Books: The Olynthiacs and the Phillippics of Demosthenes
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Demosthenes >> The Olynthiacs and the Phillippics of Demosthenes
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I have not spoken for the idle purpose of giving offense: I am not so
foolish or perverse, as to provoke your displeasure without intending
your good: but I think an upright citizen should prefer the advancement
of the commonweal to the gratification of his audience. And I hear, as
perhaps you do, that the speakers in our ancestors' time, whom all that
address you praise, but not exactly imitate, were politicians after this
form and fashion;--Aristides, Nicias, my namesake, [Footnote:
Demosthenes, the general so distinguished in the Peloponnesian war, who
defeated the Spartans at Pylus, and afterward lost his life in Sicily.]
Pericles. But since these orators have appeared, who ask, What is your
pleasure? what shall I move? how can I oblige you? the public welfare is
complimented away for a moment's popularity, and these are the results;
the orators thrive, you are disgraced. Mark, O Athenians, what a summary
contrast may be drawn between the doings in our olden time and in yours.
It is a tale brief and familiar to all; for the examples by which you
may still be happy are found not abroad, men of Athens, but at home. Our
forefathers, whom the speakers humored not nor caressed, as these men
caress you, for five-and-forty years took the leadership of the Greeks
by general consent, and brought above ten thousand talents into the
citadel; and the king of this country was submissive to them, as a
barbarian should be to Greeks; and many glorious trophies they erected
for victories won by their own fighting on land and sea, and they are
the sole people in the world who have bequeathed a renown superior to
envy. Such were their merits in the affairs of Greece: see what they
were at home, both as citizens and as men. Their public works are
edifices and ornaments of such beauty and grandeur in temples and
consecrated furniture, that posterity have no power to surpass them. In
private they were so modest and attached to the principle of our
constitution, that whoever knows the style of house which Aristides had,
or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, perceives it to be no
grander than those of the neighbors. Their politics were not for
money-making; each felt it his duty to exalt the commonwealth.
[Footnote: As Horace says:--
Privatus illis census erat brevis,
Commune magnum.]
By a conduct honorable toward the Greeks, pious to the gods, brotherlike
among themselves, they justly attained a high prosperity.
So fared matters with them under the statesmen I have mentioned. How
fare they with you under the worthies of our time? Is there any likeness
or resemblance? I pass over other topics, on which I could expatiate;
but observe: in this utter absence of competitors, (Lacedaemonians
depressed, Thebans employed, none of the rest capable of disputing the
supremacy with us,) when we might hold our own securely and arbitrate
the claims of others, we have been deprived of our rightful territory,
and spent above fifteen hundred talents to no purpose; the allies, whom
we gained in war, these persons have lost in peace, and we have trained
up against ourselves an enemy thus formidable. Or let any one come
forward and tell me, by whose contrivance but ours Philip has grown
strong. Well, sir, this looks bad, but things at home are better. What
proof can be adduced? The parapets that are whitewashed? The roads that
are repaired? fountains, and fooleries? [Footnote: Jacobs: _und
solches Geschwatz_. The proceedings of Eubulus are here more
particularly referred to.] Look at the men of whose statesmanship these
are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to opulence, or from
obscurity to honor; some have made their private houses more splendid
than the public buildings; and in proportion as the state has declined,
their fortunes have been exalted.
What has produced these results? How is it that all went prosperously
then, and nowgoes wrong? Because anciently the people, having the
courage to be soldiers, controlled the statesmen, and disposed of all
emoluments; any of the rest was happy to receive from the people his
share of honor, office, or advantage. Now, contrariwise, the statesmen
dispose of emoluments; through them every thing is done; you the people,
enervated, stripped of treasure and allies, are become as underlings and
hangers-on, happy if these persons dole you out show-money or send you
paltry beeves; [Footnote: Entertainments were frequently given to the
people after sacrifices, at which a very small part of the victim was
devoted to the gods, such as the legs and intestines, the rest being
kept for more profane purposes. Tho Athenians were remarkably
extravagant in sacrifices. Demades, ridiculing the donations of public
meat, compared the republic to an old woman, sitting at home in slippers
and supping her broth. Demosthenes, using the diminutive [Greek:
_boidia_], charges the magistrates with supplying lean and poor
oxen, whereas the victims ought to be healthy and large, [Greek:
teleia]. See Virgil, Aen. xi. 739.
Hic amor, hoc studium; dum sacra secundus aruspex
Nuntiet, ac lucos vocet hostia pinguis in altos.]
and, the unmanliest part of all, you are grateful for receiving your
own. They, cooping you in the city, lead you to your pleasures, and make
you tame and submissive to their hands. It is impossible, I say, to have
a high and noble spirit, while you are engaged in petty and mean
employments: whatever be the pursuits of men, their characters must be
similar. By Ceres, I should not wonder, if I, for mentioning these
things, suffered more from your resentment than the men who have brought
them to pass. For even liberty of speech you allow not on all subjects;
I marvel indeed you have allowed it here.
Would you but even now, renouncing these practices, perform military
service and act worthily of yourselves; would you employ these domestic
superfluities as a means to gain advantage abroad; perhaps, Athenians,
perhaps you might gain some solid and important advantage, and be rid of
these perquisites, which are like the diet ordered by physicians for the
sick. As that neither imparts strength, nor suffers the patient to die,
so your allowances are not enough to be of substantial benefit, nor yet
permit you to reject them and turn to something else. Thus do they
increase the general apathy. What? I shall be asked: mean you
stipendiary service? Yes, and forthwith the same arrangement for all,
Athenians, that each, taking his dividend from the public, may be what
the state requires. Is peace to be had? You are better at home, under no
compulsion to act dishonorably from indigence. Is there such an
emergency as the present? Better to be a soldier, as you ought, in your
country's cause, maintained by those very allowances. Is any one of you
beyond the military age? What he now irregularly takes without doing
service, let him take by just regulation, superintending and transacting
needful business. Thus, without derogating from or adding to our
political system, only removing some irregularity, I bring it into
order, establishing a uniform rule for receiving money, for serving in
war, for sitting on juries, for doing what each according to his age can
do, and what occasion requires. I never advise we should give to idlers
the wages of the diligent, or sit at leisure, passive and helpless, to
hear that such a one's mercenaries are victorious; as we now do. Not
that I blame any one who does you a service: I only call upon you,
Athenians, to perform on your own account those duties for which you
honor strangers, and not to surrender that post of dignity which, won
through many glorious dangers, your ancestors have bequeathed.
I have said nearly all that I think necessary. I trust you will adopt
that course which is best for the country and yourselves.
THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.
THE ARGUMENT.
Philip, after the defeat of Onomarchus, had marched toward
the pass of Thermopylae, which, however, he found occupied by
the Athenians, who had sent a force for the purpose of
preventing his advance. Being baffled there, he directed his
march into Thrace, and alarmed the Athenians for the safety
of their dominions in the Chersonese. At the same time he sent
a fleet to attack the islands of Lemnos and Imbrus, infested
the commerce of Athens with his cruisers, and even insulted
her coast. In Thrace he became involved in the disputes
between the rival kings Amadocus and Cersobleptes, espousing
the cause of the former; and for some time he was engaged in
the interior of that country, either at war with Cersobleptes,
or extending his own influence over other parts of Thrace,
where he established or expelled the rulers, as it suited him.
It was just at that time that Demosthenes spoke the following
oration, the first in which he called the attention of his
countrymen to the dangerous increase of Philip's power. He had
become convinced by the course of events, and by observing the
restless activity of Philip, that Athens had more to fear from
him than from Thebes, or from any new combination of the
Grecian republics. The orator himself, perhaps, hardly
appreciated the extent of Philip's resources, strengthened as
he was now by the friendship of Thessaly, possessed of a navy
and maritime towns, and relieved from the presence of any
powerful neighbors. What were the precise views of Demosthenes
as to the extent of the impending danger, we can not say. It
was not for him to frighten the Athenians too much, but to
awaken them from their lethargy. This he does in a speech,
which, without idle declamation or useless ornament, is
essentially practical. He alarms, but encourages, his
countrymen; points out both their weakness and their strength;
rouses them to a sense of danger, and shows the way to meet it;
recommends not any extraordinary efforts, for which at the
moment there was no urgent necessity, and to make which would
have exceeded their power, but unfolds a scheme, simple and
feasible, suiting the occasion, and calculated (if Athenians
had not been too degenerate) to lay the foundation of better things.
Had the question for debate been any thing new, Athenians, I should have
waited till most of the usual speakers [Footnote: By an ancient
ordinance of Solon, those who were above fifty years of age were first
called on to deliver their opinion. The law had ceased to be in force;
but, as a decent custom, the older men usually commenced the debate.
There would be frequent occasions for departing from such a custom, and
Demosthenes, who was now thirty-three, assigns his reason for speaking
first.] had been heard; if any of their counsels had been to my liking,
I had remained silent, else proceeded to impart my own. But as the
subjects of discussion is one upon which they have spoken oft before, I
imagine, though I rise the first, I am entitled to indulgence. For if
these men had advised properly in time past, there would be no necessity
for deliberating now.
First I say, you must not despond, Athenians, under your present
circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as
regards the past, is best for the future. What do I mean? That our
affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do nothing which is
needful; if, notwithstanding you performed your duties, it were the
same, there would be no hope of amendment.
Consider next, what you know by report, and men of experience remember;
how vast a power the Lacedaemonians had not long ago, yet how nobly and
becomingly you consulted the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war
[Footnote: He refers to the war in which Athens assisted the Thebans
against Lacedaemon, and in which Chabrias won the naval battle of Naxos.
That war commenced twenty-six years before the speaking of the first
Philippic, and would be well remembered by many of the hearers. See the
Historical Abstract in this volume.] against them for the rights of
Greece. Why do I mention this? To show and convince you, Athenians, that
nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared, nothing, if you are
negligent, goes as you desire. Take for examples the strength of the
Lacedaemonians then, which you overcame by attention to your duties, and
the insolence of this man now, by which through neglect of our interests
we are confounded. But if any among you, Athenians, deem Philip hard to
be conquered, looking at the magnitude of his existing power, and the
loss by us of all our strongholds, they reason rightly, but should
reflect, that once we held Pydna and Potidaea and Methone and all the
region round about as our own, and many of the nations now leagued with
him were independent and free, and preferred our friendship to his. Had
Philip then taken it into his head, that it was difficult to contend
with Athens, when she had so many fortresses to infest his country, and
he was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished would he
have undertaken, and never would he have acquired so large a dominion.
But he saw well, Athenians, that all these places are the open prizes of
war, that the possessions of the absent naturally belong to the present,
those of the remiss to them that will venture and toil. Acting on such
principle, he has won every thing and keeps it, either by way of
conquest, or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all men will side
with and respect those, whom they see prepared and willing to make
proper exertion. If you, Athenians, will adopt this principle now,
though you did not before, and every man, where he can and ought to give
his service to the, state, be ready to give it without excuse, the
wealthy to contribute, the able-bodied to enlist; in a word, plainly, if
you will become your own masters, and cease each expecting to do nothing
himself, while his neighbor does every thing for him, you shall then
with heaven's permission recover your own, and get back what has been
frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not imagine, that his empire is
everlastingly secured to him as a god. There are who hate and fear and
envy him, Athenians, even among those that seem most friendly; and all
feelings that are in other men belong, we may assume, to his
confederates. But now they are all cowed, having no refuge through your
tardiness and indolence, which I say you must abandon forthwith. For you
see, Athenians, the case, to what pitch of arrogance the man has
advanced, who leaves you not even the choice of action or inaction, but
threatens and uses (they say) outrageous language, and, unable to rest
in possession of his conquests, continually widens their circle, and,
while we dally and delay, throws his net all around us. When then,
Athenians, when will ye act as becomes you? In what event? In that of
necessity, I suppose. And how should we regard the events happening now?
Methinks, to freemen the strongest necessity is the disgrace of their
condition. Or tell me, do ye like walking about and asking one
another:--is there any news? Why, could there be greater news than a man
of Macedonia subduing Athenians, and directing the affairs of Greece? Is
Philip dead? No, but he is sick. And what matters it to you? Should any
thing befall this man, you will soon create another Philip, if you
attend to business thus. For even he has been exalted not so much by his
own strength, as by our negligence. And again; should any thing happen
to him; should fortune, which still takes better care of us than we of
ourselves, be good enough to accomplish this; observe that, being on the
spot, you would step in while things were in confusion, and manage them
as you pleased; but as you now are, though occasion offered Amphipolis,
you would not be in a position to accept it, with neither forces nor
counsels at hand. [Footnote: Important advice this, to men in all
relations of life. Good luck is for those who are in a position to avail
themselves of it.
Illi poma cadunt qui poma sub arbore quaerit.]
However, as to the importance of a general zeal in the discharge of
duty, believing you are convinced and satisfied, I say no more.
As to the kind of force which I think may extricate you from your
difficulties, the amount, the supplies of money, the best and speediest
method (in my judgment) of providing all the necessaries, I shall
endeavor to inform you forthwith, making only one request, men of
Athens. When, you have heard all, determine; prejudge not before. And
let none think I delay our operations, because I recommend an entirely
new force. Not those that cry, quickly! to-day! speak most to the
purpose; (for what has already happened we shall not be able to prevent
by our present armament;) but he that shows what and how great and
whence procured must be the force capable of enduring, till either we
have advisedly terminated the war, or overcome our enemies: for so shall
we escape annoyance in future. This I think I am able to show, without
offense to any other man who has a plan to offer. My promise indeed is
large; it shall be tested by the performance; and you shall be my
judges.
First, then, Athenians, I say we must provide fifty warships, [Footnote:
The Athenian ship of war at this time was the Trireme, or galley with
three ranks of oars. It had at the prow a beak ([Greek:
_embolon_]), with a sharp iron head, which, in a charge, (generally
made at the broadside,) was able to shatter the planks of the enemy's
vessel. An ordinary trireme carried two hundred men, including the crew
and marines. These last ([Greek: _epibatai_]) were usually ten for
each ship, but the number was often increased. The transports and
vessels of burden, whether merchant vessels or boats for the carriage of
military stores, were round-bottomed, more bulky in construction, and
moved rather with sails than oars. Hence the fighting ship is called
[Greek: _tacheia_], _swift_. It carried a sail, to be used
upon occasion, though it was mainly worked with oars.] and hold
ourselves prepared, in case of emergency, to embark and sail. I require
also an equipment of transports for half the cavalry [Footnote: The
total number was one thousand, each tribe furnishing one hundred.] and
sufficient boats. This we must have ready against his sudden, marches
from his own country to Thermopylae, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and any
where he likes. For he should entertain the belief, that possibly you
may rouse from this over-carelessness, and start off, as you did to
Euboea, [Footnote: The expedition about five years before, when the
Thebans had sent an army to Euboea, and Timotheus roused his countrymen
to expel them from the island. Of this, Demosthenes gives an animated
account at the close of tho oration on the Chersonese.] and formerly
(they say) to Haliartus, [Footnote: B. C. 395, when the war between
Thebes and Sparta had begun and Lysander besieged Haliartus. He was
slain in a sally by the Thebans and Athenians.] and very lately to
Thermopylae. And although you should not pursue just the course I would
advise, it is no slight matter, that Philip, knowing you to be in
readiness--know it he will for certain; there are too many among our own
people who report every thing to him--may either keep quiet from
apprehension, or, not heeding your arrangements, be taken off his guard,
there being nothing to prevent your sailing, if he give you a chance, to
attack his territories. Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be
agreed upon and provided. But besides, men of Athens, you should keep in
hand some force, that will incessantly make war and annoy him: none of
your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, not your forces on paper,
[Footnote: Literally "written in letters," that is, promised to the
generals or allies, but never sent. Jacobs: _eine Macht die auf dem
Blatte steht_. Compare Shakspeare, Henry IV, Second Part, Act i.
We fortify in paper and in figures.
Using the names of men instead of men.]
but one that shall belong to the state, and, whether you appoint one or
more generals, or this or that man or any other, shall obey and follow
him. Subsistence too I require for it. What the force shall be, how
large, from what source maintained, how rendered efficient, I will show
you, stating every particular. Mercenaries I recommend--and beware of
doing what has often been injurious--thinking all measures below the
occasion, adopting the strongest in your decrees, you fail to accomplish
the least--rather, I say, perform and procure a little, add to it
afterward, if it prove insufficient. I advise then two thousand soldiers
in all, five hundred to be Athenians, of whatever age you think right,
serving a limited time, not long, but such time as you think right, so
as to relieve one another; the rest should be mercenaries. And with them
two hundred horse, fifty at least Athenians, like the foot, on the same
terms of service; and transports for them. Well; what besides? Ten swift
galleys: for, as Philip has a navy, we must have swift galleys also, to
convoy our power. How shall subsistence for these troops be provided? I
will state and explain; but first let me tell you why I consider a force
of this amount sufficient, and why I wish the men to be citizens.
Of that amount, Athenians, because it is impossible for us now to raise
an army capable of meeting him in the field: we must plunder [Footnote:
Make predatory incursions, as Livy says, "popula bundi magis quam justo
more belli." Jacobs: _den Krieg als Freibeuter fahren_. Another
German: _Streifzuge zu machen_ (guerilla warfare). Leland: "harass
him with depredations." Wilson, an old English translator: "rob and
spoil upon him."] and adopt such kind of warfare at first: our force,
therefore, must not be over-large, (for there is not pay or
subsistence,) nor altogether mean. Citizens I wish to attend and go on
board, because I hear that formerly the state maintained mercenary
troops at Corinth, [Footnote: He alludes to the time when Corinth,
Athens, Thebes, and Argos, were allied against Sparta, and held a
congress at Corinth, B. C. 394. The allies were at first defeated, but
Iphicrates gained some successes, and acquired considerable reputation
by cutting off a small division (_mora_) of Spartan infantry.]
commanded by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and some others,
and that you served with them yourselves; and I am told, that these
mercenaries fighting by your side and you by theirs defeated the
Lacedaemonians. But ever since your hirelings have served by themselves,
they have been vanquishing your friends and allies, while your enemies
have become unduly great. Just glancing at the war of our state, they go
off to Artabazus [Footnote: Diodorus relates that Chares, in the Social
war, having no money to pay his troops, was forced to lend them to
Artabazus, then in rebellion against the king of Persia. Chares gained a
victory for the satrap, and received a supply of money. But this led to
a complaint and menace of war by the king, which brought serious
consequences. See the Historical Abstract.] or any where rather, and the
general follows, naturally; for it is impossible to command without
giving pay. What therefore ask I? To remove the excuses both of general
and soldiers, by supplying pay, and attaching native soldiers, as
inspectors of the general's conduct. The way we manage things now is a
mockery. For if you were asked: Are you at peace, Athenians? No, indeed,
you would say; we are at war with Philip. Did you not choose from
yourselves ten captains and generals, and also captains and two generals
[Footnote: There were chosen at Athens every year
Ten generals (one for each tribe), [Greek: _strataegoi_].
Ten captains (one for each tribe), [Greek: _taxiarchoi_].
Two generals of cavalry, [Greek: _ipparchoi_].
Ten cavalry officers (one for each tribe), [Greek: _phularchoi_].
In a regular army of citizens, when each tribe formed its own division,
both of horse and foot, all these generals and officers would he
present. Thus, there were ten generals at Marathon. A change took place
in later times, when the armies were more miscellaneous. Three Athenian
generals were frequently employed, and at a still later period only one.
Demosthenes here touches on a very important matter, which we can well
understand, viz. the necessity of officering the foreign mercenaries
from home.] of horse? How are they employed? Except one man, whom you
commission on service abroad, the rest conduct your processions with the
sacrificers. Like puppet-makers, you elect your infantry and cavalry
officers for the market-place, not for war. Consider, Athenians, should
there not be native captains, a native general of horse, your own
commanders, that the force might really be the state's? Or should your
general of horse sail to Lemnos, [Footnote: To assist at a religious
ceremony held annually at Lemnos, where many Athenians resided.] while
Menelaus commands the cavalry fighting for your possessions? I speak not
as objecting to the man, but he ought to be elected by you, whoever the
person be.
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