Books: Indian Frontier Policy
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General Sir John Ayde >> Indian Frontier Policy
There surely must have been some very strong feeling of resentment and
injustice which brought so many tribesmen for the first time to combine
in opposition to what they evidently considered an invasion of their
country. As regards the Afredis, who are spoken of as treacherous and
faithless, it must be borne in mind that in 1881 we specially recognised
their independence,[Footnote: _Afghanistan_ No. 1, 1881, page 57.]
and have ever since subsidised them for the special purpose of guarding
the commerce through the Kyber; a duty which they have faithfully
carried out until the present summer. Lord Lytton, who was Viceroy when
the arrangement was proposed at the end of the war, wrote in 1880
[Footnote: _Ibid_, page 62.]--'I sincerely hope that the Government
of India will not be easily persuaded to keep troops permanently
stationed in the Kyber. I feel little doubt that such a course would
tend rather to cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies of troops
would be a constant provocation to attack; large bodies would die like
flies....'
'I believe that the Pass tribes themselves, if properly managed, will
prove the best guardians of the Pass, and be able, as well as willing,
to keep it open for us, if we make it worth their while to do so....'
Many of these very men, and those of other tribes on the frontier, have
for years enlisted in our ranks, and have proved to be good soldiers. I
repeat that some strong cause must have influenced them suddenly to
break out into war.
Until the present military operations have been brought to a close, and
until full official information has been given of the circumstances
which have led to them, it is not possible to pronounce a final
judgment; still, it seems to me, that we have strong grounds for
believing that the border policy of late years has in many instances
been too aggressive and regardless of the rights of the tribes; and that
the course finally pursued of the retention of fortified posts through
Swat and Bajour to Chitral, has been the ultimate cause which has
excited the people against us, and produced so great and costly a border
war. It must also not be forgotten, that even now we are merely on the
fringe, as it were, of the question; and that if we persist in forcing
ourselves forward, we shall have many a costly campaign to undertake far
away in distant, little-known regions, more difficult and more
inaccessible even than those in which we now find ourselves.
On the whole it appears to me that we should as far as possible
withdraw our isolated posts, so many of which, are either within the
tribal country or along its borders. It is sometimes argued that any
withdrawal on our part would have a demoralising effect on the tribes,
who would ascribe our retirement to inability to maintain our positions.
[Footnote: _Chitral_, 1895, page 62.] The best reply will perhaps
be to quote the words of Lord Hartington, when under similar
circumstances it was decided in 1881 to retire from Candahar. He said:
[Footnote: _Afghanistan_, No. 1, 1881, page 92.] 'The moral effect
of a scrupulous adherence to declarations which have been made, and a
striking and convincing proof given to the people and princes of India
that the British Government have no desire for further annexation of
territory, could not fail to produce a most salutary effect, in removing
the apprehensions, and strengthening the attachment of our native allies
throughout India, and on our frontiers....'
These remarks may now be brought to a close. My object throughout has
been to give an historical summary of the various wars and expeditions
in which we have been engaged during the present century on the North
-West frontier of India; and of the causes which have led to them. My
observations are founded on Parliamentary official papers, and on other
works of authority; and I hope they may prove useful to the public, who
have not, as a rule time to study the intricate details of this
difficult subject. I have endeavoured to prove that the tribes on the
frontier, and the people of Afghanistan, have no real power of injuring
our position in India; and turbulent as they may be, a policy of
patience, conciliation, and subsidies, is far more likely to attain our
object than incessant costly expeditions into their mountains. Our
influence over them is already great, and is increasing year by year. By
carefully maintaining the principles I have sketched out, we shall
gradually obtain their friendship, and also their support, should other
dangers ever threaten our dominions.
We are the rulers of a great Empire in the East, with its heavy duties
and responsibilities, and in devoting ourselves to the welfare of the
millions under our sway, and in developing the resources of the country,
we shall do far more for the happiness of the people and the security of
the Empire than by squandering our finances in constant expeditions
beyond its borders.