUBSIST.
But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension,
figure, and motion are ONLY IDEAS EXISTING IN THE MIND, and that an idea
can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they
nor their archetypes can exist in an UNPERCEIVING substance. Hence, it is
plain that that the very notion of what is called MATTER or CORPOREAL
SUBSTANCE, involves a contradiction in it.[Note.]

[Note: "Insomuch that I should not think it necessary to spend more time
in exposing its absurdity. But because the tenet of the existence of
matter seems to have taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers,
and draws after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be
thought prolix and tedious, than omit anything that might conduce to
the full discovery and extirpation of the prejudice."--Edit 1710.]

10. ARGUMENTUM AD HOMINEM.--They who assert that figure, motion, and the
rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in
unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours,
sounds, heat cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not--which they
tell us are sensations existing IN THE MIND ALONE, that depend on and are
occasioned by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute
particles of matter. This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can
demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those
original qualities ARE INSEPARABLY UNITED WITH THE OTHER SENSIBLE
QUALITIES, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted
from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind.
But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any
abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a
body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see
evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body
extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other
sensible quality which is ACKNOWLEDGED to exist only in the mind. In
short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other
qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible
qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere
else.

11. A SECOND ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--Again, GREAT and SMALL, SWIFT and SLOW,
ARE ALLOWED TO EXIST NOWHERE WITHOUT THE MIND, being entirely
RELATIVE, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of
sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the
mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow,
that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension
in general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet
of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on
the strange doctrine of ABSTRACT IDEAS. And here I cannot but remark how
nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal
substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their own
principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of
MATERIA PRIMA, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Without
extension solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shown
that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also
be true of solidity.

12. That NUMBER is entirely THE CREATURE OF THE MIND, even though the
other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever
considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as
the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is
one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with
reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative,
and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any
one should give it an absolute existence without the mind. We say one
book, one page, one line, etc.; all these are equally units, though some
contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the
unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put
together by the mind.

13. UNITY I know some will have to be A SIMPLE OR UNCOMPOUNDED IDEA,
accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea
answering the word UNITY I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could
not miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to
my understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to
be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more,
it is an ABSTRACT IDEA.

14. A THIRD ARGUMENT AD HOMINEM.--I shall farther add, that, after
the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible
qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without the mind,
the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities
whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are
affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings,
existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that
the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another.
Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not
patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter, because to the
same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the
same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of
anything SETTLED AND DETERMINATE WITHOUT THE MIND? Again, it is proved
that SWEETNESS is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing
remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a
fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that
MOTION is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the
mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower
without any alteration in any external object?

15. NOT CONCLUSIVE AS TO EXTENSION.--In short, let any one consider
those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours
and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with
equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure,
and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing
does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in
an outward object, as that we do not know by SENSE which is the TRUE
extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly
show it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other
sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an UNTHINKING subject
without the mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an
outward object.

16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.--It is said
EXTENSION is a MODE or accident OF MATTER, and that Matter is the
SUBSTRATUM that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me
what is meant by Matter's SUPPORTING extension. Say you, I have no idea
of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no
positive, yet, if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a
relative idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be
supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant
by its supporting them. It is evident SUPPORT cannot here be taken in
its usual or literal sense--as when we say that pillars support a
building; in what sense therefore must it be taken? [Note.]

[Note: "For my part, I am not able to discover any sense at all that can
be applicable to it."--Edit 1710.]

17. PHILOSOPHICAL MEANING OF "MATERIAL SUBSTANCE" DIVISIBLE INTO TWO
PARTS.--If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare
themselves to mean by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, we shall find them acknowledge
they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of BEING
IN GENERAL, together WITH THE RELATIVE NOTION OF ITS SUPPORTING
ACCIDENTS. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract
and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents,
this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common
sense of those words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but
what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the TWO PARTS
or branches which make the signification of the words MATERIAL SUBSTANCE,
I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why
should we trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material
SUBSTRATUM or support of figure and motion, and other sensible qualities?
Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not
this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

18. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES WANTS PROOF.--But, though it
were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may exist
without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies,
yet HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO KNOW THIS? Either we must know it by
sense or by reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge ONLY
OF OUR SENSATIONS, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived
by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things
exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are
perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains
therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it
must be by REASON, inferring their existence from what is immediately
perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the
existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the
very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is ANY NECESSARY
CONNEXION BETWIXT THEM AND OUR IDEAS? I say it is granted on all hands
(and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond
dispute) that IT IS POSSIBLE WE MIGHT BE AFFECTED WITH ALL THE IDEAS WE
HAVE NOW, THOUGH THERE WERE NO BODIES EXISTING WITHOUT RESEMBLING THEM.
Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary
for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced
sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we
see them in at present, without their concurrence.

19. THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES AFFORDS NO EXPLICATION OF THE MANNER
IN WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE PROCUCED.--But, though we might possibly
have all our sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought
EASIER to conceive and explain the MANNER of their production,
by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise;
and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies
that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said;
for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they
by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas
are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in
what manner BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT, or how it is possible it should
imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas
or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter
or corporeal substances, SINCE THAT IS ACKNOWLEDGED TO REMAIN EQUALLY
INEXPLICABLE WITH OR WITHOUT THIS SUPPOSITION. If therefore it were
possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so,
must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without
any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings THAT ARE
ENTIRELY USELESS, AND SERVE TO NO MANNER OF PURPOSE.

20. DILEMMA.--In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we
should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very
same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose--what no one
can deny possible--an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to
be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are,
imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask
whether that intelligence has not all the reason to believe the
existence of corporeal substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting
them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same
thing? Of this there can be no question--which one consideration were
enough to make any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever
arguments be may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies
without the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any FURTHER PROOF AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF
MATTER after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors
and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that
tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in
philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall
not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think
arguments A POSTERIORI are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I
mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated A PRIORI, as because I shall
hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in
handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which
may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one
that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own
thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound,
or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived.
This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a
downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon
this issue:--If you can but CONCEIVE it possible for one extended movable
substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to
exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the
cause. And, as for all that COMPAGES of external bodies you contend for,
I shall grant you its existence, THOUGH (1.) YOU CANNOT EITHER GIVE ME ANY
REASON WHY YOU BELIEVE IT EXISTS [Vide sect. lviii.], OR (2.) ASSIGN ANY
USE TO IT WHEN IT IS SUPPOSED TO EXIST [Vide sect. lx.]. I say, the bare
possibility of your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that
it is so. [Note: i.e. although your argument be deficient in the two
requisites of an hypothesis.--Ed.]

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine
trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody
by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it;
but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind
certain ideas which you call BOOKS and TREES, and the same time omitting
to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? BUT DO NOT YOU
YOURSELF PERCEIVE OR THINK OF THEM ALL THE WHILE? This therefore is
nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of imagining or
forming ideas in your mind: but it does not show that you can conceive it
possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make
out this, IT IS NECESSARY THAT YOU CONCEIVE THEM EXISTING UNCONCEIVED OR
UNTHOUGHT OF, WHICH IS A MANIFEST REPUGNANCY. When we do our utmost to
conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only
contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is
deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or
without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or
exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth
and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on
any other proofs against the existence of material substance.

24. THE ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF UNTHINKING THINGS ARE WORDS WITHOUT
A MEANING.--It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts,
to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the
ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE OF SENSIBLE OBJECTS IN THEMSELVES, OR WITHOUT THE MIND.
To me it is evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or
else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or
fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own
thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those
expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for the
conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the
ABSOLUTE existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or
which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and
earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

25. THIRD ARGUMENT.[Note: Vide sect. iii. and vii.]--REFUTATION
OF LOCKE.--All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we
perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly
inactive--there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that
ONE IDEA or object of thought CANNOT PRODUCE or make ANY ALTERATION IN
ANOTHER. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else
requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every
part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in
them but what is perceived: but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether
of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity;
there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little
attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies
passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an
idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything:
neither can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is
evident from sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension,
figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say,
therefore, that these are the effects of powers resulting from the
configuration, number, motion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly
be false. [Note: Vide sect. cii.]

26. CAUSE OF IDEAS.--We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are
anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore
some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and
changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination
of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. I must therefore be a
substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material
substance: it remains therefore that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporeal
active substance or Spirit.

27. NO IDEA OF SPIRIT.--A spirit is one simple, undivided, active
being--as it perceives ideas it is called the UNDERSTANDING, and as it
produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the WILL. Hence
there can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever,
being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us,
by way of image or LIKENESS, that which acts. A little attention will make
it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall be like that active
principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is
the nature of SPIRIT, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself
perceived, BUT ONLY BY THE EFFECTS WHICH IT PRODUCETH. If any man shall
doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try
if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has
ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names WILL and UNDERSTANDING,
distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or
Being in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the
subject of the aforesaid powers--which is signified by the name SOUL or
SPIRIT. This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words
WILL [Note: "Understanding, mind."--Edit 1710.], SOUL, SPIRIT, do not stand
for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something
which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be
like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned
at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the
operations of the mind: such as willing, loving, hating--inasmuch as we
know or understand the meaning of these words.

28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift
the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and
straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power
it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of
ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain
and grounded on experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of
exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words.

29. IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR MEMORY.--But,
whatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find the ideas
actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When
in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether
I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present
themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other
senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There
is THEREFORE SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM.

30. LAWS OF NATURE.--The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and
DISTINCT than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness,
order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are
the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series,
the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and
benevolence of its Author. Now THE SET RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODS
WHEREIN THE MIND WE DEPEND ON EXCITES IN US THE IDEAS OF SENSE, ARE CALLED
THE LAWS OF NATURE; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us
that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in
the ordinary course of things.

31. KNOWLEDGE OF THEM NECESSARY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WORLDLY AFFAIRS.--This
gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our
actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally
at a loss; we could not know how to act anything that might procure us
the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food
nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the
seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to
obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conducive--all this we
know, NOT BY DISCOVERING ANY NECESSARY CONNEXION BETWEEN OUR IDEAS, but
only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, without which we
should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know
how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.

32. And yet THIS consistent UNIFORM WORKING, which so evidently displays
the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes
the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it
rather SENDS THEM A WANDERING AFTER SECOND CAUSES. For, when we perceive
certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and WE KNOW
THIS IS NOT OF OUR OWN DOING, we forthwith attribute power and agency to
the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which
nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having
observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure
we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called HEAT,
we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like
manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with
sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

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