Books: An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
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David Hume >> An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
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Most people, I believe, will naturally, without premeditation,
assent to the definition of the elegant and judicious poet:
Virtue (for mere good-nature is a fool)
Is sense and spirit with humanity.
[Footnote: The Art of preserving Health. Book 4]
What pretensions has a man to our generous assistance or good
offices, who has dissipated his wealth in profuse expenses, idle
vanities, chimerical projects, dissolute pleasures or extravagant
gaming? These vices (for we scruple not to call them such) bring
misery unpitied, and contempt on every one addicted to them.
Achaeus, a wise and prudent prince, fell into a fatal snare,
which cost him his crown and life, after having used every
reasonable precaution to guard himself against it. On that
account, says the historian, he is a just object of regard and
compassion: his betrayers alone of hatred and contempt [Footnote:
Polybius, lib. iii. cap. 2].
The precipitate flight and improvident negligence of Pompey, at
the beginning of the civil wars, appeared such notorious blunders
to Cicero, as quite palled his friendship towards that great man.
In the same manner, says he, as want of cleanliness, decency, or
discretion in a mistress are found to alienate our affections.
For so he expresses himself, where he talks, not in the character
of a philosopher, but in that of a statesman and man of the
world, to his friend Atticus. [Lib. ix. epist. 10]. But the same
Cicero, in imitation of all the ancient moralists, when he
reasons as a philosopher, enlarges very much his ideas of virtue,
and comprehends every laudable quality or endowment of the mind,
under that honourable appellation. This leads to the THIRD
reflection, which we proposed to make, to wit, that the ancient
moralists, the best models, made no material distinction among
the different species of mental endowments and defects, but
treated all alike under the appellation of virtues and vices, and
made them indiscriminately the object of their moral reasonings.
The prudence explained in Cicero's Offices [Footnote: Lib. i.
cap. 6.] is that sagacity, which leads to the discovery of truth,
and preserves us from error and mistake. MAGNANIMITY, TEMPERANCE,
DECENCY, are there also at large discoursed of. And as that
eloquent moralist followed the common received division of the
four cardinal virtues, our social duties form but one head, in
the general distribution of his subject.
[Footnote: The following passage of Cicero is worth quoting, as
being the most clear and express to our purpose, that any thing
can be imagined, and, in a dispute, which is chiefly verbal,
must, on account of the author, carry an authority, from which
there can be no appeal.
'Virtus autem, quae est per se ipsa laudabilis, et sine qua
nihil laudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est
alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes, quae
videntur in moribus hominum, et quadam comitate ac beneficentia
positae: aliae quae in ingenii aliqua facultate, aut animi
magnitudine ac robore. Nam clementia, justitia, benignitas,
fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus, jucunda est auditu in
laudationibus. Omnes enim hae virtutes non tam ipsis, qui eas in
se habent, quam generi hominum fructuosae putantur. Sapientia et
magnitude animi, qua omnes res humanae tenues et pro nihilo
putantur, et in cogitando vis quaedam ingenii, et ipsa eloquentia
admirationis habet non minus, jucunditatis minus. Ipsos enim
magis videntur, quos laudamus, quam illos, apud quos laudamus
ornare ac tueri: sed tamen in laudenda jungenda sunt eliam haec
genera virtutum. Ferunt enim aures bominum, cum ilia quae jucunda
et grata, tum etiam ilia, quae mirabilia sunt in virtute,
laudari.' De orat. lib. ii. cap. 84.
I suppose, if Cicero were now alive, it would be found difficult
to fetter his moral sentiments by narrow systems; or persuade
him, that no qualities were to be admitted as virtues, or
acknowledged to be a part of PERSONAL MERIT, but what were
recommended by The Whole Duty of Man.]
We need only peruse the titles of chapters in Aristotle's Ethics
to be convinced that he ranks courage, temperance, magnificence,
magnanimity, modesty, prudence, and a manly openness, among the
virtues, as well as justice and friendship.
To SUSTAIN and to ABSTAIN, that is, to be patient and continent,
appeared to some of the ancients a summary comprehension of all
morals.
Epictetus has scarcely ever mentioned the sentiment of humanity
and compassion, but in order to put his disciples on their guard
against it. The virtue of the Stoics seems to consist chiefly in
a firm temper and a sound understanding. With them, as with
Solomon and the eastern moralists, folly and wisdom are
equivalent to vice and virtue.
Men will praise thee, says David, [Footnote: Psalm 49th.] when
thou dost well unto thyself. I hate a wise man, says the Greek
poet, who is not wise to himself [Footnote: Here, Hume quotes
Euripedes in Greek]. Plutarch is no more cramped by systems in
his philosophy than in his history. Where he compares the great
men of Greece and Rome, he fairly sets in opposition all their
blemishes and accomplishments of whatever kind, and omits nothing
considerable, which can either depress or exalt their characters.
His moral discourses contain the same free and natural censure of
men and manners.
The character of Hannibal, as drawn by Livy, [Footnote: Lib. xxi.
cap. 4] is esteemed partial, but allows him many eminent virtues.
Never was there a genius, says the historian, more equally fitted
for those opposite offices of commanding and obeying; and it
were, therefore, difficult to determine whether he rendered
himself DEARER to the general or to the army. To none would
Hasdrubal entrust more willingly the conduct of any dangerous
enterprize; under none did the soldiers discover more courage and
confidence. Great boldness in facing danger; great prudence in
the midst of it. No labour could fatigue his body or subdue his
mind. Cold and heat were indifferent to him: meat and drink he
sought as supplies to the necessities of nature, not as
gratifications of his voluptuous appetites. Waking or rest he
used indiscriminately, by night or by day.--These great Virtues
were balanced by great Vices; inhuman cruelty; perfidy more than
punic; no truth, no faith, no regard to oaths, promises, or
religion.
The character of Alexander the Sixth, to be found in Guicciardin,
[Footnote: Lib. i.] is pretty similar, but juster; and is a proof
that even the moderns, where they speak naturally, hold the same
language with the ancients. In this pope, says he, there was a
singular capacity and judgement: admirable prudence; a wonderful
talent of persuasion; and in all momentous enterprizes a
diligence and dexterity incredible. But these VIRTUES were
infinitely overbalanced by his VICES; no faith, no religion,
insatiable avarice, exorbitant ambition, and a more than
barbarous cruelty.
Polybius, [Footnote: Lib. xii.] reprehending Timaeus for his
partiality against Agathocles, whom he himself allows to be the
most cruel and impious of all tyrants, says: if he took refuge in
Syracuse, as asserted by that historian, flying the dirt and
smoke and toil of his former profession of a potter; and if
proceeding from such slender beginnings, he became master, in a
little time, of all Sicily; brought the Carthaginian state into
the utmost danger; and at last died in old age, and in possession
of sovereign dignity: must he not be allowed something prodigious
and extraordinary, and to have possessed great talents and
capacity for business and action? His historian, therefore, ought
not to have alone related what tended to his reproach and infamy;
but also what might redound to his Praise and Honour.
In general, we may observe, that the distinction of voluntary or
involuntary was little regarded by the ancients in their moral
reasonings; where they frequently treated the question as very
doubtful, WHETHER VIRTUE COULD BE TAUGHT OR NOT [Vid. Plato in
Menone, Seneca de otio sap. cap. 31. So also Horace, Virtutem
doctrina paret, naturane donet, Epist. lib. I. ep. 18. Aeschines
Socraticus, Dial. I.]? They justly considered that cowardice,
meanness, levity, anxiety, impatience, folly, and many other
qualities of the mind, might appear ridiculous and deformed,
contemptible and odious, though independent of the will. Nor
could it be supposed, at all times, in every man's power to
attain every kind of mental more than of exterior beauty.
And here there occurs the FOURTH reflection which I purposed to
make, in suggesting the reason why modern philosophers have often
followed a course in their moral enquiries so different from that
of the ancients. In later times, philosophy of all kinds,
especially ethics, have been more closely united with theology
than ever they were observed to be among the heathens; and as
this latter science admits of no terms of composition, but bends
every branch of knowledge to its own purpose, without much regard
to the phenomena of nature, or to the unbiassed sentiments of the
mind, hence reasoning, and even language, have been warped from
their natural course, and distinctions have been endeavoured to
be established where the difference of the objects was, in a
manner, imperceptible. Philosophers, or rather divines under that
disguise, treating all morals as on a like footing with civil
laws, guarded by the sanctions of reward and punishment, were
necessarily led to render this circumstance, of VOLUNTARY or
INVOLUNTARY, the foundation of their whole theory. Every one may
employ TERMS in what sense he pleases: but this, in the mean
time, must be allowed, that SENTIMENTS are every day experienced
of blame and praise, which have objects beyond the dominion of
the will or choice, and of which it behoves us, if not as
moralists, as speculative philosophers at least, to give some
satisfactory theory and explication.
A blemish, a fault, a vice, a crime; these expressions seem to
denote different degrees of censure and disapprobation; which
are, however, all of them, at the bottom, pretty nearly all the
same kind of species. The explication of one will easily lead us
into a just conception of the others; and it is of greater
consequence to attend to things than to verbal appellations. That
we owe a duty to ourselves is confessed even in the most vulgar
system of morals; and it must be of consequence to examine that
duty, in order to see whether it bears any affinity to that which
we owe to society. It is probable that the approbation attending
the observance of both is of a similar nature, and arises from
similar principles, whatever appellation we may give to either of
these excellencies.
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