Books: Indian Frontier Policy
G >>
General Sir John Ayde >> Indian Frontier Policy
From official correspondence published subsequently [Footnote:
Parliamentary Papers, _Afghanistan_, 1881, No. 2.--c. 2811.] it
appeared that in entering Afghanistan our chief object at the outset was
to establish what was called a strategical triangle, by the occupation
of Cabul, Ghuznee and Jellalabad; and it was stated that by holding this
position, entrenched behind a rampart of mountains, we should have the
power of debouching on the plains of the Oxus against Russia in Central
Asia! 'It is difficult,' said Lord Lytton, 'to imagine a more commanding
strategical position.' The events of the war, however, soon put an end
to this somewhat fanciful strategy.
In November 1878 the British forces entered the country by three main
routes, the Kyber, the Koorum, and the Bolam, and hard fighting at once
ensued on the two northern ones. The results were immediate: Shere Ali
fled northwards, and died soon after. His son, Yakoob Khan, assumed
temporarily the position of Ameer, but in the convulsed state of the
country lie possessed little real power or authority. In May, 1879, he
met the British authorities at Gundamuk, and after considerable
discussion signed a treaty, the chief points of which were as follows:--
The foreign affairs of Afghanistan were to be under our guidance; and we
undertook to support the Ameer against foreign aggression; British
agents were to reside in the country; the Koorum, Pisheen, and Sibi
Valleys were assigned to the British Government; and finally, Yakoob
Khan was to receive an annual subsidy of 60,000_l_.
So far, it would appear as if the campaign had at once realised the
main objects of British policy; but tragic events rapidly followed,
active hostilities were resumed, and the Treaty of Gundamuk became mere
waste paper.
As a first result of the treaty, Sir Louis Cavagnari [Footnote:
_Afghanistan_, 1881, No. 1.] was appointed our Envoy, and
accompanied by a few officers and a small escort, arrived at Cabul in
July, being received in a friendly manner by the Ameer; although
influences adverse to his presence in the capital soon became apparent.
Suddenly, on September 3, the British Residency was attacked by several
Afghan regiments, and after a desperate resistance, Cavagnari and the
whole of his officers and escort perished.
This deplorable event, of course, upset all previous arrangements, and
led to an immediate resumption of hostilities. Our troops at once
advanced and captured Cabul, Yakoob Khan voluntarily abdicating and
becoming an exile in India. Ghuznee also was occupied shortly afterwards
by our advance from Candahar.
The Government of India, in a despatch in January, 1880, pointed out
that, in view of the complete change in the political situation, it was
necessary, in the first place, fully to establish our military position
in the country. They acknowledged that the hopes entertained of
establishing a strong, friendly, and independent kingdom on our frontier
had collapsed; and that Afghanistan had fallen to pieces at the first
blow, its provinces being now disconnected and masterless. In view of
these unexpected results, they went on to recommend the permanent
separation of the provinces under separate rulers; and having regard to
the special difficulties connected with Herat, advocated its being
handed over to Persia!
This was indeed a policy of despair!
Lord Hartington, who had become Secretary of State for India, writing
in May, 1880, summed up the situation as follows :--'It appears that as
the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous
force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yet
been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it was
desired to see strong, friendly and independent; the assumption of fresh
and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and a
condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country.'
Long and careful consideration was naturally given to the solution of
the difficulty in which this country found itself owing to the untoward
circumstances just related. Two important decisions were however
ultimately arrived at: [Footnote: _Afghanistan_, 1881, No. 1.]
1. That authority in Afghanistan, and the unity of its provinces,
should as far as possible be restored by the appointment of a new Ameer;
and Abdul Rahman, a nephew of Shere Ali, who had been for twelve years
an exile in Bokhara, was invited to Cabul, and was supported by us in
assuming the title.
The chief conditions were, that his foreign policy was to be under our
guidance, that no English officers were to reside as our representatives
in Afghanistan, and that he was to receive a subsidy.
2. That the British troops should be withdrawn as soon as the
pacification of the country would permit. This decision was recommended
not only by the Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, but by the higher
officers who had held command during the war. Sir Donald Stewart, who
was in chief command, and Sir Frederick Roberts, both, concurred in our
withdrawal from the country; the Kyber Pass was to be held by subsidised
tribes, and the Koorum Valley to be altogether abandoned; the
independence of the tribes being in each case recognised. Sir John
Watson, who was in command in that valley, pointed out that as a route
from India into Afghanistan it was practically useless. As a further
argument in favour of withdrawal, it may be well to allude to the fact
that the men of our native regiments were sick of serving in
Afghanistan, far away from their homes, and that it would be impolitic
to keep them there.
Some differences of opinion existed as to whether we should relinquish
possession of Candahar; but as it was 400 miles from the Indus, in a
foreign country, and as our remaining there would not only be hateful to
the Afghans, but in a military sense would be dangerous and costly, its
final abandonment was decided on; the valley of Pisheen, between
Candahar and Quetta, being alone retained by the British Government.
So ended the great war of 1878-80. At its close we had over 70,000 men
in Afghanistan, or on the border in reserve; and even then we really
only held the territory within range of our guns. The whole country had
been disintegrated and was in anarchy; whilst the total cost of the war
exceeded twenty millions sterling, being about the same amount as had
been expended in the former great war of 1839-41.
The military operations in themselves had been conducted throughout
with great skill in a most difficult country, and the troops, both
British and Native, had proved themselves admirable soldiers; but as
regards the policy which led us into war, it appears to have been as
unjust in principle as it was unfortunate in result. The facts, however,
speak for themselves.
CHAPTER III
FRONTIER POLICY SINCE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, INCLUDING EXPEDITION TO CHITRAL
Further Advance of Russia--Merv Occupied--Sir West Ridgeway's Frontier
Commission of 1885--The Durand Agreement with Abdul Rahman--The Chitral
Expedition of 1895: its Results--Sudden Outbreak of Frontier Tribes,
1897.
The reaction after the war naturally inclined the authorities in both
countries to leave frontier policy alone, at all events for the time.
Our professed object for years had been to make Afghanistan strong,
friendly, and independent. The first had certainly not been
accomplished, and the other two were doubtful. Still, by patience,
conciliation, and subsidies, we might hope in the course of time that
the wounds we had inflicted would gradually be healed, and a more stable
condition ensue. For a short period it was so; but then the old bugbear
of Russian advance over the dreary wastes of Central Asia again
supervened, and exercised its malign influence on our policy.
In 1881 and the following years, Russia, whilst completing her
conquests, and improving her communications in the south-western part of
Central Asia, became involved in somewhat prolonged hostilities with the
Tekke-Turcomans, ending in their subjugation, and in the occupation of
the long, desolate strip of country extending eastwards from the
Caspian, which had hitherto been independent. A railway was gradually
constructed from the vicinity of Kras-novodsk, on the Caspian, towards
Samarcand. Merv, formerly a city of importance, but of late a mere
village in the desert, was also occupied. These acquisitions of Russia,
accomplished in districts far removed from India, would not appear to
involve any special consideration on our part; but as the southern
frontiers of Russia thus became conterminous for a long distance with
Northern Persia, and also with some districts of Afghanistan, their new
position was regarded as possibly involving designs against our Indian
Empire, and remonstrances were made by us, more especially as regards
the occupation of Merv.[Footnote: _Central Asia_, No. 2, 1885.]
In a strategical point of view the question would not appear to be of
much importance, and would probably have dropped; but early in 1885 the
Russians attacked and drove the Afghan troops out of Penjdeh, a small,
hitherto almost unknown village in the desert. It was a high-handed
measure, and the relations between the two Governments, British and
Russian, which were already rather strained, became critical, and war at
one moment appeared to be almost inevitable.
It is not necessary, nor would it be desirable, now to recapitulate the
details of this serious crisis; because, happily, owing to the prudence
exercised by both Governments, the danger gradually passed away, a Joint
Commission being agreed on, to meet on the frontier, and to report as to
its delimitation. It may, however, be as well to mention that it seems
rather doubtful whether Penjdeh at the time absolutely belonged to
Afghanistan. Frontiers in the East are proverbially uncertain and
shifting, and in our own official maps, not very long before the
occurrences in question, it was marked as outside the Afghan border.
Colonel Stewart, reporting in 1884 on the northern frontier of
Afghanistan, and alluding to Penjdeh, said that it was inhabited by
Turcomans, and he thus described the position: 'The state of affairs
seems to have been that the Turcomans acknowledged that they were
squatting on Afghan land, and were liable to pay taxes, and each year
they paid something as an acknowledgment of Afghan rights; but so long
as this was done, the Afghans looked upon them as a protection against
the Tekke further north, and left them very much to themselves.'
The appointment of a Joint Commission of Russian and British officers
to delimit the northern frontiers of Afghanistan proved of great value,
not only in gaining information regarding districts hitherto but little
known, but also because its conjoint work tended to engender feelings of
respect and goodwill between the two nations concerned.
Its labours commenced in the autumn of 1885, and the report of Sir West
Ridgeway, the British Commissioner, is full of interest and
encouragement. In an article in the 'Nineteenth Century' of October,
1887, on the completion of his work, he gives some details of the
country, and also of the position of Russia in Central Asia, which are
worth quoting. As to the Afghan border he says: 'The three or four
hundred miles of country through which the new north-western frontier of
Afghanistan runs is a sandy, treeless, waterless desert, except where it
is traversed from south to north by the Heri-Rood, the Murghab and the
Oxus. The only cultivable ground is on the banks of these rivers; but in
spring time, after the winter snows have melted, the intervening plains
afford good grazing for sheep.' But perhaps the most important part of
his article is his view of the position of Russia in Central Asia: 'If
any Russian general,' he writes, 'were so reckless as to attempt the
invasion of India, and relying on the single line of lightly constructed
rails which connects the Caspian with the Oxus, and which are liable in
summer to be blocked by the moving sands of the desert, and in winter by
the falling snows of Heaven--if, relying on this frail and precarious
base, he were to move an army through the barren plains bordering the
Oxus, and leaving in his rear the various hostile and excited races of
Central Asia, he were to cross the difficult passes of the Hindoo Koosh,
and entangle his army in the barren mountain homes of the fanatical and
treacherous Afghan, then indeed our fortunate generals may well
congratulate themselves that the Lord has delivered the enemy into their
hand....'
Whilst, however, his conclusions as to the military weakness of Russia
in that part of the world are clear and decisive enough, he at the same
time does full justice to the good work which she is carrying out in
that vast area. He says: 'Hitherto Russia's advance in Central Asia has
been the triumph of civilisation. Wherever she has planted her flag
slavery has ceased to exist. This was keenly brought home to us in the
course of our travels. For hundreds of miles before we reached Herat we
found the country desolated and depopulated by Turcoman raids, while
even in the Herat valley we continually came across the fathers and
brothers of men who had been carried off from their peaceful fields by
man-stealing Turcomans, and sold into slavery many hundred miles away.
All this has ceased since the Russian occupation of Merv; the cruel
slave trade has been stamped out....'
Lord Salisbury, speaking in 1887, at the conclusion of the frontier
delimitation, happily described the situation as follows: 'I value the
settlement for this reason--not that I attach much importance to the
square miles of desert land with which we have been dealing, and which
probably after ten generations of mankind will not yield the slightest
value to any human being: but the settlement indicates on both sides
that spirit which in the two Governments is consistent with continued
peace. There is abundant room for both Governments, if they would only
think so....' What a pity that some statesman could not have persuaded
England to that effect fifty years before!
During the next few years no events of special importance occurred to
affect our general frontier policy in India, so far as Russia and
Afghanistan proper are concerned. The ample information we now possess
of the relative power and position of each country, and the experience
gained in bygone wars, enable us to form a correct judgment of the great
strength of our Empire in the East; and it is to be hoped that in the
future we shall hear less of those alarmist views which have so
frequently led us into erroneous policy and untoward expeditions.
Russia and England are now, happily, on friendly terms, and Abdul
Rahman, the Ameer of Cabul, although his position is difficult in the
midst of a turbulent people, has proved himself a loyal neighbour.
But another cloud has appeared on the horizon, and our troubles with
the intervening frontier tribes are now apparently worse than ever. From
accounts already given of those who dwell along the border, it is
evident that although our differences with them, during past years, have
been frequent and often serious, they have been more or less of a local
character. Troublesome as our neighbours have proved, still they have no
power of inflicting serious injury, or of endangering our rule. Under
these circumstances, the best policy, whilst firmly repressing their
predatory instincts, is to leave them alone.
In the absence of full official information as to the origin of recent
difficulties, which have culminated in the present frontier war, it is
only possible to speak in general terms. It may be mentioned, in the
first place, that owing to the uncertain line of demarcation between the
territories of the Ameer of Cabul and those of his independent tribal
neighbours, constant feuds and local hostilities occurred from time to
time in the mountains; and with a view of defining their respective
spheres, the Government of India, in 1893, sent a Mission to Cabul for
the purpose. This in itself would appear to have been a reasonable step;
and the 'Durand Agreement' which ensued (but which has not been
published) would, it was hoped, tend to a cessation of conflicts between
the Ameer's subjects and their neighbours. But there is a further aspect
of the question. So far as is known, not only were the respective
borders laid down, but it is understood that in many cases the
intervening tribes are now assumed to be what is termed 'within the
sphere of British influence.' In maps recently published, presumably
with some authority, vast mountainous districts are now included in this
somewhat mysterious phrase. For instance, the Koorum Valley, the Samana
Range, the countries of the Afredis and the Mohmunds, the districts of
Chitral, Bajour, Dir, Swat, Bonair, and others, are all included within
it; and in many instances fortified positions, occupied by British
troops, are to be found either within or along their borders.
Surely this opens out a wide question, and it would be interesting to
know whether, in the discussions at Cabul, the chiefs of the intervening
tribes were present, and whether they acquiesced, not only in the new
boundaries, but also in being included as within our sphere of
influence? It is evident it should have been a tripartite, and not a
dual, agreement. It is perfectly well known, and has been proved by long
experience, that these frontier tribes value their independence and
liberties, beyond everything else, and will not submit peacefully to
interference; and if they were not consulted in the arrangements just
described, we may begin to trace the origin of the present crisis.
Although, as I have explained, we are unable, from want of official
information, to deal fully with, the larger topic of recent border
policy, we have, at all events, ample details as regards the Chitral
question in the Parliamentary Papers published [Footnote: _North-West
Frontier, Chitral_, 1895.] in 1895. It appears that so long ago as
1876 the ruler of Chitral voluntarily tendered his allegiance to the
Maharajah of Cashmere, and endeavoured, but without success, to persuade
the neighbouring chiefs of Swat, Bajour, and Dir, to follow his example.
Now Chitral and Cashmere are not only far apart, but are separated by
lofty mountain ranges, inhabited by other tribes, so that this sudden
offer of vassalage seems rather inexplicable. It transpired, however, a
few years afterwards, that his real motive in seeking the friendship of
Cashmere was due to his fear of aggression by the Ameer of
Cabul.[Footnote: _Ibid_, page 46.]
The Government of India at the time encouraged this somewhat
sentimental friendship, and in order to obtain influence over the
intervening tribes established a fort at Gilgit, in an almost
inaccessible position, not far from the snowy crests of the Hindoo
Koosh. The position, however, proved to be costly, and also dangerous
from unfriendly neighbours, and, as after three years' experience no
special object was attained, it was withdrawn in 1881.
In 1889 the old fears of possible Russian aggression again revived, and
Gilgit was reoccupied with a strong detachment of Cashmere troops,
accompanied by several English officers. The Government of India pointed
out that the development of Russian military resources in Asia rendered
it necessary to watch the passes over the mountains, in order to prevent
what was called a _coup de main_ from the north. In short, they
dreaded the march of a Russian army over the Pamirs and the Hindoo Koosh
--a region where Nature has constructed for us perhaps one of the most
formidable frontiers in the world.
Friendship with the ruler of Chitral was also cultivated. He was given
an annual subsidy, and a present of 500 Sniders; being visited also by
English officers. It was even contemplated at the time to construct a
direct road from his capital to our frontier near Peshawur; but as he
was suspicious, and as his neighbours in Swat, Bajour, and others would
probably have objected, the suggestion was happily postponed.
In October 1892 the ruler of Chitral died, and after the usual family
contests and intrigues, Nizamul-Mulk, his son, established his
authority in the country.
In January, 1893, Dr. Robertson arrived at Chitral as our
representative, accompanied by two officers and fifty Sikhs. Although he
was received in a friendly manner by the new ruler, his account of the
state of affairs in April was discouraging and ominous. He wrote: 'We
seem to be on a volcano here. Matters are no longer improving; the
atmosphere of Chitral is one of conspiracy and intrigue.' A few weeks
later he gave a more cheerful account, and although he described the
people as fickle, he considered that Englishmen were safe. It became
evident, however, that the Nizam-ul-Mulk was weak and unpopular, and Dr.
Robertson described the country as 'in a distracted state, and torn by
factions.'
The reports of our Agent, in short, would seem to prove that he was in
a false and dangerous position, with a small escort, far away in the
mountains, about 200 miles from our frontier.
In January, 1895, the Nizam was murdered by his brother, and the whole
country at once again fell into anarchy. Dr. Robertson, who had been
temporarily absent, but had returned in February, was besieged in a
fort, with his escort, which, however, had been increased to about 290
men. The crisis had come at last, and there was no time to spare.
A strong force under Sir Robert Low was assembled at Peshawur, and
crossed the frontier on April 1. It must be pointed out that, in
proceeding to Chitral, the British troops had necessarily to pass
through a difficult mountainous country inhabited by independent tribes;
and the Government of India issued a proclamation in which they pointed
out that their sole object 'is to put an end to the present and to
prevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and that as
soon as this object has been attained the force would be withdrawn.' The
proclamation went on to say, that the Government 'have no intention of
permanently occupying any territory through which Mura Khan's misconduct
may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of
the tribes.'
The military operations were conducted with great skill and rapidity,
and Dr. Robertson's small garrison, which at one time had been hard
pressed, was saved: a small force under Colonel Kelly, which had left
Gilgit, having by a daring and successful march arrived just before the
main body from Peshawur.
The short campaign having thus accomplished its object, the gradual
withdrawal of the British troops in accordance with the proclamation
would seem to have been a natural sequence. In the weak, distracted
state of the country, and in the assumed necessity of not losing our
influence in those distant regions, the Government of India, however,
considered that a road from our frontier to Chitral should be made, and
certain positions retained in order to guard it. This vital question
having been carefully considered at home, the Secretary of State for
India, on June 13, 1895, telegraphed to the Viceroy that her Majesty's
Government regretted they were unable to concur in the proposal. He went
on to say that no 'military force or European Agent shall be kept at
Chitral; that Chitral should not be fortified; and that no road shall be
made between Peshawur and Chitral.' He added that all positions beyond
our frontier should be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allowed.
It so happened that within a few days of this important decision a
change of Government occurred at home, and the question was
reconsidered; and on August 9, fresh instructions were telegraphed to
India, by which it was ordered that British troops should be stationed
at the Malakund Pass, leading into Swat, and that other posts up to, and
including, Chitral, should also be held, and a road made through the
country. In short the previous decision was entirely reversed.
Before going further it may be as well to point out that this is no
mere question between one political party and another. It goes far
beyond that, and we may feel assured that in considering the subject,
both Governments were actuated by a desire to do what was considered
best in the interests of the Indian Empire.
Still, it is I think impossible not to regard the ultimate decision as
very unfortunate, and as likely to lead to serious consequences. In a
mere military point of view, it was a repetition of the policy pursued
of recent years of establishing isolated military posts in countries
belonging to others, or in their vicinity; inevitably tending to
aggravate the tribes, and which in time of trouble, instead of
increasing our strength, are and have been the cause of anxiety to
ourselves. Therefore, not only as a matter of policy, but in a purely
military sense, the arrangement was dangerous.
I would further observe that many officers, both civil and military,
men of the highest character and long experience in the Punjaub and its
borders, did not hesitate to express their opinions at the time, that
retribution would speedily follow; and their anticipations appear now to
have been verified. Suddenly, not many weeks ago, the people of Swat,
who were said to be friendly, violently attacked our position on the
Malakund, losing, it is said, 3,000 men in the attempt; and also nearly
captured a fortified post a few miles distant at Chakdara. Not only
that, but this unexpected outbreak was followed by hostilities on the
part of the tribes in Bajour, and by the Mohmunds north, of Peshawur,
and also by the Afredis, who, subsidised by us, had for years guarded
the celebrated Kyber. Again, the tribes of the Samana range, and others
to the west of Kohat, rose in arms; and a very large force of British
troops had to be pushed forward in all haste to quell this great
combined attack on the part of our neighbours. General Sir Neville
Chamberlain, perhaps the greatest living authority on frontier
questions, has written quite recently, pointing out that never
previously had there been a semblance of unity of action amongst the
different tribesmen.[Footnote: _Saturday Review_, 30th Oct. 1897.]